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CHAPTER :I
:IHTRODUCT:IOB
The Korean peninsula has been geopolitically critical to
the neighboring three great powers in the Far East - China,
Russia, and Japan. The peninsula has been regarded by them as
either a
Therefore,

defensive barrier or a

dangerous

exposed flank.

each of these three great powers have over the

centuries made strenuous efforts to keep the Korean peninsula
under their control. 1
Unlike these three great Asian powers, the United States,
located about 6, 000 miles away from the peninsula,

showed

little interest in Korea except for missionary activity after
opening official

diplomatic

relations

in

1882. 2

In

1901

Admiral Frederick Rogers urged the United States Government
to negotiate for a naval base in Korea in order to check the
Russian and German fleets in that area. However, the proposal

1 . Richard G. Stilwell, "The Need For U. S. Ground Forces
in Korea," The American Enterprise Institute Defense Review
(May 1977), 15.
2 . James William Morley, "The Dynamics of the Korean
Connection, " in The U. S. South Korean Al 1 iance Evolving
Patterns in Security Relations,
ed.
Gerald L.
Curtis
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), 10-1.
1

2

was rejected by the General Board of the United States Navy
because Korea was located far from the American Naval base in
the Philippines and was too close to Russian and German naval
bases. 3 The following year, the United States government again
considered building an American naval
Korea,

base at Masanpo in

canceled because of the General

but the plan was

Board's opinion that "a Korean base would be superfluous if
Japan

were

an

ally.

With

Japan

an

enemy,

it

would

be

untenable. 114
In 1905 the United States consented to Japan's control
over Korea in accordance with the Taft-Katsura Agreement. The
Japanese

victory

over

Russia

had

aroused

considerable

uneasiness over the security of the Philippines. 5

The United

3 . William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in
the Pacific. 1897 - 1909 (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1958), 131. Immediately after the Spanish American War, the
U.S. Navy urgently needed a body to study newly gained
overseas possessions. So, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long
established the General Board of the Navy in March 1900 under
the presidency of Admiral George Dewey. The body had no
executive function but played a purely advisory role. The
Board generally made recommendation to the Secretary of the
Navy on policies, war plans, naval bases, etc ..
4

. Ibid., 134.

5 . Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American
People
(New
York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Meredith
Corporation, 1969), 519. Howard K. Beale said in his book
Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power that
in his eff arts to end the Russo-Japanese war, Roosevelt
sacrificed Korean independence. Meanwhile, Tyler Dennett
argued in his book Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War that
the United States did not sacrifice Korea for the sake of the
Philippines. Instead, Korea herself had consented to the
establishment of a virtual Japanese protectorate during the
Russo-Japanese war.

3

states

also

believed

a

strong Japan

could

check Russian

expansion in the Far East and would help to maintain the
balance of power in that area. The agreement over Korea was
a

small price to pay for good relations with Asia's most

powerful nation.
After 1905 Korea became a forgotten nation for the United
states. America's ignorance of Korea continued through-out
world War II. The United States•s relations with the Korean
people were reopened in September 1945, a month after World
War II ended, when American forces landed in Korea in order
to accept the surrender of Japanese forces south of the 38th
parallel. The United states agreed to let the Soviet Union
perform the same function in the rest of the peninsula. 6
In addition to disarming Japanese military personnel, the
occupation forces under General John R.

Hodge had another

mission, to keep order in the nation until the Koreans could
organize their own government. 7
In 1948, President Harry S. Truman decided to withdraw
American
occupation

troops
forces

from

South

Korea,

partly

because

the

completed their mission when the South

Koreans formed their own government through free elections in
1948

and

partly

because

his

National

Security

Council

6 • Suk Bok Lee, The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987),
4.
7 • Ibid., 7.

4

recommended the evacuation of American troops.

The Joint

chiefs

of

of

staff

had

decided

that

"Korea

was

little

strategic value to the United States and any commitment to
u.s. use of military forces in Korea would be ill-advised and
impracticable in view of the potentialities of the overall
world situation."8
In the middle of September 1948, a month after the birth
of the south Korean Government, American units began to pull
out. The withdrawal of about 45,000 soldiers from South Korea
was completed by the end of June 1949, leaving only a token
United States military presence. 9
The heavy military imbalance between South and North
Korea and Secretary of State Dean Acheson's declaration of 5
January 1950 that South Korea would not be included in the
United States new defense line encouraged Kim Il Sung and
Soviet

premier

Joseph

V.

Stalin

to

communize

the

whole

peninsula. The North, supported by Russia, invaded the South
on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950. 10
Even though the United States still believed that Korea
was militarily valueless, the Truman Administration, based on

8 . Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1973), 62; Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest
R. May, Thinking in Time (New York: The Free Press, 1986),
35.
9 . Lee,

Impact, 20-24.

1 ~ Hong Nam Joo, America's commitment to South Korea
(London: Cambridge University press, 1986), 31; Lee, Impact,
37.

5

its cold war strategy, quickly decided to defend South Korea. 11
The united states forces participated in the Korean war as
leader of the United Nations forces. During the Korean War,
American forces in Korea reached a peak of eight infantry
divisions

and

supporting

air

and

naval

forces,

total

of

302,000 men, of whom 33,629 lost their lives and 103,000 were
wounded. 12
After the armistice of 1953, the United States pulled
back six divisions, leaving the Second and Seventh Divisions
in south Korea to keep the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. 13 By
1971, the total United States force in Korea had dwindled to
61,000 men. 14 Later a major reduction occurred when President
Nixon removed the Seventh Division, about 20,000 troops, in
accordance with so called "Nixon Doctrine.n 15
At

that

time

Secretary

of

Defense

Melvin

R.

Laird

recommended that the president withdraw an additional twothirds of the Second Division by 1974, but President Nixon
forestalled Secretary Laird's plan because he feared that the

1 ~ Neustadt and May, Thinking, 35.
12• Marc Leepson, "Relations with South Korea," Editorial
Research Reports 2 (12 August 1977): 607;Lee, Impact, 55; New
York Times, 30 May 1977. (Hereafter cited as NYT).
1 ~ Lee, Impact, 57-60. The Mutual Defense Treaty signed
in August 1953, and entered into force in November 1954. The
treaty provided the basis for the further presence of United
States forces in Korea after the Korean War.
l~ NYT, 17 May 1978.
l~ Ibid., 10 March 1977.

6

south Korean Government would pull back its 50,000 troops who
were fighting in the Vietnam War as an ally of the United
states.

16

According to information provided to the House Armed
services Committee by General Bernard W.

Rogers,

Chief of

staff of the united States Army, the Laird plan remained in
effect until August 1972, only to be cancelled later after a
general review of the security of Northeast Asia, especially
of Japan and South Korea. As Rogers put it:
Based on a reassessment of the situation in
Northeast Asia and the contribution these ground
forces made to the total deterrent strategy •.. It
was felt that the division took on a much greater
significance than its combat role. In the political
military dimension it manifested to friend and foe
the strength of the U.S. commitment to the stability
in Northeast Asia and the defense of Korea and
Japan. Withdrawals from Korea, particularly when
coupled with the Vietnam drawdowns, would have
called into question U.S. intentions, reliability,
the credibility of U.S. commitments, and the future
rol 7 _of 1 lhe U. S. as a power in the Western
Pacific.
Meanwhile,

having

been

shocked

by

President

Nixon's

decision to withdraw the Seventh Division from South Korea,
the South Korean Government began to prepare a self-defense
strategy which included the rapid development of the defense
industries.

At the same time,

it strengthened efforts to

l~ Ibid.
1 ~ House Committee on Armed Services, Investigations
Subcommittee, Hearings on Review of the Policy Decision to
Withdraw United Ground Forces from Korea, 95th Cong., 1st and
2d sess., 1977-8, HASC no. 95-71 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1978), 89. (Hereafter cited as Cong. HASC 95-71.)

7

influence American policy makers to keep the Second Division
in south Korea until a military balance could be achieved with
North Korea. This led to an illegal lobbying scandal which
involved the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), the
businessman Park Tong Sun, and Congressional clerk Suzi Park
Thompson.
By 1976, when James Earl Carter was campaigning for the
presidency, no other country was receiving as much criticism
from the American news-media as South Korea. Newspapers were
filled with accounts of the illegal lobbying scandal in the
united States as well as of human rights violations in Korea.
Press stories, editorials,
documentaries,

and

even

letters to editors,
church

columns, TV
competed

letters

in

criticizing the immorality of the Seoul Government in its
efforts to buy Congressional influence and restrict civil
liberties.

American opinion,

at the time of the Watergate

affair, was very critical; the scandal was called "Koreagate."
As

criticism of Koreagate mounted, more politicians joined

the anti-Korea
military

aid

campaign.
was

The

advocated.

restriction of
Therefore,

economic

Korea

became

and
an

"Achilles' Heel" to the administration of President Gerald R.
Ford, at a time when it was fighting for its own political
future. 18
Having believed that most Americans would

favor

the

18. Donald L. Ranard, "The U. s. in Korea: What Price
Security?", Worldview 20 (January/February 1977): 23-37.

8

Korean withdrawal policy because of their negative images of
Korea and their Vietnam experiences, candidate Carter broached
the withdrawals as one of his major campaign issues from the
beginning of his Presidential campaign. During the primary
election, however, few Americans seemed interested in Carter's
,
19
troop pullou t issue.
The brutal murder of two United States army officers by
North Korean guards at the Korean Demilitarized Zone {DMZ) in
August 197620 reminded the American public of the Vietnam
trauma,

and as the election day approached,

more people

listened to Carter's advocacy of a Korean pull-out. Carter's
military non-involvement policy became more vivid when he
stated in an interview with a reporter from the New York Times
on 16 October 1976 that he would not deploy American troops
even if an Eastern European country were to fight against
Russian domination. Candidate Carter also made it clear that
he would not try to protect Taiwan against a Chinese military
or naval attack. 21
Carter's new Korean policy became one of the major
campaign issues when President Ford criticized Carter's Korean
withdrawal program as "an invitation to disaster." Ford added,

1 ~ Kenneth Adelman, "A Reckless Policy In Korea," Chicago
Tribune, 29 May 1977, sec. 2. {Hereafter Chicago Tribune will
be cited as CT.)
20. CT, 20 August 1976, sec. 1.
2 ~ NYT, 17 October 1976.

9

"Mr. carter's approach has a strong flavor of isolationism.
If it is applied to practice in the same way that it is
described in campaign oratory, there is a significant risk it
could lead to a major international crisis. 1122 until the last
day of the presidential campaign, the two candidates continued
to debate the merits of the Korean withdrawal.
As soon as President Carter took the oval Office in
January 1977, he began to form a new framework for American
foreign policy based on moral value and social justice rather
than the old balance of power system. In building a new world
order,

he

also

advocated

that

the

United

States

should

cooperate with world powers rather than act with excessive
"fear of communism. 1123 President Carter made one of the most
radical changes in United States global strategy since the
Korean War by attempting to remove all United States ground
troops

from South Korea.

At the

same time,

he

advocated

increasing United States military strength in Europe. 24
In accordance with his new global strategy,

President

Carter's new Koreanization plan proceeded without getting
significant public attention or Congressional objection until

2 ~ Ibid., 27 October 1976.
23. u. s. News & World Report 82 (6 June 1977): 17.
(Hereafter cited as USNWR); Time 109 (6 June 1977): 10; Brian
Klunk, Consensus and American Mission (New York: University
Press of America, 1986), 120-1. Carter's address on 22 May
1977 at the University of Notre Dame articulated his new
foreign policy.
2 ~ USNWR 82 (20 June 1977): 22.

10

General John K. Singlaub, Chief of Staff of the United States
Forces in South Korea, publicly criticized it by alleging that
the proposed withdrawal plan would lead to war. 25
Immediately after he criticized the President, General
singlaub was removed from his Korean post by the President.
This incident touched off the noisiest clash over civilian
control of the military since during the Korean War when
President Harry s. Truman summoned General Douglas MacArthur
to Washington and forced his retirement. The Singlaub affair
received

heavy

American

news

media

coverage,

and

it was

followed by Congressional debates and heated academic and
public discussion on the issue.
about

the

interests

nature
in

Korea

and

These controversial debates

extent

continued

of

United

among

States

Americans

strategic

as

well

as

concerned foreigners until the President finally suspended his
Korean pullout plan in July 1979.
This is a study of President Carter's Korean withdrawal
policy from its conception to its adoption by the Carter
Administration, the reactions to that policy, and its eventual
rejection. The goal is to better understand the formation and
meaning of President Carter's withdrawal policy, to analyze
domestic

reaction,

and

to

understand

how

this

policy

influenced United states relations with its key allies in the
Far East, South Korea and Japan.

2 ~ Washington Post, 19 May 1977. (Hereafter cited as WP)

CHAPTER I I

ORIGINS OP TBB WITHDRAWAL PLAN

Jimmy Carter first pledged to withdraw United States
ground forces from South Korea in 1975, during the earliest
days of his campaign for President. However, the roots for
carter's idea can be found in his Annapolis Naval Academy
school days and his career as a naval officer. As a naval
academy

student,

traditional

Carter

naval

was

tremendously

thinking that

influenced

the United States

by

should

support foreign countries with air and sea power, and only if
necessary with mobile landing forces,

rather than stationing

ground forces abroad. 1
In 1974 and early 1975, while Carter was still governor
of Georgia, he consulted with several defense experts such as
retired Admiral Gene R. LaRocque, director of the privately
founded

Center

for

Defense

Information.

Admiral

LaRocque

recalled what he told Carter in his telephone conversation:
North Korean President Kim Il Sung or South Korean
President Park Chung Hee or their successors could
1

. Don Oberdorfer, "Carter's Decision on Korea Traced to
Early 1975," WP, 12 June 1977.
11

12
get us involved in a land war in Asia and it would
tear this country apart. We have to think of the
Middle East and Europe. On a scale of importance to
us, I'd put Kor~ about 1 and the Middle East and
Europe about 10.
During

this

time,

Carter

realized

the

dangerous

"tripwire" role of the Second Division in South Korea.
attack

from

the

North

would

require

automatic

An

American

involvement in another Asian land war.
When Carter announced his candidacy for the Democratic
presidential nomination in Atlanta, Georgia on 12 December
the American public knew little about him. 3

1974,

At the

beginning of December 1974, in the two Gallup polls on name
awareness of possible Democrat candidates, Carter was even not
listed as a possible candidate for the Democratic presidential
nomination:
Democratic Name Awareness
George Wallace .••••..••••..
Hubert Humphrey ••.......•.•
George McGovern ••.•.......•
Edmund Muskie . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Henry Jackson ••••••••••••••
Morris Udall •••••••••.•••••
Lloyd Bentsen ....••.......•

94%
91%
86%
83%
58%
38%
13%

2 . Ibid. According to LaRocque, Carter carefully listened
to what LaRocque told him but did not express his opinion on
the issue.
3

•
Margaret
c. Thompson, ed., President Carter
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1977), 82.
When Carter announced his candidacy, only Congressman Morris
K. Udall had officially declared his candidacy. They were
followed by Senator Henry M. Jackson (6 February) and Lloyd
M. Bentsen (17 February). Governor George c. Wallace announced
his candidacy on 12 November 1975.

13
choice Of Democrats
First Choice
George Wallace •.••••• 19%
Hubert Humphrey •••••• 11%
Henry Jackson •••••••• 10%
George McGovern •••••• 6%
Lloyd Bentsen •..•••.• 2%
Morris Udall ••••••••• 0%

First,Second,
Third combined
32%
29%
25%
21%
3%
4
1%

Even three months after Carter's official announcement
of his candidacy, a Gallup poll showed that he received only
one percent of national support. 5 Therefore, at the beginning
of the campaign, Carter urgently needed to obtain national
recognition by establishing himself as a serious candidate.
For that purpose,

Carter first had to prove himself as a

southern favorite son among a group of southern candidates who
included Governor of Alabama George C. Wallace, a conservative
who was an independent presidential candidate in 1968, Senator
Lloyd

Bentsen,

a

conservative

Democrat

of

Texas,

and

Congressman Morris K. Udall, a liberal Democrat of Arizona. 6
Carter had to overcome Wallace's strength among conservative
blue-collar voters. At the same time, he had to compete with
a favorite southern liberal, Congressman Udall to get liberal
support in the South. Because Udall had a record of supporting

4

• George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll. Public Opinion
1972-1977, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc.,
1978), 384-5.
5 . Ibid., 443.
6. Charles Moritz, ed., Current Biography Year Book (New
York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1969), 430-2; Ibid. (1973),
43-5.

14
American involvement in the Vietnam war during the Johnson
Administration, 7

Carter

considered

the

Korean

withdrawal

policy as a main campaign issue to differentiate his position
from congressman Udall, and other possible liberal Democratic
candidates, such as Senator Hubert Humphrey and Senator Edmund
Muskie. 8 The Korean issue would also differentiate him from
more conservative Democratic candidates such as Senator Henry
Jackson,

Senator

Lloyd

Bentsen,

and

Governor

George

C.

Wallace. In addition, Carter hoped that he could overcome his
opponents' charges that Carter had no experience in foreign
policy by advocating this revolutionary foreign policy. While
carter referred himself as "a good southern alternative to
wallace, 119

he carefully began to advocate the Korean pullout

policy.
On 16 January 1975, a month after declaring his candidacy
for President, Carter stated at a meeting with editors of the
Washington Post that he favored the pullout of United States
ground troops

from South Korea as

a

means of saving tax

payer's money. He would begin the process by removing about
5,000 troops from South Korea as soon as he took the Oval

7

. Ibid. (1969), 431-2. 22 October 1977 Udall admitted
that he made a mistake in supporting President Johnson's
Vietnam policy in his speech in Tucson, Arizona.
8

• Ibid.

(1968), 277; Ibid.

9 • Thompson, Carter, 82.

(1978), 470.

15
.

office.

10

TWO weeks later, Carter had an important meeting with
seven officials of the Brookings Institution in Washington
D.C .. At the four hour meeting, they discussed the advantages
and disadvantages of the Korean withdrawal plan. Senior fellow
Barry M.

Blechman emphasized the tripwire role of American

troops in Korea and advised Carter to remove them as well as
nuclear weapons within four or five years. 11 Dr.

Blechman

recalled what he told Carter as follows:
I told Carter we should take out the nukes(nuclear
weapons) right off and phase out the ground troops
over four or five years. I said the most important
reason was to avoid getting the U.S. involved with
ground forces almost automatically in a new war
which
of course, why the South Koreans want them
there.

i~'

In

May

1975,

on

Trilateral Commission,

his
a

way

to

Tokyo

month after the

meeting
fall

of

the

of Saigon,

1 ~ Oberdorfer, "Carter's Decision," WP, 12 June 1977;
House Committee on Armed Services, Review of the Policy
Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea,
Report prepared by Samuel S. Stratton, Chairman of the
Investigations Subcommittee, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 26 April
1978, HASC no. 95-61 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), 7.
(Hereafter cited as Cong. HASC 95-61); Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Troop Withdrawal from the
Republic of Korea, Report prepared by Hubert H. Humphrey and
John Glenn, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 9 January 1978 (Washington,
D.C.: GPO), 19. (Hereafter cited as Humphrey Report).
1 ~ Oberdorfer, "Carter's Decision," WP, 12 June 1977.
Stuart Eizenstat, who accompanied Carter, said that the
Brookings meeting was "a significant development" in Carter's
thinking.
12• Ibid. According to Dr. Blechman, Carter carefully
listened but did not express his opinion on the issue.

16

carter told his aide Peter Bourne that he wanted not only to
withdraw the ground troops from South Korea but also to remove
American air force units while significantly bolstering South
Korean air defenses. Carter said, "What I think we should do
is strengthen the air force of South Korea and withdraw

u. s.

troops on a rapid schedule, with adequate air cover, so they
can defend themselves. 1113
However, Trilateral Commission members warned him that
a strong air force might tempt the Seoul Government to make
a preemptive strike against Pyong Yang. Carter, therefore,
changed his mind and advocated the maintenance of reinforced
American air forces in South Korea rather than undertaking the
drastic strengthening of the South Korean air force. In a news
conference in Tokyo on 28 May 1975, Carter confirmed this
Korean proposals and announced a five year troop pullout plan.
In addition, Carter told Japanese correspondents that he would
seek guarantees from the two Communist super powers that they
would prevent North Korea from attacking the South. 14
1 ~ Ibid. The Trilateral Commission was a private policy
research group which provided Carter with many of his advisors
later. According to Oberdorfer, Carter's campaign staff asked
Harvard Law School professor Jerome Cohen, an Asian expert,
to write Carter's campaign statement to be delivered at the
Tokyo meeting. Dr. Cohen met Carter in Cambridge, Mass., on
May 13 and suggested him a moderate pullout. At this meeting,
Carter told Dr. Cohen that he wanted to remove American troops
from South Korea immediately.
1 ~ Ibid. Oberdorfer argued that some time later Carter
dropped the idea of seeking an advance guarantee from China
and Russia. Actually, Carter never gave up this idea until he
suspended the Korea pullout plan in 1979.
Jimmy Carter,
Keeping Faith. Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Book,

17
carter continued to advocate the withdrawal of u. s.
ground troops from South Korea through out his campaign for
president. on 6 May 1976, Carter declared in an interview

on

the

to

PUblic

Broadcasting System that

"I

would prefer

withdraw all of our troops and land forces from South Korea
over a period of years - three or four years whatever. 1115
on 23 June Carter delivered an address at the Foreign
Policy Association. He stated that;
I believe it will be possible to withdraw our ground
forces from South Korea on a phased basis over a
time span to be determined after consultation with
both South Korea and Japan. At the same time, it
should be made clear to the South Korean government
that its internal oppression is repugnant to our
people1ind undermines the support for our commitment
there.
Even after the brutal murder of two American officers by North
Korean guards armed with the axes and pikes at the DMZ around
Panmunjom in August 1976, 17 Carter did not give up his hope
that U.S. ground troops could be brought home within three or
four years. At this point, however, he began to hedge his plan
by emphasizing that he would consult with both the South
Korean and Japanese governments in advance. He also proposed

1982), 186-211.
15. Cong. HASC 95-61, 7.
1 ~ Frank Gibney, "The Ripple Effect in Korea," Foreign
Affairs 56 (October 1977): 160; John K. c. Oh, "South Korea
1976: The Continuing Uncertainties," Asian Survey 17 (January
1977): 78.
17• CT, 20 August 1976, sec. 1.

18

a prior agreement with the Soviet Union in order to secure
,
l
peace on the Korean peninsu
a. 18

While campaigning in Kansas City in October 1976, Carter,
by then the Democratic presidential nominee, reaffirmed that

he would remove nuclear weapons as well as the troops from
south Korea if he became President.

But by this time his

position was becoming more conservative.

He called for a

phased pullout spread out over a five year period. 19
After he was elected, President-elect Carter became even
more cautious about the Korean withdrawal policy, stressing
prior consultation with South Korea and Japan. He said,
I want to establish a
within Japan that we
will disturb them or
sti~l.go~Bg to play a
Pacific.

feeling within South Korea and
won't do anything abrupt that
upset their belief that we are
legitimate role in the Western

Carter introduced the Korean withdrawal policy in order
to distinguish himself from other presidential candidates.
However, it did not attract American public attention during
the primary campaign period. When the withdrawal became a main
election issue immediately after the Panmunjom incident, the
American public, reflecting the Koreagate scandal as well as
the Vietnam tragedy, favored Carter's withdrawal pol icy rather

1 ~ NYT, 6 September 1976. The New York Times commented
that it was a not a very fruitful proposition because China,
not Russia, was North Korea's real sponsor.
19• Ibid., 17 October 1976.
20

. Ibid., 28 December 1976.
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than President Ford's Korean policy of maintaining the status

quo.
It was a

rather close election and there was no big

difference between the

two

candidates positions

on major

campaign subjects like energy, taxes, budgets, education, and
nuclear proliferation. 21 Carter• s

popularity rested on his

promise of a fresh, outsiders, perspective on post-Watergate
government. The Korean policy was an example of this and it
contributed to carter's successful campaign.
After Carter won the election,

however,

he began to

soften his tone by emphasizing prior consultation with the
concerned nations because by then he was no more a candidate
and his outspoken claim for the pullout could harm the United
states' relations with its key allies in Asia, South Korea and
Japan, even before he took the Oval Office.

2 ~ Kandy Stround, How Jimmy Won. The Victory Campaign
from Plains to the White House (New York: William Morrow and
Co., 1977), 424.

CHAPTER I I I

THE MILITARY BALANCE BBTWEEH HORTH AHO SOUTH KOREA

Assessments of the relative military balance between
North and South Korea in 1977 differed, but generally agreed
that

south

Korea

possessed

advantages

in

population

and

economy, while the North enjoyed a nearly two to one advantage
in fire power.
According to various sources,

the North Koreans,

who

preferred offensive deployment, had superior military strength
in ground, naval, and air forces. The North had more ground
divisions with larger numbers of tanks,

artillery pieces,

mortars, and rocket launchers than had the South. They also
had twice the combat aircraft and a better air defense system.
Moreover, many North Korean pilots had combat experience in
the Vietnam War or in the Middle East where they aided North
Vietnam and Egypt. The North also had a four to one advantage
in naval combat ships and possessed 12 submarines while the
South had none.

Moreover,

at the

sacrifice of the

civil

economy, the North had greater military production. In 1977
North

Korea

produced most

of
20

its

own

military

equipment

21
suppOr

ted by Soviet

and

Chinese technical

assistance.

It

included artillery, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft weapons,
armored personnel carriers, and submarines and tanks except
for more sophisticated weapons such as aircraft and missiles.
The south only could produce

half of its military equipment.

In addition, the North had a big advantage in proximity to its
major allies, China and Russia. 1
In the meantime, the South Koreans, who favored defensive
deployment, had advantages in natural barriers of terrain and
well-prepared defensive positions. They also had more ground
force manpower, particularly with Vietnam combat experience,
and a better educated military leadership. The South had a
better transportation system and more modern combat aircraft,
including 45 F-4 aircraft,

while half of the North's

jet

fighters were obsolete Mig-15s and Mig-17s, which were used
in the Korean War period. Moreover,

the presence of three

squadrons of American aircraft accentuated the South's air
power advantage. In addition, the presence of United States
ground troops equipped with tactical nuclear weapons kept the

1

. Cong. Rec., Force Planning and Budgetary Implication
of U.
s. Withdrawal from Korea.
Background Paper of
Congressional Budget Office, 95th Cong. 2d sess., May 1978,
LC 78-602389 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), 33-5. (Hereafter
cited as Cong. LC 78-602389); Humphrey Report, 27-33; Cong.
~SC 95-61, 14-8; Los Angeles Times, 29 May 1977. (Hereafter
cited as LAT); WP, 10 June 1977; Far Eastern Economic Review
96 (10 June 1977): 10-1. (Hereafter cited as FEER).
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ground force balance in the Korean peninsula. 2
A comparison of military balance between North and South
Korea in the calendar year of 1977 is as follows;

South Korea

North Korea
16,720,000
Population
500,000
Active Forces
1,800,000
Reserve Forces
Ground Forces
25
combat Divisions
0
Marine Divisions
1,950
Tanks
Armored Personnel Carriers 750
3,024
Artillery
1,200
Rocket Launchers
9,000
Mortars
250
surface To Air Missiles
Anti-Aircraft-guns
5,500
Air Forces
Combat Aircraft
630
Airlift Aircraft
225
Helicopters
50
Navy
Combat Vessels
425-450
Submarines
12

In

May

1977

Richard

G.

35,200,000
635,000
2,800,000
20
1-2/3
1,110
500
2,000
0

3,000
120
1,000
335
46
13
80-90
0

Stilwell,

an

3

American

Enterprise Institute defense expert, described the DMZ as the
"world's most dangerous frontier," due to North Korea's high
military capability and Kim Il Sung's belligerent attitude. 4
He emphasized that the leaders in North Korea who provoked

2 . Cong. LC 78-602389, 33-5; Humphrey Report, 27-33;
Cong. HASC 95-61, 14-8; LAT, 25 May 1977; WP, 10 June 1977;
FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 10-1.
3 • Cong. LC 78-602389, 35; Humphrey Report, 27; LAT, 29
May 1977.
4 • Stilwell, "Need U.S. Forces," 20.
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the Korean War in 1950 remained in power. In addition, they
never changed their goals to liberate the South from socalled,

"American imperialism and exploitation"

by

force.

Stilwell also stressed the North's substantial advantages in
military capability. Moreover, most of their combat forces,
heavily

armed

with

Soviet

model

offensive

weapons,

were

deployed close to the DMZ and ready to attack the South "with
no more than a few hours warning." He also claimed that North
Korea had enough stockpiles to maintain an offensive war
without support from China or Russia. Thus, Stilwell claimed,
the withdrawal of the Second Division would significantly
heighten the risk of war in Korea. 5
A government report titled "Military Strategy and Force
Posture," which was completed in late June 1977 and submitted
to President Carter by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown,
expressed a pessimistic opinion about the military balance in
Korea.

It alleged that the North could seize Seoul

in a

surprise attack. The top secret report warned that a further
pullout

of

ground

troops

from

South

Korea

would

be

dangerous. 6
A report, prepared by Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and
John

Glenn

5

6

and

submitted

to

the

Committee

on

Foreign

. Ibid., 18-20.

• NYT, 6 January 1978. This was a part of a Pentagon
report in response to Presidential Review Memorandum 10 (PRM10), a top secret interagency study on American military
posture.
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Relations of the United States Senate on 9 January 1978, said
that North Korea had "significant advantages in the critical
first days of fighting, if the North can achieve tactical and
strategic surprise."

It added,

however,

that "these North

Korean advantages are at least partly offset by the presence
of

the

United

states

Second

Infantry

Division

and

its

supporting forces in South Korea. 117
Meanwhile,

a

Pentagon

analysts'

report

in

May

1977

further affirmed that North Korea, armed with twice as many
tanks and combat aircraft,

had a certain initial military

advantage in the event of conflict. On the other hand, the
south, with nearly twice the population and a much stronger
economy, would enjoy important advantages over the North if
war dragged on. The report also said that neither the North
nor

the

South

was

likely

to

fight

war

without

outside

support. Thus, existing arms inventories were militarily not
the crucial factor. 8
A report of the Congressional Budget Office of 18 May
1977 claimed that North Korean armed forces were not strong
enough to break through the DMZ which was dominated by "hills
and ridges." Therefore, it said that American ground troops
in South Korea would be no longer needed for purely military

7
8

. Humphrey Report, 31.

• LAT, 29 May 1977; Christian Science Monitor, 26 May
1977. (Hereafter cited as CSM).
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reasons.

9

Judging the military balance between North and South
from

Korea

above

the

North

reports,

Korea

significantly

outgunned the South in every field of army, air and naval
Even

power.

population,

though

South

Korea

economic strength,

had

the

advantage

and border topography,

in
the

military balance was still in favor of the North. The South
could keep a military balance with the North only with the
presence of United States forces armed with tactical nuclear
weapons. 10

Therefore,

the

pullout

•
without

,
leaving

the

tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea would heighten the
risk because the transfer of traditional weapons held by the
second Division to the South Korean Army still could not
equalize the military balance in the Korean peninsula.
There is no evidence that candidate Carter understood
the

military

balance

between

North

and

Immediately after he was elected, however,
Carter

met

military

the

affairs,

Joint

Chiefs

including

of

the

Staff
Korean

South

Korea.

President-elect

twice
issue.

to

discuss

Therefore,

Carter must have known the military balance in Korea by the
time he took the Oval Office.

9

• CSM, 20 May 20 1977.

1 ~ For detailed consideration on this issue, please see
p. 22 or Humphrey Report, 27-33.

CHAPTER IV

THE WITHDRAWAL DECISION PROCESS

Shortly after his November election victory, Presidentelect carter met the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On two occasions,
in December 1976 and in January 1977, Carter informed them of
his intention to withdraw United States ground forces from
south Korea

and asked them how to most

effectively pull

troops back home. 1
At

the

Blair

House

meeting

of

January

1977

the

President-elect discussed the possible Korean pullout and
other military affairs such as the SALT II treaty for about
9 hours with the Joint Chiefs of Staff George s.

Brown,

Admiral James I.

Chairman General

Holloway III,

Chief of

Naval Operations, General David c. Jones, Chief of Staff of
the United States Air Force, and General Bernard W. Rogers,
Chief

of

National

1

staff

of

Security

the

United

advisors,

States Army

Secretary

Cong. HASC 95-61, 7.
26

of

-

as

well

as

State-designate

27

cyrus vance, and Secretary Defense-designate Harold Brown. 2 At
that meeting the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested to Carter
the following three points as pre-conditions of the pullout;
one, that we must assure the economic and
military capability of the South Koreans to defend
themselves.
second, We must insure that the commitment this
country has to Korea and to Japan under the mutual
defense treaties of those two countries remains a
firm commitment.
Third, that this country must continue to be
a Pacific power and within the capabilities of this
country insure the integrity of South Korea.
carter

reiterated his

Korean withdrawal

plan

on

12

January 1977 at a meeting at the Smithsonian Institution which
was attended by about 50 members of Congress and his national
security advisors. The President-elect told them that he did
not want to implement his campaign pledge hastily "but only
after very carefully considering the problem of United States
troops." He also added that "the United States air cover would
be continued and the South Korean Army would be strengthened
to defend themselves. 114
Secretary-designate Cyrus Vance also stated before the
Senate Foreign Relation Committee that he favored a gradual
phaseout after prior consultations with concerned countries.
He added that the presence of the United States Air Forces in
Korea would not be affected, stressing the mutual defense

2

. WP, 14 January 1977.

3

• Cong. HASC 95-71, 78.

4

• NYT, 14 January 1977; WP, 14 January 1977.
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treaty with South Korea. At the same time, Vance criticized
the

south

efforts.

Korean
However,

Government's
he

corrupt,

repeatedly

said

illegal
that

lobbying

the

Carter

Administration would not withdraw its troops because of such
•

actions.

5

As soon as President Carter entered the White House, his
campaign pledge of withdrawing the troops from South Korea
immediately became American foreign policy. On 26 January 1977
the President sent

PRM-13 (Presidential Review Memorandum)

to executive agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA),

the

National

Security

Adviser

(NSA),

the

State

Department, the Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff asking
them to study the possible courses of the pullout program. 6
In order to avoid a controversy about the Korean pullout plan
itself within his administration, the President asked them,
in PRM-13,

how to remove American troops from South Korea

rather than whether the forces could be removed or not. 7
Merely twelve days after his inauguration, even before
his executive agencies completed their examinations of the

5

6
7

. NYT, 12 January 1977 and 14 January 1977.
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 78.

. Oberdorf er, "Carter's Decision," WP, 12 June 1977;
Cong. HASC 95-71, 78-9; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical
Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1983), 128. Vance said in this book that the State
Department carefully studied the PRM-13, and found that they
were not allowed to suggest any options except suspension of
the plan.
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possible

pullout

options,

Carter's

withdrawal

policy

was

officially confirmed by Vice President Walter Mondale during
a visit to Tokyo on the way to Washington from an European
tour.

8

vice President Mondale met Japanese Prime Minister Takeo
Fukuda and other Japanese officials at the Prime Minister's
official residence on 31 January in order to explain Carter's
'
new Korean po 1 icy
an d

h ave J apanese approva 1

of

1' t. 9

The

meeting marked the first face-to-face contact between the 11day-old Carter Administration and the six-week-old Fukuda
Government. 10
Mondale assured Fukuda that Carter's proposed withdrawal
policy would be implemented very carefully in order not to
disturb

a

stable

situation

in

the

Korean

peninsula.

He

promised Japanese officials that the United States would not
ignore the improvement of the Korean self-defense capability
through modernizing South Korea's armed forces. Mondale added
that United States Air Force units would remain in South Korea
for a

nearly unlimited period

in order to

keep military

balance between South and North Korea. At the same time, the

8

. WP, 2 February 1977.

9 . David Rees, "South Korea Needs
Telegraph (10 May 1977): 16.

u. s.

Troops," Daily

1 ~ NYT, 1 February 1977. Secretary Vance said in his book
Hard Choices that Mondale was instructed to inform Japanese
leaders of the American position, and do not discuss any
possibility of changing the withdrawal policy.
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vice president hinted to Japanese officials that the timing
for withdrawal would be negotiable by indicating that the
schedule for withdrawals had not been set and the pullout
would occur "only in close cooperation with the governments
of Japan and South Korea." Mondale also emphasized that the
carter Administration would firmly fulfill American treaty
commitments to Japan and South Korea in order to maintain
peace and stability in the Far East. 11 However,

he advised

Japanese officials that President Carter wanted to remove the
hundreds of American nuclear warheads

from South Korea . 12

After having finished two days of talks with Japanese
leaders, Mondale declared in his news conference at Tokyo on
1 February 1977 that U.S.

ground troops would be removed

regardless of Japanese and South Korean opposition to such a
move. 13 rn order to show Asians that the Korean withdrawal was
not a sign of America's departure from the continent, Mondale
also stressed that the United States would stay in Asia as an
Asian-Pacific power and would not turn its back on South
Korea. He said,
Turning to regional and strategic issues,
I
emphasized the fact that the Administration does
not intend to turn its back on Asia. We should and
will remain an Asian-Pacific power. Our alliance
with Japan remains central to our policy in this
1 ~ WP, 1 February 1977; LAT, 1 February 1977; NYT, 1
February 1977; Wall Street Journal,
2 February 1977.
(Hereafter cited as WSJ).
12
. Nation 224 (February 1977): 197.
13
. LAT, 1 February 1977.
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vast and important part of the world. we will
preserve a balanced and flexible military strength
in the Pacific, and we will continue our interests
in southeast Asia.
With respect to Korea, I
emphasized our concern to maintain a stable
situation on the Korean peninsula. I cited that we
will phase down our ground forces only in close
consultation and cooperation with the governments
of Japan and South Korea. We will maintain our air
capability in Korea and continue to ass;.1t in
upgrading Korean self-defense capabilities.
In his news conference in Washington next day, the vice
president reaffirmed that the Carter Administration would not
sacrifice the security of Sout~ Korea

in pursuit of the

withdrawal policy. He reiterated that the policy would proceed
very carefully and gradually, accompanied by an improvement
in Korean military capabilities, the maintenance of United
states air units in South Korea, and constant consultation
with the governments of South Korea and Japan. 15
Having been informed by the vice president that the
Japanese saw the withdrawal policy as "a serious mistake,"
President Carter called General W. Vessey j r. ,

the United

States commander in South Korea, to Washington on 18 February
1977 in order to discuss the problems of the Korean pullout. 16

On 9 March 1977 in his third news conference, which was

1 ~ Department of State Bulletin 76 (7 March 1977): 191.
(Hereafter cited as DSB.)
1 ~ Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter 1 ( 2
February 1977): 64-5. (Hereafter cited as PPP); Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents 13 (7 February 1977):
135. (Hereafter cited as WCPD); NYT, 3 February 1977.

1 ~ WP, 10 March 1977.
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broadcast live on radio and television, Carter made his first
public affirmation of his long standing campaign promise of
a Korean pullout. The President, however, did not give the
public a rationale for the policy. Instead, he reaffirmed the
gradual base reduction and stressed that it would not be
reversible. Carter said:
My commitment to withdraw American ground troops
from Korea has not changed ••• I think that the time
period as I described in the campaign months, a 4
or 5 year time period, is appropriate. The schedule
for withdrawal of American ground troops would have
to be worked out very carefully with the South
Korean Government. I would also have to be done with
the full understanding and,perhaps, participation
of Japan. I would want to leave in place in South
Korea adequate ground forces owned by and controlled
by the South Korean Government to protect themselves
against any intrusion from North Korea. I would
envision a continuation of American air cover for
South Korea over a long period of time. But these
are the basic elements, and I'm very determined that
over a period of time, as described jQ_ff then, that
our ground troops would be withdrawn.
Two hours after Carter's news conference, Secretary of
State Cyrus R. Vance officially notified South Korean Foreign
Minister Park Tong Jin of Carter's decision to withdraw the
troops from South Korea at a State Department meeting. Vance
told Park that the detailed American plan would be ready for
discussion with the Seoul Government in late spring. Foreign
Minister Park did not seek to persuade the secretary to
suspend the American plan. Instead, the minister expressed his

1 ~ PPP 1 (9 March 1977): 343; WCPD 13 (14 March 1977):
330; DSB76 (4 April 1977): 307; NYT, 10 March 1977; WP, 10
March1977.
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concern about the continuing United States security commitment
to south Korea.
Minister

18

Park met

On the afternoon of the same day, Foreign
Carter

at

the

White

House

to

discuss

security issues including the proposed withdrawal policy as
well as human rights violations in South Korea. 19 ouring the
session of about 45 minutes, the President assured Park that
the troop withdrawal would be carried out very carefully in
order not to upset military balance or create instability on
the Korean peninsula. He advised the minister that the United
states Air Force in South Korea would be slightly augmented
to show American determination to protect South Korea against
communist
concern"

invasion.
about

Meanwhile,

human

mentioning

a

number

imprisoned

or under

rights
of

Carter expressed his
violations

leading

house

Korean

arrest

for

in

South

citizens
their

"deep
Korea,

who were

critic ism of

President Park Chung Hee's dictatorship. 20
On

the

next

day,

Richard

C.

Holbrooke,

Assistant

Secretary designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, for
the first time, presented a rationale for the pullout policy
in a statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. He

350.

.
.

18 WP,
10 March 1977 .
19 PPP
1 (11 March 1977): 372; WCPD 13 (14 March 1977):

.

20
1977.

NYT, 10 March 1977; WP, 10 March 1977; LAT, 10 March
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told congressmen that the changing circumstances in East Asia
required the United States to reconsider the longstanding
.American policy in that area. Most of all, the end of United
states involvement in Indochina, the possible normalization
of diplomatic relations with China, and economic progress in
that area reduced tensions in the Far East. Holbrooke stressed
that all of the major powers favored the continuous stable
situation in that area "at least for the present."

Therefore,

he claimed, the proposed withdrawal plan was not a dangerous
one. 21
carter's intention of removing all the ground troops from
south Korea over a span of four to five years was reconfirmed
at the carter-Fukuda Washington meeting of 20-23 March. The
joint communique issued on 22 March 1977 stated that;
In connection with the intended withdrawal of United
States ground forces in the Republic of Korea, the
President stated that the United states, after
consultation with the Republic of Korea and also
with Japan, would proceed in ways which would not
endanger the peace on the peninsula. He affirmed
that the United States remains ffmmi tted to the
defense of the Republic of Korea.
In the meantime,

on

4 March before

the

House Armed

Services Committee in connection with the procurement bill,

2 ~ DSB 76 (4 April 1977): 322.

2 ~ PPP 1 (25 March 1977): 480; DSB 76 (April 1977): 376.
Th 7 Chicago Tribune reported on 31 July 1977 that Japanese
Prime Minister Fukuda expressed his great doubts about
Carter's pullout plan, especially the 1982 deadline. He also
was not seen satisfied with Carter's rationale for the
withdrawal policy.

35
the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared its official opinion on
Korean situation, emphasizing its geopolitical importance that
"any precipitous change in the precariously balanced forces
there,

particularly

presence,

would

with

have

respect
an

to

u.

the

unsettling

and

s.

military

potentially

destabilizing effect. 1123
Three days later, with respect to the PRM-13, the Joint
chiefs of staff forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of
Defense recommending the President withdraw about 7,000 troops
from south Korea by the end of 1982 instead of pulling back
all ground troops home so as not to erode the deterrence and
disturb the military balance in Korea. The Joint Chiefs added
that

any

situation

further

withdrawal

reevaluated

in 1982.

should

be

delayed

The Joint Chiefs'

became one of several options for the withdrawal.

and

the

opinion
It was

forwarded to the Interagency Working Group. 24
Within the executive branch there was little consensus
on the proper rate of the troop withdrawal.
staff studies suggested pulling back a

However, most

smaller number of

troops from South Korea over a longer period of time than
Carter

wanted. 25

The

Interagency

Working

Group

studied

various recommendations suggested by the concerned executive

2 ~ Cong. HASC 95-71, 99. General Kerwin testified before
the Committee on behalf of Gen. Rogers at that time.
24

• Ibid., 79-80.
25
• Vance, Choices, 128.
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branches and made an interagency report on PRM-13. On 21 April
the

policy Review Committee,

reviewed the

chaired by Secretary Vance,

interagency report and decided to

recommend

slower and more cautious withdrawals to the National Security
counc1·1 • 26
on 27 April 1977 the National Security Council chaired
by the President met on PRM-13 and discussed several of the
withdrawal options recommended by the Policy Review Committee.
The

NSC

members

disagreed

on

the

pullout

schedule.

CIA

Director Stansfield Turner favored suspension of the plan,
based

on

a

CIA

intelligence

report. 27 Secretary

Vance,

secretary Brown, and other members of the NSC recommended a
slower and more cautious withdrawal. Only National Security
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski fully supported Carter's proposed
pullout program. 28
Finally on 5 May 1977 Carter made the official decision
on

the

withdrawals

(PD/NSC-12)
Pentagon,

and

sent

the

Presidential

Directive

to the CIA, the NSA, the State Department, the

the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

executive branches. 2 9 The

Presidential

and other concerned
Directive announced

Carter's decision on the withdrawals of the Second Division,

26
• Cong. HASC 95-71, 80.

2 -Z Oberdorfer, "Carter's Decision,"
28• Vance, Ch O1ces,
.
128-9.
29
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 80.

WP, 12 June 1977.
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its supporting troops,and nuclear weapons from south Korea by
the end of 1982, while it laid out a specific time-table. It
stated the United States would withdraw about 6,000 troops,
including one combat brigade of the Second Division, by the
end of 1978. 30
As soon as Carter made his official withdrawal decision,
he instructed Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, and General George S. Brown, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of staff, to visit Seoul and Tokyo in order
to begin consultations with officials of South Korea and Japan
on the timetable

for the withdrawals.

Department spokesman Frederick

z.

On May

11,

State

Brown announced that the

united States would begin formal talks with South Korean
officials on 24 May 1977 about the withdrawal of 33,000 United
states ground troops from South Korea over the next four to
five years. Brown emphasized that the purpose of the trip was
to hold "full and free consultations" with officials of Seoul
and Tokyo governments. 31
In the mean time, the Presidential Directive caused the
Army to begin to prepare for the withdrawal of the Second
Infantry

Division.

Proposals

were

made

to

change

its

organization to a mechanized infantry division so as to better

3 ~ Ibid., 80, 149.
31. NYT, 12 May 1977; WP, 12 May 1977; LAT, 12 May 1977.
The papers reported that the real purpose of the trip was not
for consultations but to notify the prepared u. s. timetables
for the pullout to Seoul.
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meet NATO's requirements in Europe. 3 2 At the same time, the
ArmY also began to study where to build the new home in the
united states for the Second Division when it would return
home from South Korea. The Army officials favored Fort Bliss,
Texas as a new base for the division followed by Fort Benning,
Georgia. 33 The Pentagon considered Hawaii as well as several
bases in the mainland as a

new home

for the division. 34

However, politicians quietly pressed the Pentagon to deploy
the division to their hometown in order to buoy the local
economy. New York's two senators, Jacob K. Javits and Daniel
P. Moynihan, urged the Pentagon to deploy the troops at Fort
Drum,

New

York.

Robert

c. McEwen,

Congressman

for

that

district, claimed that Fort Drum was the best place for a NATO
support force because the climate and terrain was similar to
that of Europe. 35 speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill, jr.,
Democrat of Massachusetts, urged the Pentagon to include Fort
Devens, Massachusetts as one of the division's bases, while
he also

supported the idea of any Northeast base. 36 Governor

of New York Hugh L. Carey sent an eighty-seven page report to

3 ~ Rae T. Panella, ed. Department of the Army Historical
Summary: Fiscal Year 1977 (Washington, D.C.: Center of
Military History, United States Army, 1979), 6.
33. NYT, 15 January 1978; LAT, 7 January 1978.
34• NYT, 8 September 1977.
35
. Ibid., 8 September 1977 and 5 January 1978.
36• Ibid., 5 January 1978.
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the president explaining why Fort Drum was the best place for
the second Division and asked the President to relocate it to
Fort Drum.

37

Meanwhile, a few days before Under Secretary Habib and
General Brown began initial talks with Korean officials on the
withdrawals,

General John K.

Singlaub,

Chief of Staff of

united states Forces in Korea, publicly criticized President
eater's

withdrawal

policy,

alleging

that

the

planned

withdrawal policy was not only based on outdated intelligence
on North Korea,

but would probably lead to war in Korea.

Partly because Carter was angered that his primary military
policy was criticized by a

subordinate at a

particularly

sensitive time and partly because he feared that Singlaub's
remark itself might encourage North Korea to attack South
after his completion of the pullout, President Carter recalled
the general to Washington. The general left Korea with orders
to personally report to Carter at the White House. 38

37

• Ibid., 10 January 1978.

1977.

38
• NYT,

20 May 1977; WP,

20 May 1977; LAT,

20 May 20

CHAPTER V

THE SINGLAUB Al'FAIR

General

John

K.

Singlaub

was

born

in

Independence,

California on 10 July 1921. He graduated from Van Nuys High
school and then went to the University of California at Los
Angeles, where he joined the ROTC. Singlaub did not graduate
from

the

university,

military career.

instead,

He became a

he

began

an

action-filled

second lieutenant in January

1943. In October Singlaub was assigned to the oss (Office of
Strategic Services) - predecessor of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) - and served in combat and covert operations in
Nazi-occupied Europe and later in Asia.

In 1944 he led a

three-man team that parachuted behind enemy lines

in the

central mountains of France to train a French resistance group
to help with coming Allied invasion of Europe. In 1945 Captain
Singlaub,
group

leading an oss team,

fight

against

the

helped a

Japanese

in

Chinese guerrilla
Burma,

China,

Indochina. Just before the end of the Second World War,

and
in

August, he led a rescue team that parachuted into a Japanese
Prisoner of war camp on Hainan Island, off the coast of China,
40

41
and freed about 400 POWs. During the Korean War Singlaub was
a deputy chief of the CIA mission in Korea and then served as
a battalion commander in the Third Infantry Division. During
his service in Korea, he was awarded the Silver Star. During
the Vietnam War he worked on covert operations from a secret
command post known as the Eagle's Nest from 1966 to 1968. 1
In July 1976, just before the Panmunjom incident, when
the two American soldiers were killed, Major General Singlaub
became the chief of staff of United states forces in Korea.
one of the general's functions in Korea was to serve as the
senior member of the United Nations Command on the Military
Armistice Commission. His duty was to conduct discussions with
the

chief North

Korean

representative

at

Panmunjom when

sessions were called. He thus was one of the few American
military officers dealing directly with Communist officers in
a situation of military confrontation. During nearly 34 years
of army service, Singlaub had been wounded twice and was
honored with many decorations

including the Silver Star,

Bronze star, Purple Heart, Distinguished Service Medal, and
Combat Infantryman Badge. Singlaub also graduated from several
distinguished military schools such as the Infantry School,
Advanced Course, United States Army Command and General Staff
College, and the Air war College. He also received B.A. degree

1

• NYT, 20 May 1977, 21 May 1977 and 27 May 1977; WP, 20
May 1977; CT, 28 May 1977; Newsweek 89 (30 May 1977): 17;
Cong. HASC 95-71, 3, 67.
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in political Science at the University of California in Los
.Angeles in 1958. 2
General Singlaub was described as a "super patriot," a
"Soldier's soldier" and a "thoroughly professional soldier."
singlaub's own commander, General John W. Vessey referred to
him as a "professional soldier with a distinguished combat
record. 113

General

William

c.

Westmoreland,

Commander

of

American Forces in Vietnam, also praised Singlaub. In his book
A soldier Reports,

he described the Eagle's Nest and its

covert operations against the North Vietnamese:
The SOG Commanders were an ingenious group. One of
the first had been my operations officer in the
101st Airborne Division, Colonel John K. Singlaub.
Unknown to me at the time, Jack Singlaub personally
reconnoitered the site for the Eagle's Nest to make
sure it could be defended. He and his staff
developed special clothing and equipment for
Americans manning the Eagle's Nest and participating
on patr?l~
that nothing could be traced to its
U.S. origin.

Sf

According
neither a

to

his

military

publicity seeker nor a

colleagues,

Singlaub

troublemaker.

was

He was an

2 . NYT, 20 May 1977, 21 May 1977, 27 May 1977; WP, 20 May
1977; CT, 28 May 1977; Newsweek 89 (30 May 1977):17; Cong.
HASC 95-71, 3, 67. When Singlaub was in the Command and
General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth as instructor, the
Army gave him a semester off so that he could return to
U.C.L.A. and completed his degree in Political Science in
1958.
3

. WP, 21 May 1977; Newsweek 89 (30 May 1977): 17.

4 . William c. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York:
Doubleday & Company, 1976), 108. The SOG (Special Operations
Group, its cover name was Studies and Observation Group) was
a.component of Military Assistance Command in Vietnam dealing
with unconventional warfare; WP, 20 May 1977.
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honest,

popular,

and

outspoken

man

who

sometimes

got

frustrated when he was asked by Korean military friends about
the withdrawal

policy because he himself

reasonable answers for it. 5
1cnow why
military

the

President

officers

could

not

find

He always answered them "I don't

did

frequently

this. 116 Worried
raised

the

South

issue

and

Korean
urged

singlaub to influence policy makers in Washington. 7 A few days
before he gave the controversial interview to the Washington
fost,

Singlaub was invited to a dinner party by a leading

member of the South Korean National Assembly. The host also
urged Singlaub to stand firmly against Carter's withdrawal
policy if the general really thought Washington's decision was
a mistake. 8
On 19 May 1977 John Saar, Chief of the Washington Post's
Tokyo bureau, came to Singlaub's office. He was reporting the
views of high ranking United states commanders in Korea about
the withdrawal policy. Earlier that morning, Saar interviewed
General John J. Burns, the Deputy Commander of United Forces

5

. WP, 21 May 1977.

6

• Cong. HASC 95-71, 54. Congressman Ronald V. Dellums
of California, who was a leader of liberal Democrats,
criticized General Singlaub's undiplomatic answer at the
hearing. Dellums told Singlaub that he had to answer Korean
generals that "the President of United States has established
the policy. I am an officer in the U. s. military. My
responsibility is to carry out policies, so I am not the
appropriate person to answer that question."
7
8

. WP, 21 May 1977.
• FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 12.

44

in Korea. They discussed the subject of air power and how it
would compensate for the withdrawal of ground troops. General
aurns publicly told the reporter that he was "unhappy to see
the troops go. " Following that interview, Mr.

Saar met a

civilian adviser Jim Hausman to get background on the key
issues that were going to be discussed between officials of
south Korea and the United States that week. 9
During that interview, Saar asked some purely military
and technical questions about the Second Infantry Division.
since Hausman could not answer these questions,

he asked

singlaub to answer them for Saar on a background basis.
singlaub accepted Hausman's proposal and gave a thirty-minute
interview to the reporter. According to Saar, Singlaub bluntly
criticized the Carter Administration by arguing that the
withdrawal policy was made based on out-dated intelligence on
North Korea and it would certainly lead to war in the Korean
peninsula. 10
As soon as Saar left his office, Singlaub called his
public affairs officer and asked him the general rules on
interviews and realized that he should have told the reporter

9

. Cong. HASC 95-71,
6-7, 24. Jim Hausman was the
special assistant to the CINC, UNC. He has been in South Korea
since 1946. He was at that time the personal adviser to
President Syng man Rhee, the first president of South Korea.
H7 also knew President Park when he was a young officer. Gen.
S1.nglaub said that Mr. Hausman was the most knowledgeable
American on the subject of Korea and Korean officials.
1 ~ John Saar, "Background on the Singlaub Affair," WP,
3 June 1977.
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that it was "off the record" or background if he did not want
hiS name identified in the newspaper. So, Singlaub ordered his
advisor to find out what was Saar's intention. The public
affairs officer spent the rest of that day trying to find the
reporter but could not. Late that afternoon, about 6 hours
after the interview, Saar called Singlaub in order to confirm
that interview was on the record. The general first said that
it was off the record, But the reporter explained to Singlaub
his understanding that the interview had been on the record. 11
Saar told Singlaub:
Well, you understand what the ground rules are in
this regard. You didn't tel 1 me it was off the
record or a background . • • Well, unless you are
prepared to retract what you have said, or cp~nge
what you have said, I intend to file a story.
At that point, the general figured that he could not stop
the reporter

and

ordered

his

public

affairs

officer

to

persuade Saar to give him the story before it was published.
But the officer failed to get in touch with the reporter and
the story was published13 in the Washington Post on 19 May
1977. On the front page Singlaub was quoted as saying, "If we

l~ Cong. HASC 95-71, 7-8; FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 12;
Saar, "Singlaub Affair," WP, 3 June 1977.
12. Cong. HASC 95-71, 8.
1 ~ Ibid., 8. Saar said in his article "Background on the
.
Singlaub Affair" that he was told by a well placed source that
Gen. Singlaub did not give such instruction and he did not
rec 7ive such message from the general's public affairs
officer. Saar also said that the general agreed to make the
st ory on the record during their phone conversation.
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withdraw our ground forces on the schedule suggested it will
iead to war."

14

President Carter, an early riser, read the Washington
£_ost report with distress and anger and immediately discussed
it with his top aides and several key senators including
senator John

C.

Stennis,

Chairman of

the

Armed

Service

committee and Senator Sam Nunn, the ranking Democrat from
Georgia. 15 The President called Defense Secretary Harold Brown
about 10: 00 a.m.

and instructed him immediately to order

General Singlaub back to Washington for a face-to-face meeting
with him at the White House. 16
At the same time, Carter, fearing Singlaub's remark might
encourage North Korea to consider another invasion, warned the
North that "any potential aggressor should have no doubt about
the steadfastness of our commitment to maintaining peace and
stability in that region and our commitment to the Republic
of Korea. 1117
The general 's sudden summons was splashed across the
front pages of most major newspapers and received heavy TV and
radio news coverage nationwide.

Influential newspapers such

as the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the New York

14

. WP, 19 May 1977.
15
. LAT, 20 May 1977.
16

. NYT, 20 May 1977; WP, 20 May 1977; CT, 20 May 1977.

17
• WP, 21 May 1977.
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nmes,

and the Washington Post likened General Singlaub' s

recall to the General MacArthur affair. The papers claimed
that carter's personal recall of Singlaub was the first such
disciplining of an American general since Truman recalled and
fired General MacArthur during the Korean War. 18
Military officials privately expressed anger at the
treatment of the general and said Carter's action did not
resemble Truman's recall of General MacArthur because Truman
recalled MacArthur for refusing to obey his orders in the form
of a Defense Department policy statement, but Singlaub did not
disobey a direct order. Moreover, they emphasized the fact
that singlaub confirmed at the end of his interview that if
the decision was made he would execute it "with enthusiasm and
a high level of professional skill. 1119
On 21 May 1977 Singlaub, wearing his uniform with two
gold general' stars, met Defense Secretary Harold Brown at the
Pentagon. After an hour-long interview they drove to the White
House for a thirty-minute session with the President. In his
meeting with the President, Singlaub did not try to deny his
assertion that war would follow removal of the troops from
Korea. In his defense, however, the general told Carter he
thought that his interview was to be used by the reporter as
background,

and

the

quotation

of

his

18. NYT, 22 May 1977; WP, 22 May 1977.
19• WP, 20 May 1977.

statement

in

the
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newspaper was taken out of context and "exaggerated" by the
reporter. The President did not give an explanation of his
withdrawal policy,

but simply said what Singlaub said was

wrong. The general evoked some sympathy in the meeting with
the President.

After 1 istening to Singlaub' s

explanation,

carter began to believe that Singlaub made a serious mistake
but

that

he

had

not

been

intentionally

Shortly \after

the

meeting,

disloyal

or

. t e. 20
insubord 1.na

singlaub's

dismissal

from

his

the

Pentagon

Korean

post.

announced
In

the

announcement, Secretary of Defense Brown said that he asked
the President to relieve Singlaub from his post because he
thought the general could not do his duty in Korea because of
his open objection to Carter's withdrawal policy. Secretary
Brown said:
Public statements by General Singlaub inconsistent
with announced national security policy have made
it very difficult for him to carry out the duties
of his present assignment in Korea
I have
therefore recommended to the president that General
Singlaub be reassigned, and with the president's
concurrence I have directed the s'29.retary of the
Army to take action to that effect.
On Sunday morning,

22

May

1977,

the

nation's major

newspapers reported Singlaub's dismissal on their front pages

20
. NYT, 22 May 1977; WP, 22 May 1977; LAT, 22 May 1977;
~' 22 May 1977.
21
. NYT, 22 May 1977; WP, 22 May 1977; LAT, 22 May 1977;
~' 22 May 1977.
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with the following titles: "President Fires Gen. Singlaub as
Korea staff Chief" (Washington Post,) "Carter Removes General
Who

opposed

Korea

Policy"

(Los

Angeles

Times,)

"Carter

oisciplines Gen. Singlaub, Who Attacked His Policy on Korea"
(New York Times,) and "Carter Removes Critical General from
Korea Post (Chicago Tribune.)
The dismissal of Singlaub from his Korean post shocked
not only the general but also many military officers who
thought

the

recall

itself

was

a

severe

measure

for

a

professional and courageous general who had only voiced the
opinion of numerous

senior officers

in Korea

and at

the

Pentagon. 22 Singlaub himself did not expect his dismissal and
told

a

reporter

two

days

earlier,

while

on

the

way

to

Washington, that he expected to return to his post in Korea
after meeting with the President. 23
As soon as Singlaub left Korea for a meeting with the
President, General John W. Vessey, Commander of United Nations
and

United

States

Forces

in

South

Korea,

confirmed

the

command's willingness to carry out the mission assigned by the
President in a press conference. At the same time he sent a
cable

to

Secretary

Brown

explaining

the

controversial

interview and requested that Singlaub be kept in his current

22
• NYT, 22 May 1977; WP, 21 May 1977.
23
• LAT, 22 May 1977.
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job.

24

General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
staff,

in his speech to the local Chamber of Commerce in

Columbus,

Ohio,

criticized Singlaub by

stating

that

"the

military have no right to make policy decisions and military
men should express their opinions with tact." However, he also
predicted that Singlaub would return to Korea. 25
Many officials, especially Singlaub's fellow officers in
seoul, criticized Carter's severe action. They told reporters
privately that they agree with Singlaub's claim that President
carter's withdrawal policy would lead to war. One officer at
the headquarters

of

United

States

forces

in

Korea

"everyone here thinks what he said was right."

said,

But,

they

refused to publicize their feelings to avoid a fate similar
to Singlaub. Many of them regarded Carter's reaction as a move
to ram the policy down the military's throat. 26
On 22 May,

on the CBS TV program "Face the Nation,"

Secretary Brown strongly defended President Carter's decision
to relieve the general of his Korean command. He repeatedly
stated that Singlaub's dismissal was necessary because his
effectiveness

was

undermined

in

South

Korea

outspoken opposition to Carter's Korean Policy.

due

to

But,

his

Brown

24. S an Francisco
'
' 1 e, 23 May 1977. (Hereafter cited
'
Ch ronic
as SFC).
25

. NYT, 21 May 1977.
26
. WP, 21 May 1977.
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said, singlaub's reprimand was not meant to curb freedom of
speech in the military. He revealed that there had been plenty
of opportunity for the expression of military views on the
withdrawal policy. Brown emphasized that the new Korean policy
had already been determined,

therefore,

officials had

no

choice but to follow government policy if they wanted to stay
in the military. The secretary said:
The military are not only allowed, but they' re
encouraged to express their views during the
determination of policy through the chain of
command. However, once a military person has had a
chance to express his views on a policy that's being
determined - and the policy is determined - it
therefore becomes his (an officer's) responsibility
to support that ~oJ-icy publicly, if he plans to stay
in the military.
Secretary Brown added that the withdrawal of American
ground troops over four or five years would not endanger South
Korea's security, and

said that the withdrawal plan had been

fully discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior
military officials in South Korea.
South

Korean

especially

Army

had

improved

He emphasized that the
its

in the use of artillery,

operational
tanks,

skills,

and anti-tank

weapons. Therefore, if the United States maintained logistical
support as well as air and sea power, Brown claimed, the South
Korean Army could defend the country against any attack from
the North. At the same time he made it clear that any military
officer who publicly challenged the determined policy would

2 ~ WP, 23 May 1977; Detroit News, 23 May 1977. (Hereafter
.
cited as ON); SFC, 23 May 1977.
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. h d 28
be punis
e •

carter's swift action on Singlaub brought a controversy
not only among military officers but also among politicians.
senator John Culver,

an Iowa Democrat and a member of the

senate Armed Service Committee,

praised Carter's action by

saying that "I am very pleased to see this strong assertion
of civilian control. 1129 Senator Frank Church,
Democrat

on the

Senate

Foreign Relations

the

ranking

Committee,

also

criticized Singlaub's open opposition to the President urging
carter to dismiss the general. He said that:
When I was in the Army it was made clear to me that
the unpardonable offense was insubordination. If
this holds true for enlisted men and junior
officers, even more must it bind the generals •••
We maintain an army, not to make national policy,
but to uphold and enforce it. When a general on
active duty, in command abroad, publicly criticizes
or contradicts presidential Y8licy, then he should
be disciplined or dismissed.
The senator added that if they asked the general to decide
when the troops should leave Korea, he might decide to keep
the United States Army in Korea forever.
Senate majority leader Robert

c.

Byrd, appearing on the

NBC TV program "Meet the Press" on 22 May,

also defended

Carter's action on the Singlaub affair. Senator Byrd, argued
that Carter did what he had to do in removing Singlaub from

28

• NYT, 23 May 1977; SFC, 23 May 1977.

29
. WP, 20 May 1977.
30
. NYT, 21 May 1977; LAT, 21 May 1977.
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his Korean post, said, "I think he had no choice but to do
this."3 1 senator Strom Thurmond, South Carolina Republican and
a

senior

supported

member

of

Carter's

the

Armed

measures

on

Services

Committee,

Singlaub

even

also

though

he

personally agreed with Singlaub's opinion on Korean policy.
He said that:
I'm sure the General did it for the best of reasons.
I personally agree with him. But I don't think it's
appropriate for a man in uniform to make statements
like this unless he plans to retire. 3~s long as he's
in uniform, he's not free to speak.
In his letter to the editor of the Washington Post on 1
July 1977 Congressman Bob Carr, Democrat of Michigan, argued
that

a

military

disagreements

man

through

should

express

channels.

his

Otherwise

basic
he

policy

should

be

prepared to resign his post before taking his opposition to
the public. Carr claimed that four generals, whom he discussed
the Singlaub affairs with,

described Singlaub' s

action as

"unprofessional and irresponsible."
Former President Ford also supported Carter's action on
Singlaub even though he did not agree to Carter's withdrawal
policy. At a luncheon meeting with reporters in Washington on
20 May, Ford repeatedly expressed his objection to Carter's
proposed withdrawal policy by emphasizing that the maintenance
of troops in South Korea had kept the peace since 1953. Ford

31
• WP, 23 May 1977.
32
• NYT, 21 May 1977.
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added

tha t

if

he

had

been

elected,

he

would

not

have

considered the withdrawal of the ground troops from South
Korea. However, Ford, a strong believer in civilian control
of the military,

stressed that a person in uniform should

expect the consequence if he did not carry out the orders of
the commander in chief. 33
Meanwhile,

former

California

Governor

Ronald

Reagan

criticized Carter's handling of the general in Buffalo, New
York Republican fund raising dinner. He said, "frankly, the
general is right when he says such reduction will lead to
North Korean attacks on South Korea. The President is just
plain wrong." Reagan also claimed that Carter's manner in
disciplining the general was disgraceful. There was no need
to humiliate General Singlaub who had an impeccable record.
Instead of recalling Singlaub to Washington, Reagan argued,
Carter should have instructed Defense Secretary Brown to give
Singlaub the outline of the President's policy and reasons for
it. He added that Carter should have left the general on the
job in Korea. 34
Congressman Robert Michel of Illinois, a second ranking
GOP leader in the House, also criticized President's action
on Singlaub in a speech on the House floor on 24 May. He said,
Was the general right or wrong? President Carter's
decision to withdraw those troops was first made
public in the heat of a presidential campaign. There
33
. WP, 21 May 1977; CT, 21 May 1977.
34
• LAT, 23 May 1977; SFC, 23 May 1977.
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is no evidence that he reached a dec\~on on the
basis of advise from military experts.
senator Barry Goldwater, Arizona Republican, said that
he was disturbed at the treatment of the general and was
puzzled at the Carter Administration's policy in Korea. He
said, "I can't find a policy declaration. It has not presented
to the Senate Armed Services Committee,

of which I

am a

member, and so far as I know it has not been presented to the
committee on Foreign Affairs. 1136
The nation's influential editorial writers were also
divided by the controversy. On 23 May 1977 the editor of the
Cleveland Press defended Carter's decision. The editor alleged
that:
If carter had tolerated the general's published
remarks which verged on insubordination, he would
have weakened his hand in dealing with the military
almost at the start of his administration. And this,
in turn, could have undermined the principle of
civilian control over the military that the
President is commander in chief and he and his
advisers set defense a~ foreign policies, not the
generals and admirals.
The editor continued to argue that the Korean and Vietnam Wars
proved conclusively that the American public would not support
involvement in a land war on the Asian mainland. The editor
criticized Singlaub that he attempted to keep American ground

35. DN, 25 May 1977.
36

• NYT, 27 May 1977.

3 ~ Editorial, Cleveland Press, 23 May 1977. (Hereafter
.
cited as CP).
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troops in south Korea indefinitely because he did not learn
anY lesson from the Vietnam war. 38
on the following day, editors of the New York Times, the
ws Angeles Times, and the Chicago

Sun

Times expressed similar

opinions. They defended Carter's removal of Singlaub from his
post in Korea. An editorial of the Los Angeles Times did not
agree with singlaub'

view that the troop withdrawal would

endanger south Korea's security by emphasizing the fact that
the south Korean Army of 625,000 men and strong United States
air and naval protection could defend against an attack. The
editor pointed out that the American tradition of civilian
authority

over

the

military

was

deeply

rooted

in

the

constitution. Once the President made a decision, the editor
said,

no military man could be allowed to challenge that

position in public. 39
The editorial of the New York Times also said that the
"direct challenge of a President's announced military policy
was simply unacceptable. "

It continued to argue that "the

price of democracy,

and of the nation's capacity to hold

elected

accountable,

officials

was

obedience

bureaucracy, and above all in the military. 1140

.

38

Ibid •

3 ~ Editorial, LAT, 25 May 1977, sec. 2.
4 ~ Editorial, NYT, 24 May 1977.
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An editorial in the Chicago sun Times also criticized

singlaub's

action

and

said American officers

should not

"attack United States policies publicly under the system of
civilian control of the military." The editor claimed that the
uniformed men who were against the President's policy should
use other avenues such as Pentagon and Congress. Otherwise,
they should resign in advance before going to public. the
editor said, "it is a system that works. 1141
In the meantime,
Journal,

the editorials of the Wall Street

the Detroit News,

Washington

Post

criticized

the Chicago Tribune,
Carter's

overreaction

and the
on

the

singlaub affair. The editors admitted that a President should
have control over United States military policy and Singlaub's
criticism came at highly inappropriate time because high
ranking American officials were about to leave for Seoul to
discuss the details of the proposed withdrawal policy with
South Korean officials. However, they said that the dismissal
of the general was a presidential overreaction. The editorial
of the Detroit News on 24 May 1977 stated:
Even if Mr. Carter felt he had to act to establish
his authority over the u. s. military, it was not
necessary for him publicly to humiliate the general
who had said the planned U.S. withdrawal from South
Korea was a mistake that could lead to war. To show
his displeasure, the President could have quietly
ordered Singlaub transferred to another post .•• the
entire controversy is a needless and damaging one
which, we must remember, is a product of another of

4 ~ Editorial, Chicago Sun Times, 21 May 1977. (Hereafter
,
cited as CST).
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Mr. carter's ill advised campaign promises. 42
The Wall Street Journal on 24 May stated that Carter's
decision on Singlaub affair was wrong because it not only
humiliated the general but also would impose "a gag on the
entire officer corps." The editor said,
we certainly do want civilian control and a chain
of command. We do not want military men trying to
sabotage a President's foreign policy or leading a
political campaign against it. On the other hand,
the ultimate sovereign is not the President but the
public. And if generals on the scene really do
believe a President's policy would lead to war. This
is ce.ffainly something the public has a right to
know.
The Washington Post said in an editorial of 24 May that
carter's

decision

to

defend

military was understandable.

civilian

supremacy

over

the

But the editor disagreed with

carter's claim that North Korea might miscalculate General
Singlaub's remarks and attack the South. The editor said,
We suppose it's possible, but only in the sense that
anything is possible. For it is hard to believe that
the North Koreans would make decisions on anything
as important as an attack on South Korea on the
basis of the indiscretions of one middle-level
American general. Our own view is that North Korean
policy makers are quite capable of taking their own
measure of South Korean capabilities ... High White
House drama served only to give it far more
significance and substance than it deserved. 44
The editorial

in the Chicago Tribune of 25 May 1977

basically supported the principle of civilian control over

.
43.

42

.

44

Editorial, ON, 24 May 1977.
Editorial, WSJ, 24 May 1977 •
Editorial, WP, 24 May 1977.
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ailitary policy, but praised Singlaub's courage for speaking
out his belief:
under our system, government policy is made by
civilians and the military must be subservient to
civilian control • • • Despite all this, we cannot
condemn the general for speaking out. If an
experienced military officer believes a presidential
policy will cause war, the country certainly
deserves to know about it ••• If Gen. Singlaub's
effective career is at an end because he has spoken
out, he has done what he thought right [even if he
did so more publicly than he expected to.] He will
not be the first military man to be fired for
speaking what he believed to be the truth. We hope
he will not be
last who is dedicated enough to
take that risk.

fge

The

weekly

controversy.

magazines

also

The editor of the Nation

President's decision
removing

were

Singlaub

on the

from

his

divided

by

fully def ended the

Singlaub affair arguing
post

in

the

Korea

would

that

improve

national security. The editor said,
The serious side of this episode is that prominent
American generals have told the North Koreans that
they can win a new contest once our ground troops
have left. There is no excuse for that indiscretion
.•. Carter was quite right to descend on the hapless
General Singlaub, and, if "it ends his career," as
the papers are sayJg1g, so much the better for the
national security.
Meanwhile, an editorial in the Economist stressed that
a serving officer had right to speak out when he believed his
government

policy was

wrong.

The

editor

argued

that

the

President did not always have better information than officers

4 ~ Editorial, CT, 25 May 1977, sec. 3.
4 ~ Nation 224 (4 June 1977): 677.

60

serving in the field. Therefore, the editor claimed, American
people had right to hear the soldiers' opinions,

especially

when these military men were in a position to know something
about matter.

47

The nation's columnists overwhelmingly defended Singlaub
and criticized Carter's decision on the Singlaub affair.
Patrick J. Buchanan, an influential conservative columnist,
said in his column "The General Deserves Respect", published
in the Chicago Tribune on 26 May 1977, that Singlaub merited
his countrymen's admiration. In risking his career to warn the
nation of the consequences of what he believed as dangerous,
Buchanan claimed, Singlaub exhibited "a moral courage to match
the physical bravery that has marked a long military career."
He praised the general by saying that Singlaub was acting in
the tradition of Billy Mitchell and Douglas MacArthur, risking
his career, rather than leaving his countrymen ignorant of
potential danger of present policy. Meanwhile, the columnist
accused

Carter

of maintaining

a

double

standard

in

his

treatment Singlaub and outspoken U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young,
who openly disagreed with administration policy yet remained
at his job. 48
47. E conomis
. t

263 ( 28 May 1977 ) : 67.

4 ~ Patrick J. Buchanan, "The General Deserves Respect,"
~, 26 May 1977, sec. 3. Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador to U.N.
(1977-9), generated controversy by his outspoken appraisals
of such issues as Angola, the PLO, South African apartheid.
On 25 January 1977 Young said that the presence of Cuban
troops in Angola brought a certain "stability and order" to
that country. The State Department immediately criticized
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columnist Jack Fuller argued in his article "Lashing A
General

Won't

End

Carter's

Military

Problem"

that

the

president had a reason for his double standard. According to
Fuller, Carter and Defense Secretary Brown had put together
a civilian leadership in the Pentagon, and that of course did
not please the military officers. Moreover, many of the new
civilian

appointees were

liberal

and

did

important project such as the B-1 bomber.

not

favor

some

Therefore,

many

conservative high ranking officers clashed with their civilian
bosses on strategic issues such as the troop withdrawals from
south

Korea.

Under

the

circumstances,

General

Singlaub

appeared to the civilian leaders as more than an "aberrant
indiscretion."

His

public

position,

therefore,

urgently

required Carter and Brown to go beyond the usual need to
assert civilian control over the military and resulted in
harsh response to Singlaub's remarks. The columnist predicted
that the removal of Singlaub from his Korean post would not
reduce tension between the brass and the civilian leadership
in the Pentagon. 49
J. F. terHorst, a national news columnist, pointed out
in his article "Who Lost Most in Singlaub Firing" that the
brass in the Pentagon were never asked for advice for the
withdrawal policy by the President, but simply were asked for

Young's statement.
49• Jack Fuller, "Lashing a General Won't End Carter's
Military Problems," CT, 26 May 1977, sec. 3.
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proper way to carry out the reduction of forces from South
Korea. The columnist said that the President seemed to be
betting that his political

judgement was superior to the

general •s military expertise.
right,

the

columnist

said,

If the things

Carter would

turned to be

deserve

all

the

credit, but if it ended in disaster, the brass would not be
to blame because Singlaub had made the danger clear. 50
PUblic opinion concerning the Singlaub affair also showed
disagreement.

Letters

published

in

the

nation's

major

newspapers show that eighteen out of twenty-three persons
defending General Singlaub while only five of them backed
carter's decision on the Singlaub affair. 51
In the meantime, Congressman Samuels. Stratton of New
York

Democrat,

Investigations

Chairman

of

Subcommittee,

the
asked

House
the

Armed
Pentagon

Services
to

make

General Singlaub available for public hearings on 25 May in
connection with the Subcommittee's "overall review of U. s.
defense

strategy. 1152 The chairman reminded the press that

Congress had not yet approved Carter's withdrawal plan, said
that Congress had "the highest interest" in hearing opposing
views on the pullout. At the same time, Stratton made it clear

5 ~ J F. terHorst, "Who Lost Most in Singlaub Firing?",
DN, 29 May 1977.
51
• NYT, 29 May 1977, sec. 4 and 30 May 1977, sec. 4; WP,
25 May 1977 and 1 June 1977; LAT, 27 May 1977,sec. 2; CT, 5
June 1977, sec. 3; SFC, 26 May 1977 and 30 May 1977.
5 ~ SFC, 21 May 1977.
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that the subcommittee would not pursue the issue of civilian
right to control over military, but focus on the issue of why
the

general

Korea.

believed

the

pullout

would

lead

to

war

in

53

The singlaub affair was
fost's

correspondent

John

initiated by the

Saar

who

Washington

interviewed

General

singlaub on the Korean withdrawal issue and quoted him on the
front page of the paper. But, it was enlarged by the President
himself by recalling the general to the White House. It is
unclear whether Singlaub agreed with Saar to publish the story
on the record because Singlaub and Saar contradicted each
other. Considering his outspoken character and distinguished
record of service, in my opinion, Singlaub consciously told
the

reporter

his

views

simply

to

warn

policy

makers

in

Washington off the record. He did not intend to lead a crusade
by criticizing the President publicly, nor did he want to put
the President into a difficult situation.
Unexpectedly,

the Singlaub affair brought the Korean

withdrawal issue before the American public, who had shown
little previous interest in it. By recalling and removing the
general

from his Korean Post,

Carter gave the public the

negative impression that he would not allow all Americans to
participate

in

the

debates

on

the

United

States

foreign

policy, something he promised during his campaign.

5 ~ NYT, 24 May 1977; LAT, 24 May 1977; SFC, 24 May 1977.
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The Singlaub affair gave Congressional opponents the best
opportunity to rebut Carter's new Korean policy. As a result,
the President faced
as

the

public

strong Congressional opposition as well

pressures.

It

not

only

braked

the

smooth

progress of the policy but also damaged Carter's ability to
carry out the pullout policy in the future.

The Singlaub

affair was a turning point in the whole policy process.

CHAPTER VI

CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATIVES

vs. LIBERAL DEMOCRATS:

THE SINGLAUB HEARINGS

The House Armed Services

Investigations

Subcommittee

began its hearing at 10:03 a.m., 25 May 1977, in the Rayburn
House Office Building.

Presiding was Subcommittee Chairman

Samuels. Stratton. 1 Major General John K. Singlaub appeared
before

a

largely

sympathetic

subcommittee

prepared brief opening statement.

and

unnecessary

that

his

trouble

naivete
for

the

his

He firmly supported the

concept of civilian control of the military.
apologized

read

about

the

press

The general
had

President. 2 However,

caused
in

his

response to Chairman Stratton, the first questioner, General
Singlaub reaffirmed that most top United States military and
civilian officials

in Korea did not agree with President

Carter on the proposed withdrawal plan. He answered,
I have to say, Mr. Chairman, in all honesty. I know
of no senior American or ROK official that agrees
with this proposal to make the withdrawal of all
1

• Cong. HASC 95-71, 1, 76.

2

. Ibid., 3-4.
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combat for~es in the time schedule announced by the
president.
The

general

continued

to

say

that

United

States

commanders in Korea had not been consulted on the pullout
decision except on the timing of the pullout, nor did they
receive any reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their
requests about the rationale of the withdrawal policy and the
administration's long-term Korean policy. 4
congressional conservatives, who opposed the withdrawal
policy, lacked a legislative vehicle to challenge Carter's
decision because the annual authorization bill and the annual
Pentagon appropriations measure did not specify where troops
should be deployed. Apparently they tried to make use of the
hearings as the best chance to attract public attention to the
issue and to press the President to back away. 5 Therefore,
from

the

beginning

of

the

hearings,

the

Congressional

conservative majority lauded the general's long history of
service to the country and his courage in openly voicing his
convictions at the risk of his job. First, the conservative
members focused on the general's contention that Carter had

3

• Ibid., 5.

4.
Ibid., 8-10. General Georges. Brown, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Bernard w. Rogers later
testified before House Armed Services Committee that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff was never asked for a rationale for the policy
by the Korean Command.(See Cong. HASC 95-71, 84, 122).
5. Pat Towell, "Carter Troop Withdrawal Plan Attacked,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 35 (28 May 1977): 1, 0756. (Hereafter cited as CQWR).
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made

the

decision

on

the

withdrawals

full

without

consultations with professional military experts. Congressman
oavid c Treen, a Republican from Louisiana, tried to discover
if

during

his

professional

presidential

military

campaign

advice

on

the

Carter

had

withdrawal

adequate
issue. 6

congressman Robert E. Badham, Republican of California, also
emphasized

that

military

experts

had

not

been

properly

consulted prior the Carter's decision. 7
In his answers, Singlaub reaffirmed that commanders in
Korea had never been asked by candidate Carter whether the
withdrawal was desirable or not. Even after he took the Oval
Office, Singlaub said, Carter did not ask the command in Korea
to comment on the desirability of the withdrawal, but asked
them to comment on various withdrawal options. According to
the general, all of the different options that the President
suggested were dangerous choices for the security of South
Korea. He said,
Even though we were never asked the question, do you
think this is desirable, every time we were asked
to comment on a serious of possible withdrawal
options, we made it quite clear that some would lead
to disaster. And we ended up with the least
undesirgble of some
very undesirable courses of
action.

6

7
8

. Cong. HASC 95-71, 16.
• Ibid., 25.
. Ibid., 16.

68

congressman Treen and other Congressional conservatives
pai d k een attention to new intelligence about North Korea's
military strength that was not available to candidate carter
at the time of his campaign.

Singlaub stressed that North

Korea achieved a much higher level of readiness than the
united states had estimated earlier. The North increased the
number of tanks from 500 to 2,000 over a four or five year
period. They also had similarly increased artillery pieces,
armed

personal

carriers,

combat

ships,

aircraft during the same period. 9 As a

and

jet

result,

fighter

the North

possessed over three times as much artillery and twice as many
tanks and aircraft as the South. North Korea also had larger
numbers

of

rocket

south. 10 Therefore,

launchers

and

submarines

the general claimed,

than

did

the

there was a clear

military superiority in the North over the South even with
United states troops in South Korea. 11 The general added that
the North was clearly showing its offensive intentions in its
deployment

of

forces 12 and

communication lines. 13

. Ibid., 17 •
10. Ibid.,
34 •
11. Ibid.,
14 .
12. Ibid.,
17 •
13.
Ibid., 60 .
9

by

recent

moves

to

shorten
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carter's Congressional opponents tried to use singlaub's
claim that South Korea faced a dangerous military threat from
the North as a platform for pressing the President to suspend
his policy. Congressman Robert Daniel, Republican of Virginia,
focused his question on the origin of these increased weapons.
singlaub answered that the North Koreans were producing most
of these new weapons themselves, except highly sophisticated
ones such as aircraft. The general answered that:
North Korea has a very extensive industry. They are
not only producing all of their own artillery,
soviet design. Their own trucks. They are producing
their own armored personnel carriers. They are now
believed to be producing their own tanks. They have
not as far as we know gone into the production of
aircraft, but they have received recent deliveries
of highly sophisticated jet fighter aircraft in
large numbers. Most of these have come from China,
specifically the Mig-19. They have received other
transport-type aircraft. Transport aircraft has
increased by approximately 60 percent now giving
them an airlift capacity to a single lift of between
4,000 to 5,000 troops. They have manufactured most
of their own ships and boats. These are high speed
amphibious vessels. They are missile boats equipped
with what we believe to be the Styx missile. They
are producing their own submarines. The submarine
threat is one of those that bothers the Republic of
Korea most seriously. The1 4are of Soviet design but
North Korean manufacture.
Congressional

hardliner

Larry McDonald,

Democrat

of

Georgia, and Robert L, Leggett, Democrat of California, tried

1 ~ Ibid., 20, 34. The general explained why the submarine
was serious threat to the South in his answer to Congressman
Richard H. I chord, Democrat of Missouri. According to the
general's explanation, South Korea is regarded strategically
as island because there is no land route access to allies and
all its raw materials and manufactures must be transported by
ship. Thus, submarines pose a great threat to the security of
South Korea.
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to paint a picture of

North Korea's bellicose attitude by

reminding the committee of tunnels that the North made in the
DMZ and the Panmunjom incident,in which North guards killed
two American officials with axes and metal pikes in August
1 916. Being asked by Congressman Leggett whether tunnels were
real or fabricated, the general forcefully answered that those
tunnels in the DMZ were "very, very real" and a serious threat
to the South.

Singlaub confirmed that the tunnels started

north of the DMZ and got through under the DMZ into the area
of the southern edge of the DMZ when they were found by the
south in 1974 and 1975. 15 He explained that:
Those tunnels are dug through solid granite,
approximately 200 to 300 feet below the ground,
making it very difficult to detect. And they are
large enough that you can drive vehicles through
those tunnels. You can run troops th~%ugh them,
three abreast without any difficulties.
Meanwhile,

liberal Democrats charged that the hearing

was held intentionally to frustrate Carter's Korean policy.
They claimed that the hearing was "inappropriate and only
embarrassing the President." While liberal Democrats focused
on

the

general's

alleged

naiveness

about

the

press,

Congressional conservatives sympathized with Singlaub's claim
that he was mouse-trapped by the press. Congressman Lucien N.
Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, who was an ardent supporter of

15• Cong. HASC 95-71, 13-4; James N. Wallace, "In Korea,
War Goes on Underground," USNWR 84 (6 November 1978): 36.
16. Cong. HASC 95-71, 13.
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carter's pullout policy, doubted Singlaub's naivete, raising
the fact

that the general

spent almost ten years

in the

washington area during the period of the Watergate.

Nedzi

suggested that Singlaub, who must have known how to deal with
the press, intentionally criticized the President in order to
hamper Carter's ability to implement the policy of phased
withdrawal of the troops from South Korea. 17 The Congressman
maintained that the President had no obligation to explain his
decision to military officers. He said, "this could be helpful
but not

necessary. "

Congressman Nedz i

asked the

general,

"should the President go to Korea and hold a mass meeting of
the infantry division and tell them the whole story? 1118
Congressman Ronald V. Dellums, a leading liberal Democrat
from

California,

commander

in

criticized

chief

by

Singlaub's

pointing

out

disloyalty
the

opposition to the President foreign policy.

to

general's

the
open

Dellums argued

that the American people did not want to engage in another
land war in Asia nor did they want to kill North Koreans or
to die for South Korea. 19 He said,

"we don't want our young

people to go and fight and die in a war that some old men
dreamed up. That is the result of Vietnam. 1120

17 Ibid., 28 •

.
18.

Ibid., 29 .

.
20.

Ibid., 45 •

19 Ibid., 44 .
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The

panel

also

discussed

the

Second

contributions to the security of Korea.
Nicholas,
oivision's

Democrat
strategic

of

Alabama,

value

attacking the South. 21

in

asked

Division's

Conservative Bill
about

preventing

the

the

Second

North

from

Singlaub answered that the Second

Division was stationed between two direct corridors to Seoul
from the North. Therefore, its location had important tactical
value because the North Korean leaders who were contemplating
a drive on Seoul would have to attack the di vision.
would,

of

course,

be

followed

by

full

scale

That

American

intervention. That was why their Russian and Chinese sponsors,
who did not want to have trouble with the United States in
that area, restrained the North from attacking the South. If
the Second Division was removed, Singlaub argued, the North
could launch its attack without fear of fighting with American
ground troops. Moreover, the Russians and Chinese who wanted
to keep the unified Korea under their influence also could
support the North without fear of direct confrontation with
the United States. Therefore, the general concluded that the
Second Division could not be replaced by any number of South
Korean combat divisions. 22
Congressman Thomas J.

Downey,

Democrat of New York,

called the hearing "a frontal assault" on Carter's new Korean

21. Ibid., 30.
22
. Ibid., 30-2.
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policy, asked the general the minimum numbers of troops that
could perform a deterrent role.

He asked,

"will . a

rifle

company on the DMZ possibly be enough to constitute a tripwire
or does it necessarily have to be the 42,000 or could it be
less?"

23

The general stated that about 40,000 United States forces
in south Korea including the Second Division fulfilled the
minimum requirement for the effective deterrent.

He also

raised the point that the presence of those forces in South
Korea had prevented a war since the end of the Korean War. He
said,
The deterrent to be effective, must be believable.
It must be a believable force, and it must have
sufficient strength not only to make a military
contribution, but to be believable that it is
capable being reinforci~' rather than just being a
force there by itself.
Dellums claimed that the presence of American troops
could not be justified militarily, reminding the general of
former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's statement that the
troops in Korea were only there for a political purpose rather
than a military calculation. 25 The general rebutted Dellums
claim by saying that many of those officials such as General
Richard G. Stilwell, former commander of U.S. Forces in Korea,
and the present commander General Vessey, who believed that

23

• Ibid., 43.

2 ': Ibid.
25. Ibid., 22.
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the second Division's contribution to the military balance was
insignificant,

changed

their

minds

after

seeing

intelligence coming out of North Korea. 26

the

new

Singlaub argued

that the Second Division, with more sophisticated weapons and
better

communication

equipments

than

any

South

Korean

division, had become very important in the military balance
between North and South Korea in that new situation. 27
congressman Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, questioned
the general why the new intelligence information came out when
the

administration

was

about

to

change

Korean

policy. 28

singlaub answered that the Panmunjom incident of 1976 required
United States intelligence to increase its study of North
Korea. At the same time, more capable intelligence personnel,
released from Vietnam because of the end of that War, were
available to examine the strength of North Korea. He answered
that:
It is a result of the availability of more analysts,
as I understand it, in the intelligence community
having been released from Vietnam, (was) able to
concentrate on these areas. When these first
indications came out, more and more have started to
concentrate, and more of the intelligence is being
examined, and there was a great boost in this in
August of 1976. When we had our DMZ incident, trying
to find out what does this mean? Is this the
beginning of a major confrontation? And since
August, there has been a great concentration of
intelligence collection and analysis. the whole

.

26
27

.

.

Ibid., 23-9 .
Ibid., 31.

28 Ibid.,
36 .

75

picture has changed within a year. 29
The subconuni ttee also discussed the problem of the Second
oivision's tripwire role in Korea. Liberal Democrats argued
that because the force was forward deployed, the United States
had no alternative but to be involved in war should North
Korea attack.

Congress would have no chance to consider

whether the United States should or should not wage a new war
in Korea. 30 In case of fighting on the Korean peninsula,
oellums argued, the United States faced potentially disastrous
consequences including, "automatic involvement in a new land
war, early use of nuclear weapons or their being captured by
North Korea, and the withdrawal of United States forces under
fire. 1131
Singlaub tried to remind Dellums of the purpose of the
presence of U.S. forces in South Korea was to prevent war
there, rather than to fight. He pointed out that there were
no troops (save for at Panmunjom) "close to or on" the DMZ.
Even if a new war broke out, the general maintained, U.S.
forces would not become automatically involved in war because
they were stationed far behind the front line. Therefore, the
President would have enough time to consider the option of
whether he

should conuni t

29. Ibid., 37.
30• Ibid., 44.
31. Ibid., 53.

the

force

or not.

The general

76

confirmed that the troops would not be involved in war and
could not be committed without the specific approval of the

t 32
presi'den•
Both conservatives and liberals showed keen attention to
cost

figures

projected

for

the withdrawals.

A

Government

Accounting Office report and the Congressional Budget Office
report figured that the United States could save a billion
dollars a year by keeping the troops at home rather than in
south Korea.

33

Singlaub, however, ruled out the possibility of any big
cost savings from the withdrawals. He argued that lower costs
of maintaining facilities in Korea and many other benefits
such as free use of the real estate fully compensated the
transportation

costs

for

all

the

supplies

and

personnel

rotation. Moreover, taking the cost of building new facilities
in

the

United

States

into

consideration,

the

general

predicted, there would be no savings. He said,
We have run some rather detailed studies •.. on this
subject of whether it is more costly to maintain
the 2nd Division in Korea with the long distances
that troops and material and supplies have to
travel, or to maintain it in the United States.
Those studies, while not conclusive, because there
are many factors that are too difficult to measure
precisely, show that if it is not cheaper to keep
it in Korea, it is pretty close to it. Despite the
increased transportation costs for all of the
supplies and the people that rotate to and from
Korea, there are many compensating or off setting
32. Ibid.
33
• Ibid., 18, 48.
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savings. These are brought about by the lower cost
of maintaining facilities in Korea - the cost of
labor is less than it is here. The cost of building
materials is less there. Some of the other materials
consumed in the normal operation and maintenance of
a force there are less. The real estate has been
given to us free of charge. The training areas are
free of charge. We are not paying anything for the
upkeep of those. That is the responsibility of the
Republic of Korea. And there are other costs that
the Republic of Korea picks up that 3 in the United
states we would be responsible for.
Meanwhile, liberal Democrats questioned why the South
Koreans, who had twice the population and five times the gross
national product as well as more military personnel, lacked
self

defense

capability

against

the

North. 35 Congressman

Richard H. !chord, Democrat of Missouri, criticized the South
Koreans for their negligence of building a military capability
even though they possessed far more population and resources
than the North. While he did admit that the South Korea had
been good ally, !chord emphasized that the United States could
not keep American forces in South Korea forever. He said, "I
don't think we can continue to support South Korea as a
satellite nation as the Soviet Union supports North Korea."
The Congressman concluded that South Korea should develop
their ability to defend themselves against their enemy. But
he suggested that the President might adjust the process of
withdrawal in accordance with a build up of South Korean

34

. Ibid., 18.
35• Ibid., 33-7.
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forces.

36

Meanwhile, Congressman G. William Whitehurst, Republican
of

strongly

Virginia,

recommended

that

the

Carter

Administration reconsider the pullout policy because it would
affect more than security of South Korea. He argued that if
the united states took that step, Japan would reassess not
only its defense relationship but also its entire relationship
with the United States.

It might push the Japanese toward

rearmament, including their own nuclear weapons. 37
singlaub and Congressional conservatives thought that it
was

very

unwise

to

withdraw

combat

forces

without

some

countervailing concessions from North Korea. Congressman Robin
L. Beard, Republican of Tennessee, and Singlaub made the same
38

point.

When asked by Congressman Donald J.

Republican

of

withdrawal,

New

York,

about

a

schedule

for

Mitchell,
a

safe

the general expressed his opinion that the United

States could safely pull out its troops when North Korea was
ready to

sign a

nonaggression pact with South Korea.

He

maintained that the United States could use the withdrawals
as an effective tool for bringing about greater peace in the
Korean peninsula. 39

36

.
37.

.

38
39

.

Ibid., 33 .
Ibid., 48 •
Ibid., 12, 39 .
Ibid., 39 .
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Patricia Schroeder, Democrat of Colorado, complained that
the hearing was "a Kangaroo court."

She admitted American

troops in Korea were very important to protect Seoul. But, she
argued, the United States foreign policy should be made for
America's priorities in the world rather than for particular
interests of another nation. Therefore, Schroeder concluded,
the withdrawal policy should be judged by the President based
on America's world strategic priorities. 40
Congressman Dan Daniel, a Democrat of Virginia, strongly
supported General Singlaub' s words that "the purpose of having
the force in Korea was not to fight war but to prevent it."
and urged the President to listen to military experts in order
to prevent another unnecessary war in Korea. he said,
When we listened to Dean Acheson, and he declared
that Korea was outside our defense perimeter what
happened? A vacuum was created and in marched the
enemy. When I was in Vietnam in 1964, my first visit
there, we were talking to military people, and I
believed what they told me; because the evidence I
think proved it - that if the politicians would stay
out of their way they could win the war in 6 months
- I think they could have. In the first instance,
if we had won the Korean war we wouldn't have had
a war in Vietnam. It seemed4 ro me we are going right
down that same path again.
Congressman Charles H. Wilson, Democrat of California,
also fully supported Singlaub's cause and said that Carter's
withdrawal policy was potentially one of the biggest mistakes
the United States could make in recent history. He said,
40• Ibid., 40.
41. Ibid., 55.
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I think it is a stupid mistake to telegraph our
position to say within 5 years - we talked about
secretary of State Dean Acheson who telegraphed what
we were going to do. And that is how we got into
trouble in Korea. An~ 2 here we are doing the same
thing all over again.
on the next day, the Washington Post covered the whole
story of the hearing on the front page under the headline
"House Panel Begins Frontal Assault on Korean Policy." Other
major newspapers also favorably reported what Singlaub told
before the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee.
The papers stressed the general's assertion that all senior
.American

and

South

Korean

officials

President on the withdrawal plan.

disagreed

with

the

And Washington did not

provide the Korean command with the rationale for it, nor did
they consult with military officials properly before they made
a decision on the withdrawals.

The papers played up

the

alleged rapid buildup of North Korean military forces and the
new deterrent role of the Second Division envisioned by the
general. 43
While Singlaub was testifying on Capital Hill, Defense
Secretary

Harold

Brown

was

defending

Carter's

proposed

withdrawal policy in his speech to the National Press Club on
May 25. He said Carter's decision was based on South Korea's
growing economic and military strength. The Secretary said

42• Ibid., 64.
43
• NYT, 26 May 1977; WP, 26 May 1977; LAT, 26 May 1977;
~' 26 May 1977, sec. 1; CSM, 26 May 1977; CST, 26 May 1977.
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that he and General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of

staff,

believed

the

proposed

withdrawal

could

be

accomplished successfully if the United States continued to
assist in upgrading Korean capabilities as well as maintaining
its air and navy forces with a firm treaty. The Secretary said
that:
I assure you that this carefully planned action
definitely will not diminish our commitment to South
Korea's security ••• I believe that withdrawals of
u. s. ground combat forces from Korea can be safely
accomplished over the period of four to five years
under the conditions we have publicly declared,
namely, the maintenance of U. s. air and logistic
support, continued strengthening of South Korean
military forces and the full commitm~2t of the
United states to the security of Korea.
In response to Singlaub' s Congressional testimony, Carter
himself

defended

his

new

Korean

policy

at

a

nationally

televised news conference on 26 May. The President confirmed
that he did not agree with Singlaub' s prediction that the
pullout would bring war in Korea:
that

there

is

any

cause

for

a

"I certainly don't agree
war

to

be

expected."

He

emphasized that the withdrawal policy had been considered by
the United States Government for many years because overall
strategic considerations such as the relations among the major
powers in that area had changed since the end of the Korean
War.

Carter affirmed that

consultation

with

the

he made a

military

intelligence agencies. He

decision

leaders

as

after

well

as

full
the

also stressed that South Korea,

44
. LAT, 26 May 1977; CSM, 26 May 1977; CST, 26 May 1977.
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with much more population and a stronger economy than that of
the North, was strong enough to stand on its own feet.

He

added incorrectly that even South Korean President Park Chung
Hee wanted to remove American troops from his country. 45 He
said that:
I think it is accurate to say that the time has come
for a very careful, very orderly withdrawal over a
period of four or five years of ground troops,
leaving intact an adequate degree of strength in
the Republic of Korea to withstand any foreseeable
attack and making it clear to the North Koreans,
the Chinese, the Soviets, that our commitment to
south Korea is undeviating and is staunch. We will
leave
there
adequate
intelligence
forces,
observation forces, air forces, naval forces, and
a firm open commitment to our defense treaty, so
there need not be any doubt about potentia]i
adversaries concerning our support of South Korea. 6
Asked by a reporter why he fired General Singlaub, carter
answered that the general was neither fired nor "chastised or
punished," only transferred to a new position. However, the
President explained that Singlaub was removed from his Korean
post

partly

because

of

"a

very

serious

breach"

of

his

responsibility and partly because his effectiveness in Korea
had been seriously damaged by his open opposition to the

4 ~ President Park Chung Hee was interviewed by American
reporters several times. He told them that his country's goal
was
to
achieve
self-defense.
But
his
remarks
were
misunderstood by the reporters to indicate that Park wanted
to remove American troops from that country. Later, Park
denied that he wanted the departure of American troops.
Instead, he urged American leaders to keep American ground
t:oops until achievement of a definitive political agreement
with the North. See NYT, 13 January 1977.
46
. WCPD 13 (30 May 1977): 817; PPP 1 (26 May 1977): 1018;
~ 76 (20 June 1977): 654.
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withdrawal decision. Carter added that Singlaub's continued
stay in south Korea would have been a "disturbing factor",
attracting admiration and attention" from others who opposed
to the policy, and obstructing his superiors from carrying out
the policy smoothly. 47
After carter's news
t,etroit

News

claimed

conference,

that

the

an editorial

President

"still

in the
has

not

convinced everyone that General Singlaub is wrong and he is
right"

on

commented

the
in

pullout

its

issue. 48 The

editorial

that

"Mr.

Chicago

Tribune

also

Carter at his

news

conference gave an answer that is not quite an answer." The
paper continued to say that the President's explanation only
left the impression that "this is what you're going to do, so
shut up and get going. 1149
The

Singlaub

hearing

heated

up

the

Korean

pullout

controversy among the American public. Before the hearing was
held, the American public did not care about the realities of
the withdrawals. There had been discussions about issues of

4 ~ WCPD 13 (30 May 1977): 817-9;
PPP 1 (26 May 1977):
1018-21; DSB 76 (20 June 1977): 653-6; CQWR 35 (11 June 1977):
1165-7; NYT, 27 May 1977; WP, 27 May 1977; LAT, 27 May 1977.
Singlaub was assigned to the chief of staff of the Army Forces
Command at Fort Mcpherson in Atlanta, Georgia. A year later,
on 28 April 1978, he was forced to retirement from the Army
after another attack on Carter's decision not to produce the
neutron bomb. For further consideration, see NYT, 29 April
1978 and Eileen Keerdoja, "Talkative General," Newsweek 93 (5
March 1979): 18.
4 ~ Editorial, ON, 27 May 1977.
4 ~ Editorial, CT, 27 May 1977, sec. 3.
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whether

the

general

was

right

publicly

to

oppose

the

president's policy or if the President should or should not
have removed the general from his post in Korea. But after the
hearing, many Americans saw that the pullout might lead to
another Asian land war just as easily as it might free them
from an Asian involvement. As a result, many Americans changed
their minds

and

raised their voices

against

the

pullout

policy. Carter's news conference, which attempted to explain
how singlaub was wrong, still could not fully convince the
American public that the President was going the right way.
Meanwhile,
conservatives

the
a

Singlaub

platform

to

hearings
initiate

gave
a

Congressional

campaign

against

carter's Korean pullout policy in Congress. This Congressional
movement seriously damaged Carter's ability to carry out the
policy.

CHAPTER VII

HABIB AND BROWN'S TRIP TO SEOUL

Meanwhile, on the same day President Carter met General
singlaub at the White House, Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs, and Georges. Brown, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were ordered to attend a White
House meeting.

The meeting included

Zbigniew Brzezinski,

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
Warren M.
Brown,

Christopher,

Secretary

Assistant

of

Secretary

Acting Secretary of State,

Defense,
of

State

and
for

Richard

c.

East Asian

Harold

Holbrooke,
and

Pacific

Affairs. 1 Habib and Brown were preparing to brief South Korean
and Japanese leaders on the withdrawal policy.

They were

instructed to give the leaders of both governments a

full

opportunity to express their views on the decision. At the
same time, the two envoys were ordered by the President not
to enter into negotiations with officials of South Korea and

1 . PPP 1 (26 May 1977): 1029; WCPD 13 (30 May 1977): 8245.
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Japan and not to give them any specific commitments. 2
on 24 May 1977 both envoys arrived in Seoul,

Korea.

Habib, who had once served as ambassador in Seoul, made an
airport

statement

that

President

Carter

ordered

them

to

confirm America's "continuing commitment" to South Korea's
security "clearly and publicly." He also emphasized that the
withdrawal would be gradually and carefully carried out in
order not to disturb the military balance and security in the
Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia. 3 While General
singlaub

was

testifying

Investigations

before

Subcommittee,

the

the
two

House

Armed

Services

presidential

envoys

officially began to consult with South Korean officials on the
withdrawals at the Blue House, the presidential mansion in
central Seoul. During a three hour session, Habib and Brown
made it clear that Carter's pullout decision was final and
non-negotiable.

The envoys informed South Korean officials

that the United States would remove about 6,000 ground troops
from South Korea by the end of 1978 in accordance with the
first phase of Carter's pullout program. They reaffirmed that
the pullout would be made in a careful and gradual way so as
not to break the military balance between the North and the
South or weaken the security of South Korea. President Park
Chung Hee expressed his thanks to the visitors for all the

2 . DSB 77 (11 July 1977): 50.
3 . NYT, 25 May 1977.
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united states had done for South Korea since the Korean War
and added that he also did not expect American troops to stay
in Korea forever. President Park, however, made his position
clear that he would accept Carter's decision on the condition
that south Korea was compensated by the United states in
return.

4

In their three-day talks, Korean officials made it clear
that they would prefer to keep United states forces in Korea. 5
Meanwhile, they requested the envoys to give them control over
some of the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea
which had been tightly controlled by American troops in Korea.
This was Park Chung Hee•s idea of compensation. The Koreans
also presented a shopping list of needed conventional weapons
including tanks, anti-tank missiles, aircraft, and aircraft
rockets. Habib and Brown expressed their opinion that there
would be no difficulty about conventional weapons, but they
refused to even discuss nuclear weapons. 6 Korean officials
asked the envoys to provide details on how the United states
intended to continue its security commitment to their country.
They requested that the United States strengthen the Korean
Mutual Defense Treaty in order to guarantee automatic American

4. NYT, 26 May 1977 and 6 June 1977; LAT, 26 May 1977
and 6 June 1977; Time 109 (6 June 1977): 28; Newsweek 89 (6
June 1977): 49.
5 . DSB 77 (11 July 1977): 49.
6. FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 11.
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involvement in the event of war in Korea. Habib and Brown made
it clear that to amend the treaty was well beyond the scope
.

.

of their mission.
The

three

7

day

talks

produced

nothing

except

that

consultation was officially started. Details of the pullout
program were scheduled to be discussed at the tenth annual
Military consultative Committee meeting in Seoul in late July
or early August 1977.

However,

the South Koreans clearly

understood that the withdrawal decision itself could not be
negotiable and all that remained before them was to decide
time table of the pullout and the size of compensation in
return. 8
At his farewell news conference in Seoul on 26 May, Habib
reiterated

American

determination

to

keep

its

security

commitment to South Korea and expressed his sympathy on Korean
requests

for

compensation

by

saying

it

was

"perfectly

reasonable and rational. 119 Meanwhile, General Brown left no
doubt about the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons from
South Korea by stating that all missiles would be taken out
from South Korea with all American ground combat elements. 10
However, the general disclosed that not all American ground

7 . Ibid.
8 . CT, 6 June 1977; FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 10-1.
9 • FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 10.
l~ NYT, 27 May 1977.
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troops

would

withdrawn.

be

Brown

did

not

specify

the

re•aining force but he implied that duties of those troops

were to support the United States air force units and some
. t 'ics an d communica
. t 'ion. 11
soldiers for logis

on the way to Washington,
Japan to
Japanese

explain
leader.

the
They

Habib and Brown stopped in

background
met

with

of

Carter's

Foreign

decision

Minister

to

Iichiro

Hatoyama and Asao Mihara, Director-General of Japan's SelfDefense Agency.

The envoys reportedly informed the Japanese

that carter made his final decision of the withdrawals only
after he had obtained assurances from Peking and Moscow that
the two Communist empires had no intention of encouraging
North Korea to heighten tension in the Korean peninsula

after

the American pullout. 12
The

Japanese

leaders

diplomatically

conveyed

their

concerns over the security of South Korea and Northeast Asia.
They

suggested

the

pullout

should

be

carried

out

in

an

l~ LAT, 29 May 1977.
12. NYT, 6 June 1977: WP, 6 June 1977:
LAT, 6 June 1977:
CT, 6 June 1977. NHK, the semi-governmental radio and
television network, reported this, quoting an unidentified
Japanese government source. A Washington Post correspondent,
John Saar, reported that both China and Russia had been told
that the United States was determined to defend South Korea
that any military action to the South would lead a direct
confrontation with Washington. The New York Times quoted one
official in Washington that he did not expect either Peking
or Moscow to start trouble or to encourage the North to do so,
no formal assurance had been received from China or Russia.
The Los Angels Times quoted one independent source that called
this report "imaginative."
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appropriate manner in order not to disturb peace and stability
in that area.

13

The two presidential envoys told Japanese officials that
at the end of the withdrawal program, only 6,000 non-combat
American ground troops out of 32,000 would remain in South
Korea; 14 but ,

they

said,

Carter would

not

carry

out

the

schedule for the withdrawals regardless of what happened in
Asia. The envoys also stressed that the five year framework
for the pullout was a "basic goal," but it would be alterable
and

the

withdrawals

circumstances

would

be

done

step

by

step

and

in Asia would be scrutinized at each stage

before proceeding to the next stage. 15
On

10

June

Habib

and

Brown

were

called

to

the

Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs
and Asian and Pacific Affairs

of the House

Committee on

International Relations to brief Congress on the results of
their

Far

Eastern

trip.

In

his

statement

before

the

subcommittee, Habib defended Carter's pullout plan by saying
that the withdrawal "is a natural, proper development in our
ongoing security relationship" with South Korea. He emphasized
that the decision was made after the Carter Administration had
"carefully

weighed

the

military

l~ DSB 77 (11 July 1977): 50.
14
. WP, 6 June 1977.
15
• LAT, 29 May 1977.

and

international

91
1116
con S 1'derations involved.
General Brown also testified before the Subcommittee that
there would be some risk involved but "it is of an acceptable
degree." He further assured that war would not break out from
"a rational decision" of the North Korean leaders in case the
united states carried out the withdrawal program. The general
added that the United States Government could not make foreign
policy based on "irrational acts. 1117
The two envoys also testified before the Subcommittee
that Seoul and Tokyo officials accepted the withdrawal plan
on the condition that the United States would take "adequate
measures" in order to insure the security of South Korea and
Northeast Asia. They also were convinced that American ground
troops could be removed from South Korea without any risk of
war because China and the Soviet Union had no intention of
supporting such an invasion. 18
Habib and Brown's trip to Seoul and Tokyo was aimed to
communicate the Carter Administration's decision of 5 May 1977
on the pullout to the both governments formally. It made South
Korean officials realize that Carter's decision was final and
irreversible. The South Korean Government focused its efforts
on getting more compensation rather than on suspending the

l~ DSB 77 (11 July 1977): 49.
17. WP, 11 June 1977.
18

• NYT, 11 June 1977.

92
poliCY• At the same time, Seoul planed a rapid development of
its defense industries and seriously considered a covert
nuclear weapon project for the nation's self-defense.

The

envoys' message dismayed the South Korean people, especially
Christians, and it incited them to protest Carter's withdrawal
policy through street demonstrations. 19

19• WP, 27 May 1977; Time 109 (6 June 1977): 29; FEER 96
(10 June 1977): 11.

CHAPTER VIII

THB BYRD AMENDMENT

The Singlaub affair also ignited Senatorial debates on
the Korean pullout policy. Senator George McGovern,

senior

Democrat of South Dakota, who was the Democratic presidential
nominee in 1972,

strongly supported President Carter's new

Korean policy. He argued in his article "The U. S. Risk in
Korea",

which

was

published

in

the

American

Enterprise

Institute (AEI) Defense Review in May 1977, that the Second
Division was in a "tripwire position" which guaranteed United
states automatic involvement in case of another war in Korea
whoever

would

start

it.

He

continued

to

argue

that

the

President or Congress would have no choice with American
troops under fire. Therefore, in order not to become involved
in another Asian land war, the Senator claimed, the United
States should give up being a policeman of the DMZ in the
Korean peninsula. 1
Sena tor John C.

1

Culver,

. George McGovern, "U.
Review (May 1977): 11-3.

Democrat of Iowa,

who was a

s. Risk in Korea," AEI Defense
93

94

member

of

Senate Armed Service

interview with the U. S. News

Conuni ttee,

& World

stated

in his

Report that the South

Korean Army had grown strong enough to def end the country
against

Northern aggression. He pointed out incorrectly that

south Korean President Park himself acknowledged the selfdefense capability several times, 2 said, "I believe now is an
appropriate time to phase out the redundant American ground
presence there." 3

The

Senator also

stressed the

changed

strategic conceptions of China and Russia by indicating that
Kim Il Sung, who visited Peking after Vietnam fell, was not
encouraged to start aggressive moves,

and he was not even

allowed to visit Moscow. 4
Senator Alan Cranston,

Democrat of California,

agreed

with Senator Culver that neither China nor Russia were likely
to

support

However,

North

Korea's

attempt

to

attack

South Korea.

Cranston, while claiming that he had long been a

student of the Korean issue, was concerned about South Korea's
possible adventuring into the North. He argued that whoever
started war first,

the United States had no choice to be

involved in another war in Korea as long as American ground
troops stayed along the border. Therefore, he claimed, United
States should remove its troops immediately in order to avoid

2 • For detailed consideration, see Chapter VI, 82.
3 . USNWR 82 (20 June 1977): 27-9.
4 . Ibid., 28.
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its tripwire role. 5
Meanwhile, Senate Republican leader Howard H. Baker Jr.
of Tennessee sharply challenged Carter's new Korean policy.
In his written statement submitted to the Subcommittee, Baker
argued that the Carter Administration was proceeding with its
withdrawal plan on the basis of "a campaign promise" made by
carter, not a careful and comprehensive review by the relevant
military experts. The senator stressed that the pullout would
create uncertainty throughout free Asia, stimulate regional
tensions, and risk a major outbreak of hostilities on the
Korean peninsula. 116
Senator Barry Goldwater,

Republican of Arizona,

also

criticizing Carter's withdrawal policy, said, "I am convinced
that this action could lead to war in South Korea. 117 Senator
Charles

Percy,

Republican

of

Illinois,

and

influential

Democratic Senator John Glenn joined the critics of Carter's
Korean withdrawal policy. They were followed by Senator Sam
Nunn,

Senator Henry Jackson,

Senator Daniel

Inouye,

and

Senator Gary Hart. 8
During

debate

on

the

fiscal

1978

State

Department

5• LAT, 7 June 1977.
6

• WP, 11 June 1977.

7

• CT, 17 June 1977.

8• Vance, Choices, 128-9. According to Vance, Senator
Percy, one of the most ardent supporters for Asia, told
Holbrooke, banging his fist on the table, that he would forge
a united Republican opposition to the pullout.
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operations

authorization

bill

(HR

6689),

Senate

majority

ieader Robert C. Byrd, Democrat of West Virginia, submitted
an amendment endorsing Carter's withdrawal pol icy technically,
yet

omitting

the

explicit

four

to

five

years

pullout

timetable. However, minority leader Senator Howard H. Baker
Jr. and angry conservatives did not want to accept Byrd's
language which supported the Carter's pullout plan, and tried
to submit an amendment to delete the language in question.
concerned

that

Baker's

amendment

might

create

a

strong

negative mood in the Senate against Carter's proposed policy
even if it was defeated, Byrd proposed to modify the language.
Finally, after seven modifications in three hours, the Byrd
Amendment was adopted by seventy-nine to fifteen votes. In its
final

version,

the

opposed Carter's

Byrd

amendment

neither

supported

nor

Korean pullout policy but expressed the

sentiment that United States

policy toward

Korea

"should

continue to be arrived at by joint decision of the President
and Congress." It also asked the administration to submit to
the Senate

an annual report assessing the effect of the

withdrawals. 9 The Senate vote neither bound the President
legally and constitutionally nor totally rejected Carter's
plan,

but

the

debate

explicated

that

Carter

would

face

substantial opposition from congress if he attempted to carry

9 . CQWR 35 (18 June 1977): 1204; Congress and the Nation
5 ( 1981) : 1008.
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out the policy without modification. 10
on 17 June Carter made it clear that, in spite of the
senate resolution, he would proceed with his pullout program
as scheduled. The White House announced that the President
would respect the Byrd amendment and continue to consult with
congress on the withdrawal policy. However, carter reaffirmed
that he would not change his basic decision by emphasizing the
fact that certain decisions on the deployment of military
personnel were the sole responsibility of the commander in
chief. 11 In his interview with Bob Clark and Barrie Dunsmore
of ABC news on 19 June, Secretary of State Vance also claimed
that the Byrd amendment could not restrict the President's
rights to proceed with the policy. However, he added that the
administration would welcome Congressional cooperation and
consultation on the Korean policy. 12
In the meantime, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
received a closed door briefing on 20 June about the impact
of the withdrawal on South Korea from Stansfield Turner,
Director of the CIA. Afterward, Chairman John J. Sparkman,
Democrat of Alabama, said, "there had been some confusion over
the basis of intelligence as it relates to the question of a
possible pullout of United States ground troops from Korea

10• WP, 17 June 1977.
1 ~ NYT, 18 June 1977.
l~ DSB 77 (18 July 1977): 78.
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ove r

the next few years." The chairman added that there was

"no urgency" and the committee would take no action one way
or the other in the near future. 13
The

Byrd

Amendment

did

not

limit

President

Carter

legally, nor did it fully reject his Korean policy. However,
it

clearly

represented

the

Senatorial

concern

over

the

withdrawal policy and constrained the President to modify or
suspend the withdrawals.

13
• WP, 21 June 1977.

CHAPTER IX

THE TENTH ANNUAL SECURITY CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE

For ten years, the Washington and Seoul governments had
held an annual security meeting to discuss general defense
issues

between

attention.

two

Unlike

countries

the

previous

without
ones,

attracting
the

tenth

public
Security

conference had attracted considerable interest especially in
south Korea because the meeting would define the troop pullout
schedules. In order to fulfill the policy within the proposed
period,

the

Carter

Administration

had

to

settle

upon

a

specific pullout schedule with Seoul at the meeting. Moreover,
they had to demonstrate to the public that it could be done
safely in order to calm the growing domestic and overseas
objections to the policy. Meanwhile, the Seoul Government had
to secure

adequate

compensatory measures

from

the United

States to fill the military gaps that the departure of the
Second

Division would

create.

They

also

needed

a

strong

American defense promise to deter war in Korea as well as to
sooth the growing fears among South Korean people.
In order to prepare for the conference, officials of both
99

100

countries frequently met in Washington and in Seoul. To judge
f r om the number of preliminary meetings to prepare for
. the
tenth annual conference, the issues were troublesome. On 3
June in Washington, Korean Ambassador Kim Yong Shik visited
Philip

c.

Habib. 1

In Seoul, on 10 June, the first committee

meeting between both countries military officers was held at
the united Nations Command headquarters. 2 On 14 June Richard
L. Sneider,
Foreign

United states Ambassador in Seoul,

Minister

Park

Dong

Jin

met

to

and Korean

discuss

adequate

compensatory measures that the United States could offer in
the next annual security meeting in Seoul. 3

On 10 July, two

weeks before the annual

Under-Secretary

security meeting,

Habib visited Seoul again for talks with both American and
Korean officials

on the proposed pullout policy.

laying the groundwork for
his purpose was also to

Besides

the tenth annual security meeting,

discourage the Seoul Government from

attempting to develop its own nuclear weapons. 4
1 . "Chronology Of Korea - u. S. Relations", Korea & World
Affairs, 6 (Summer 1982): 361.
2

. Ibid.

3

• NYT, 15 June 1977.

4 . NYT, 9 July 1977 and 11 July 1977; CSM, 11 July 1977.
South Korean officials repeatedly advocated the development
of nuclear weapons if they were faced serious security threats
from the North. President Carter, who did not want nuclear
proliferation,
confirmed
that
South
Korea
would
be
continuously covered by American nuclear umbrella in his
interview with editors of the U. S. News & World Report in
~une 1977. He also hinted that he might use nuclear weapons
in South Korea if the North were to start another war. See
U.s. News & World Report 82 (6 June 1977): 19.
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While officials of both countries were negotiating on the
pullout plan,

Secretary of State Cyrus

Vance

repeatedly

confirmed to the public that American troops could be safely
pulled back home with in four or five years. On 28 June the
secretary claimed that the South Korean Army could fully
defend its nation with United States air and naval support. 5
on the next day, in his address before the Asia Society at New
York, Vance reaffirmed that South Korea's economic growth and
military

strength were

the

decision on the pullout.

basis

for

The secretary,

President Carter's
pointed out that

American ground forces in South Korea only constituted about
5 percent of the total ground troops in South Korea.

He

maintained that a careful phaseout of these troops over a four
to five year period would not endanger the security of South
Korea. He also expressed his strong expectation of China's new
role in keeping peace and stability in the Korean peninsula
by stating that "we consider friendly relations with China to
be a central part of our foreign policy" in that region. 6
On 23 July Secretary of Defense Harold Brown,accompanied
by officials of the State Department, the National Security
Council, and the Pentagon, visited Seoul in order to attend
the tenth Annual Security Consultative Conference between the

5 • DSB 77 (25 July 1977): 122.
6. Ibid., 1 August 1977, 142-3.
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united states and south Korea. 7
In

his

arrival

statement,

Secretary

Brown

stressed

America's firm intention to respond to any attack from North
Korea against the South. He said,
we will affirm the intention of the United States
to maintain powerful military forces in Korea and
throughout the Western Pacific in order to respond
promptly and decisivell to any armed attack against
the Republic of Korea.
However, in his greeting statement, South Korean Defense
Minister Suh Jyong Chul expressed a sharply different view by
emphasizing the importance of preventing such an possible
attack. He said,
our purpose is to deter a renewal of war. I believe
our combined strength and determination must remain
strong enough t~ discourage any miscalculation by
the adversaries.
At the beginning of the talks, Secretary Brown officially
informed officials of South Korea that the United States would
remove 6, 000 troops

including one brigade of the Second

Division by the end of 1978 as the

first

stage of the

withdrawals. At the same time, the secretary offered a four
year US$1.9 billion aid package for its compensation - a oneshot US$300 million credit for weapon purchases, a four-year
US$1.1 billion military sale credit

(US$275 million each

7. NYT, 24 July 1977; WP, 23 July 1977; LAT, 24 July
1977; CT, 24 July 1977.
8

. LAT, 24 July 1977.

9

• Ibid.
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and free gift of US$500 million worth of weapons and
yea r) ,
equipment held by the Second Division in South Korea. 10 Brown
also advised Koreans that about 8,000 to 9,000 ground troops
would be pulled back by 1980. And the rest of them except
7 , ooo air force personnel and about 3,000 to 6,000 troops
involved in communication, logistics, and intelligence would
be removed by 1981 or 1982. 11
The secretary also tried to persuade Koreans with a new
rationale for the withdrawal. He claimed that "a sound five
year withdrawal program", prepared by Carter, would be better
than leaving troops in place but open to Congressional action
that could lead to a "spasm withdrawal," that would not give
Koreans a chance to offset the loss of military capability.
He also told Koreans that South Korea would be politically
more stable if the balance of military power between the South
and the North could be established without the presence of
U.S. ground troops. 12
South Korean delegates wanted to keep American ground
troops as long as possible in order to gain time to build up
their military capability. They asked the U.S. delegates to

l~ LAT, 25 July 1977; WSJ, 25 July 1977. (US$1.4 billion
credit was repayable in seven years at 8 percent interest).
1 ~ Sam Jameson, "Brown's Asian Visit Paves the Way for
Koreanization," LAT, 31 July 1977, sec. 4; NYT, 26 July 1977
and 27 July 1977; CT, 27 July 1977.
12. LAT, 25 July 1977; Jameson, "Brown's Asian Visit,"
Lh'.r, 31 July 1977, sec. 4.
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keep two brigades of the Second Division and its headquarters
in Korea until the last month of the withdrawal. Secretary
Brown made this concession to the South Koreans in a meeting
with President Park. 13
In the wake of the Vietnam defeat,

the South Koreans

already set aside US$5 billion beyond the normal defense
budget

for a

force

improvement program over a

five

year

period. The Koreans told the U.S. delegates that they would
need at least US$2 billion in aid to fill

in the gaps of

military capability created by departing American troops. 14
secretary Brown did not make a specific promise but explained
carter's plan to ask Congress for a US$1.9 billion Korean aid
package.

Defense

Minister

Suh

asked

Secretary

Brown

to

complete compensatory measures before the withdrawal began.
However, Brown made it clear that the United States plan was
to have them proceeded "in parallel." 15
The discussion focused on what would be left behind and
what would be taken out. Koreans wanted the United States to
leave behind 116 latest model M-60 tanks held by the Second
Division and buy more of this model in order to offset the
North Korean's sizable advantage in armor. American delegates

13. NYT,

27 July 1977; LAT, 27 July 1977; CT,

27 July

1977.

.

14
sec. 4.

Jameson,

"Brown's Asian Visit," LAT,

1 ~ LAT, 26 July 1977; CT, 26 July 1977.

31 July 1977,
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rejected the Korean proposal because the older M-48 tanks held
bY south Korea were equivalent in capability, moreover the new
weapon would require the South Koreans to assume an additional
burden

for

delegates

separate
did

agree

line. 16 The

logistic
to

hand

over

United

sizable

States

numbers

of

helicopters and armed personnel carriers held by the Second
Infantry

Di vision

to

South Korea.

But

the

United States

offered only a limited ammunition stockpile in South Korea,
between 250,000 and 300,000 tons (about US$700 million value)
that the Korean troops could use for thirty to forty-five days
in case of military confrontation,

even though the Korean

delegates wanted to have a stockpile several times as large. 17
The south Koreans were eager to buy more sophisticated
weapons

from

the

United

States,

but

the

United

States

delegates advised Koreans to concentrate on defensive rather
than offensive weapons because they did not want both Koreas
to

accelerate

promised

to

an

let

race. 18 However,

arms
South

Korea

Secretary

buy American weapons

Brown
"on

a

priority basis" including the sophisticated F-16 fighter. He
also promised that the United States would help with the
development of South Korea's new defense industry. At the same
time,

the

secretary

promised

to

expand

16• NYT, 27 July 1977; WSJ, 25 July 1977.
17. WSJ, 25 July 1977.
l~ Ibid.

joint

military
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exercises, establish a combined United States - South Korea
Military Command, and strengthen the United States Air Forces
in Korea.
The

19

issue

of

600

tactical

nuclear

weapons

held

by

AI11erican forces in Korea was one of the most sensitive points
in the two days of talks. The United States made it clear that
south Korea should rest its defense on non-nuclear weapons,
while

confirming

that

South

Korea

would

continue

to

be

protected by the United States nuclear umbrella. 20
Meanwhile, Secretary Brown gave President Park a personal
letter from Carter. The letter reaffirmed the United States
commitment to South Korea in spite of the withdrawals. the
President confirmed in his letter that the United States would
provide "prompt support" to help South Korea against any armed
attack in accordance with the mutual defense treaty of 1954,
and added that "neither North Korea nor any other country
should

have

commitment."

any

doubt

the

continuing

In his letter to Park,

strength

of

Carter offered a

this
new

pledge that he would keep American ground troops involved in
communication, logistics, and intelligence in South Korea "for
the indefinite future. 1121
After ending two days of talks, both parties issued a

.

19 Jameson, "Brown's Asian
Visit," LAT,
sec. 4; LAT, 27 July 1977.

.
21.

20 WSJ, 27 July 1977; LAT, 27 July 1977.
NYT, 26 July 1977; LAT, 26 July 1977 .

31 July 1977,
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seven page joint communique. The gist of the joint communique
is as follows:
The first 6,000 Gis would go home by the end of
1978.
A u.s. - Korean Command would be created after the
first phase of pullout was complete.
The U.S. Air Force in Korea would be strengthened
as ground troops return home.
The American nuclear umbrella would continue to
cover South Korea following the withdrawal of ground
forces.
The U. s. would help South Korea beef up its own
armed forces and help with Korea's new defense
industry.
Congress would be asked to approve a Korean aid
package totaling an estimated US$1.9 billion.
The u. S. agreed in principle to sell weapons on a
priority basis, including F-16 jet fighters, to
South Korea.
The U. s. commitment to the defense of South Korea
made in the 1954 treaty would be unchanged.
The u. sand South Korea urged North Korea to
agree to the resumption of 2 the S-N dialogue
suspended by the North in 1973.
The successful completion of the tenth Annual Security
Consultative Conference brought the Carter Administration one
step close to the withdrawals. However,

it still could not

calm the growing domestic and overseas objections to the
policy.

Nor

did

the

security

meeting

mi ti gate

the

Congressional conservatives' movement to suspend the policy.

22. NYT,
1977.

27 July 1977; WP,

27 July 1977; LAT,

27 July
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such an opposition threatened Congressional approval for a
us$!. 9 billion Korean aid package, which was essential in
managing

the

completion
unclear.

of

withdrawals.
the

proposed

Therefore,
withdrawal

carter's

successful

program was

still

CHAPTER X

SAMUELS. STRATTON AND CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATIVES

Samuels. Stratton was born in Yonkers, New York on 27
September 1916.

He was educated in the public schools of

Schenectady and Rochester,

New York and at Blair Academy,

Blairstown, New Jersy. He graduated from the University of
Rochester

in 1937.

Stratton entered Haverford College

Pennsylvania and got a M.A.

degree in 1938.

in

For next two

years, he continued to study philosophy at Harvard University,
and in 1940 Stratton obtained his second M.A. degree there.
After that, Stratton started to work for Congressman Thomas
H. Eliot of Massachusetts for 2 years. In 1942 he joined in
U.S. Naval Reserve. In 1943, after he had studied the Japanese
language at the University of Colorado in Boulder for one
year, Stratton worked at headquarters under General Douglas
MacArthur's Command in Australia as a Japanese interpreter.
He

participated

in

landings

in

New

Guinea

and

in

the

Philippines during World War II and received the Bronze star
Medal twice. From 1948 to 1954, Stratton taught philosophy at
109
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union college in Schenectady and at Rensselaer Polytechnic
rnsti tute. At the same time,

he joined local radio and TV

stations as a news commentator. During the Korean War, he was
recalled to active duty.

In 1956 he was elected mayor of

Schenectady. As mayor from 1956 to 1959, he reformed city
government and campaigned to wipe out gambling in the city.
one local journalist described Mayor Stratton as "the most
controversial figure ever to stir up political sparks" in the
history of the city. In 1959 Stratton became a United States
congressman.

1

since taking his seat in the House, Stratton had been a
member

of

the

Armed

Services

Committee.

He

advocated

effective military management and did not favor an increase
in the defense budget.

Meanwhile,

in the area of foreign

policy, Stratton always supported U.S. military assistance and
other foreign aid programs. 2
As soon as the Singlaub affair occurred, Stratton called
for Congressional hearings,

pointing out that Congress had

never been officially advised of President Carter's withdrawal

1

. Adcock, Edgar, Jr., Beverley McDonough, Judy Redel,
eds. Who's Who In American Politics 1988-90 (New York: R.R.
Bowker Company, 1989), 1160; Congressional Directory. 95th
Cong. 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), 130; Charles
Moritz, Current Biography Yearbook (New York: The H. w. Wilson
Company, 1966), 392-4.
2 . Moritz, Biography 1966, 394. Stratton was the only
opponent among members of the House Armed Services Committee
to a bill of 1965 requesting salary increase for military men
a US$1 billion each year.
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policy, nor had the policy been discussed in the Congress. As
of

chairman

the

House

Armed

Services

Investigations

subcoJlllllittee, Stratton encouraged General Singlaub to present
his beliefs and urged fellow Congressmen to decide

whether

the proposed policy risked a war in Korea. 3
Having concluded from the Singlaub hearings that the
pullout

would

peninsula,

involve

Chairman

the

risk

Stratton

of
and

a

war

in

other

the

Korean

Congressional

conservatives decided to continue their examination of the
policy.

They asked the Pentagon to make General George S.

Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Bernard

w.

and General

Rogers, Chief of Staff of the United States Army,

to be available for Congressional hearings. 4
At the same time,

the House Armed Services Committee

officially requested the National Security council (NSC) to
provide copies of the Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM13) and Presidential Directive (PD/NSC-12) on Korea in order
to know the details of the withdrawal plan. However, the NSC
rejected the Congressional request by answering that those
documents were too sensitive to be presented to the congress

3 • Cong. HASC 95-71, 2-10. During the hearing, Stratton
frequently requested Gen. Singlaub to repeat his views,
repeating them himself in his questions, e.g.: "In other
words, General, what you are telling us is, as far as you know
t~e overwhelming majority of people on the spot in Korea,
either military or civilians, feel that the withdrawal of all
U.S. ground forces from Korea is a mistake and could run the
risk of war?"
4

. LAT, 27 May 1977.
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. t 5
at that po1n.

congressional conservatives censured the Executive for
ignoring the Constitutional right of the Congress to review
those documents. 6 Congressman Charles Wilson,

Democrat of

California, complained that "only the President and Secretary
Brown seem to know what in the world is going on as far as the
defense of our country is concerned. 117 Congressman Richard
Ichord,

who

university

was
of

a

former

Missouri,

law

advised

school
the

professor
committee

at

the

that

the

executive process of the presidential directive would be
matter of executive privilege, but the directive itself could
not be the matter of executive privilege. He suggested that
the committee issue a subpena. However, the committee decided
instead to again request that the NSC provide Congress with
the documents. 8
In the meantime, General George S. Brown and General
Bernard

w.

Rogers denied General Singlaub's assertion that

military experts were not consulted by the President on the
withdrawal policy except on the timing of the pullout. Both
generals confirmed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff participated
in the NSC meeting and other security review processes which

.
6
.
7.
5

8

.

Cong. HASC 95-71, 87-8 •
Ibid., 77, 92-4 •
Ibid., 87 •
Ibid., 93-4 •
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ied to president Carter's decision to pullout the ground
troops from south Korea. General Brown added that local
commanders in the Pacific and Korea were also consulted by
carter.

9

Contrary to Singlaub, Rogers and Brown defended

carter's new Korean policy by claiming that the withdrawal
would be "an acceptable risk. 1110
Liberal Democrats expressed their satisfactions with both
generals' testimony on the withdrawals. Congressman Dellums
told Brown that:
This is a very interesting moment for me, today,
General Brown ••. I am having a great deal of fun
this morning ••• Based on all those factors you came
to the conclusion you are in support of the
President's policy with respect to phased withdrawal
of troops in South Korea. And that, to use the
military term, you perceive the risk but that risk
is within acceptable range. I would seem to me that
testimony ought to be adequate for all members of
this committee and Congress. That is that the
president, the State Department, the Pentagon, (the)
Joint Chiefs of staff, everyone has looked at it
from a multiplicity of perceptions, factored in a
multiplicity of considerations, and has 'i.Ofle to the
conclusion that you can withdraw troops.
Meanwhile, Stratton officially requested General Brown
to provide the committee with copies of back-channel telegraph
traffic,

which represented the personal view of military

personnel on the issue, in order to trace Singlaub's assertion
that most local officials believed that the withdrawal would

9

• Ibid., 78-80, 111.
10• Ibid., 85, 124.
11• Ibid., 138.
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seriously increase the risk of war. 12
congressman Marjorie

s.

Holt,

Republican of Maryland,

conscious that every government officials confirmed the United
states would remain a Pacific power, asked General Brown how
the united States could remain a Pacific power if the Carter
Administration pulled out troops and nuclear weapons from
south Korea,

which was one of the most important overseas

bases in Asia. Holt said, "what do we do, just stand up and
say we

are

a

Pacific

power

and

everything

will

be

all

. ht?"13
rig
.

congressman William L. Dickinson, Republican of Alabama,
argued that even though the North Koreans did not consider the
south

a

threat,

tremendously

in

they

still

manpower,

increased
aircraft,

their
naval

capabilities
vessels,

and

particularly tanks during the past five years. Pointedly he
asked, "what kind of calculation should a reasonable person
draw from that? 1114
Congressman Larry McDonald, Democrat of Georgia, argued
that since Kim Il Sung did not change his attitude of using
force in achieving unification, it is hard to understand why
the administration

suddenly made

the gesture

to withdraw

troops at that particular moment. He was concerned that the

.
13.
14.
12

Ibid., 121-2 •
Ibid., 132 •
Ibid., 136 •
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~ithdraw policy could be easily be interpreted by the United
states allies in Asia as a "symbol of our bugging out, or
getting flaky, or flakier. 1115
Stratton and other conservative Congressmen tried to
block the policy by comparing the situations between Korea and
NATO. congressman Robert E. Badham, Republican of California,
argued that the United States did not pull its troops out of
Germany even though that country had a stronger economy than
that of Korea. He also stressed that there was much more risk
of war in Korea than in Germany by pointing out the fact that
the North Koreans had shot down an American helicopter in the
DMZ area on the previous day. 16
Rogers and Brown emphasized that the greatest threat
still lay in Europe rather than in Asia because Warsaw Pact
forces had been enhanced in size and sophistication during the
ten years while the United States was engaged in war in South
Asia. Both generals also argued that they could not equate

Europe with Korea because the United States did not face the
Russians or Communist forces like the Warsaw Pact in Korea. 17
Stratton admitted that the most important United States
strategy was keeping a stable situation in Europe. However,
he claimed that

.
.
.

it would not be to

15 Ibid., 129 .
16 Ibid., 128 •
17 Ibid., 98, 128 •

the United States'
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advantage to stir up a war in Korea even though Northeast Asia

wa s strategically less important than Europe. He said, "if
. we
have a stable balance there and we can keep a stable balance
there, why should we want to run any risk of upsetting it at
all ?"1 8

The chairman,

while mentioning his

two years

of

service in the Korean War, said, "I certainly don't want to
go back again or see our country go back again. 1119
stressed

that

the

Vietnam War

proved

that

the

He also

deterrent

capability of air and naval forces was not as great as ground
forces.

Stratton said,

"I think all indications we saw in

Vietnam that you can't fight an infantry war with air and
naval power; you have to fight it on the ground. 1120
Stratton,

criticized

the

government's

intention

to

increase a NATO budget by 3 percent while at the same time
talking about withdrawing troops from South Korea. He warned
that it might give the enemy impression that Asia wasn't
really important to the United States. 21 The chairman reminded
the committee that the United States got into World War II not
because
happened

of
in

what

happened

Asia.

in

Americans,

Europe

but

interested

because

of

in

nation's

the

what

security, should pay more attention to what was going on in

.
19.
18

20

Ibid., 99 .
Ibid., 323 .

.

Ibid., 325 .

.

Ibid., 429-30 .
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han to Europe. 22 Stratton again used the Pearl Harbor
Asia t
analogy during the testimony of Roger Sullivan,

Deputy of

foreign Mission, United States Embassy in Taiwan:
I went through Pearl Harbor and we were told that
the Japanese wouldn't possibly attack us and
everything was under control, and it didn't work out
that way. So we are trying to get to the bottom of
a situation. We are not zeroing in on you or anybody
else, . but this 2 Jias been a rather revealing
experience to us.
Stratton stressed that the North Koreans maintained a
threatening offensive capability. They could attack Seoul with
very little warning, less than six hours. He said,
North

Koreans

come

something like that,

down

and

take

Seoul

in

"if the

3 o hours

or

the ball game is largely over. 1124 The

chairman also pointed out that

only a

single brigade of

American troops kept the peace and stability in Berlin, a city
that was surrounded by communist power. He, argued that it was
possible because the presence of American ground troops there

were a tremendous deterrent, said, "it seems to me the same
thing would apply to Korea. 1125
Congressman Harold Ford,

Democrat of Tennessee,

while

emphasizing that the goal of United States involvement in
Europe was

to create a

.

Ibid., 256 •

.

Ibid., 336 •

22

23

.
25.

24

Ibid., 315 .
Ibid., 99 •

deterrent,

claimed that

the

same
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ent should be made in Korea. He said, "if you replace

argum
35 I

u.s. troops with 35,000 South Korean troops, regardless

000

.

of hoW well they are equipped,

they do not have the same

.. 26
deterrent capab 1'l't
1 y.
In his written statement to the committee, Congressman
William M.

Ketchum,

Republican of California,

who was a

veteran of the Korean War and World War II, expressed his deep
concern over the proposed withdrawal policy. Ketchum doubted
the rationale of the policy decision. He did not think that
the south Korean Army was strong enough to maintain the status
quo in the Korean peninsula. Peace had been kept only through
the presence of American ground troops. The North attacked the
south shortly after the completion of the American military
withdrawal from South Korea in 1949. He further argued that
any drastic shift in the delicate balance of power in Korea
would disturb political, economic, and military stability not
only in Asia but also in Western World as well. He said,
The question is not can we afford to remain in South
Korea, but can we afford not to remain in South
Korea? We must be made to fully realize the grave
implications with which we are dealing. The chance
we take ~9day can only become the peril we face
tomorrow.
Meanwhile,

Congressman Robin L.

Beard,

Republican of

Tennessee, discussed the advantage of using Korean soil as a
training area for United States soldiers.

26

• Ibid., 98.

27

. Ibid., 212.

The congressman
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argued that American soldiers got more motivation in Korea
than in any other place in the United States because they were
"locked into a situation in a war zone." He maintained that
unless there was a significant cost savings benefit, it would
be mistake to give up the most effective

u.

s. training area

in the world. 28
Having heard the criticism of Carter's withdrawal policy,
Stratton and three other hawkish committee members traveled
to south Korea and other countries in the Far East in order
to obtain on-the-spot views of the military situation in
Korea.

During their trip from 2 to 16 January 1978,

the

subcommittee delegation met not only with senior American
military and civilian officials but also with relevant foreign
military and civilian officials in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and
Philippines in order to learn their views on the proposed
pullout policy. 29
After completing his Far Eastern trip, Stratton made a
report entitled "Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw
United States Ground Forces from Korea." The report pointed
out the following findings:

2 ~ Ibid., 239-40.
2 ~ Cong. HASC 95-61, 1-2. The committee heard views of
Donalds. Zagoria, Professor of Government at Hunter College
and Graduate Center of the City University of New York,
Professor Morton A. Kaplan, Director of the Center for
Strategic and Foreign Policy Students at the University of
Chicago, and Richard G. Stilwell, a retired general who was
former commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in Korea. All of them
criticized Carter's pullout policy.
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President Carter had arrived at his decision to
withdraw U. s. forces from Korea well before his
inauguration. The Subcommittee found no evidence
that
the
President
had
sought
any
advice;
assistance, recommendations or estimates of probable
impact of his withdrawal decision on u.s security
considerations or stability in the Far East from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff ••• or from any other
knowledgeable military sources prior to making his
decision •••• All of the testimony presented to the
subcommittee agrees that the presence of U.S. forces
in Korea, particularly U.S. ground forces, has been
the single most important factor in preventing the
outbreak of a new war in Korea .••• on the basis of
current
intelligence
estimates
and
all
the
information made available to it, the subcommittee
concluded that the North Koreans possess the
capability of attacking the South with a minimum of
warning, and that the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division is
needed for an adequate defense. Were that Division
to be withdrawn, t~l> defense of Seoul would be
greatly complicated.
The

report

emphasized

the

significant

psychological

deterrent role of the Second Di vision in addition to its
combat capability.

It also pointed out that the withdrawal

would not save money, but might well result in increased cost,
lose the best feasible training ground for American combat
troops, and reduce America's influence in the Pacific. 31
The report concluded that the 30,000 U.S. ground troops
in Korea fulfilled the same deterrent function as some 300,000
American troops stationed in Western Europe. Therefore, its
pullout

without

a

proper

countermeasure

would

not

only

significantly increase the chances of war with Communist North
but also

seriously endanger the

30• Ibid., 2-4.
31• Ibid., 3-4.

safety

of

the

remaining
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AJnerican troops in South Korea. 32 The report accepted the
announced schedule of removing 6,000 troops from South Korea
on condition that the Congress enacted legislation authorizing
the transfer of their equipments to the South Korean Army
before they left Korea. However, it suggested a slower and
more protracted withdrawal and recommended that the President
modify his plan and for him to use the remaining American
forces as a final card to conclude a peace settlement between
North and South Korea. 33
Chairman Samuels. Stratton and his fellow conservative
congressmen played the greatest role in rallying Congressional
objections to Carter's Korean policy. They not only called for
hearings but also traveled to South Korea and other Asian
nations to obtain local commanders' views on the policy. They
made a report that Carter's proposed policy would only risk
war

without

convinced
withdrawal

getting

significant

Congressional
policy

was

benefits.

conservatives
a

mistake.

that
It

Their

report

the

Korean

encouraged

conservatives to continue to stand against the policy.

32. Ibid., 5-6.
33• Ibid., 6-7, 18.

the

CHAPTER XI

MILITARY OPINION

The

United

overwhelmingly

States'

opposed

withdrawal policy. 1

to

top

military

President

officers

Carter's

were

proposed

After the President officially decided

the pullout policy on 5 May 1977, however, the Joint Chiefs
of staff agreed to support the presidential decision on the
condition that the United States reaffirmed the Mutual Defense
Treaty,

supplied

adequate

military

compensation,

and

maintained U.S. air and naval power in South Korea even after
the pullout. 2

But the local commanders in the Pacific still

did not support Carter's pullout policy.
opposition

not

only

inspired

Their continuing

Congressional

conservatives

opposition to the policy, but also raised the spectre that
Carter might face the blame for any future conflict between
the two Koreas. This debate continued to slow the momentum of

1 • NYT, 6 October 1976; WP, 9 January 1977, 19 May 1977,
21 May 1977, and 14 July 1977; .LA.l'., 19 April 1977; Cong. HASC
~5-71, 78-79, 99.
2 • Humphrey Report, 20.
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carter's policy.
The singlaub affair divided the military leaders into
defenders or critics of President Carter on the withdrawals.
General George S.

Brown,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

staff, who favored a partial and slower pullout, defended the
president's decision after the Singlaub affair. He argued that
south

Korea,

with

its

strong

economy

and

sizable,

well

disciplined professional military forces, was strong enough
to defend itself against the North. The United States would
need to help the South Korean Army to develop additional
capability in areas such as logistics and intelligence. But
because of the South Korean's overall defensive capability,
he argued, it would be unfair if the United States continued
to let them remain dependent on American protection. 3 In his
brief statement before the House Armed Services Committee on
14 July 1977, General Brown defended Carter by emphasizing
that the President was fully aware of the following views of
the Joint Chiefs of staff:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that North Korea
cannot now attack South Korea with assurance of
victory. The ROK force improvement program plus the
so called compensatory actions which are being
defined, if approved and supported by the Congress
and carried out in a timely manner, will assure
successful defense against attack subsequent to U.S.
ground force withdrawal. If that capability is
accompanied by a strong, visible U.S. commitment to
support the ROK through our Mutual Defense Treaty,
then
only
an
irrational
act
or
a
serious

3

. Cong. HASC 95-71, 128.
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miscalculation would lead to war. 4
General Brown admitted that there would be less risk if the
united states left its ground troops in South Korea and that
the withdrawal did entail additional risk. But he said that
he believed it would be an "acceptable risk." He contended
that:
The likelihood of this program leading to war was
perhaps slightly higher than it would be if we
didn't do it, but we really don't think war is going
to come as a result of it. I think that is probably
as clear and about as close as I can come to
defining it. It is acceptable. It obviously would
be unacgeptable if we thought it was going to lead
to war.
General Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of staff of the U.S.
Army, also defended carter's policy by claiming that the risk
involved in the pullout would be "acceptable." He also told
members of the House Armed Services Committee on 13 July 1977
that, "there is a risk involved, greater than the risk in
retaining

the

status

quo

that

the

risk will

be

an

acceptable risk. 116
Meanwhile, United States military commanders in the Far
East strongly opposed any pullout of the Second Division from
South Korea. Even before Carter took the Oval Office, General
John W.

Vessey,

Commander in Chief of United Nations and

United States Forces in Korea, who was among the most ardent

4

.

Ibid., 111 •

5

.

Ibid., 127 •

6

.

Ibid., 85 •
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critics

of

the

Carter's

pullout

policy,

declared

in

an

interview with John Saar of the Washington Post that the
withdrawal would heighten the

risk of war

in the Korean

peninsula. 7 On 30 April General Vessey reaffirmed his view in
hiS interview with the United Press International by saying,
"In my view the withdrawal of all the American ground troops
would raise the possibility of war in Korea. 118 The general
noted that the Second Division was located along a possible
North Korean invasion route to Seoul. He claimed that this
deployment was very important to deter war in Korea because
it gave a clear message to the North that they must fight the
United States as well as South Korea if they tried to size
seoul. 9

Vessey

Division's

emphasized

deterrence

role

the

importance

stating

that

of
"we

the
are

Second
here

to

prevent war, not a fight one. 1110 He also argued that "the cost
of one day of war in blood and resources could equate to fifty
years of deterrence. 1111
The

general

also

said that

North

and

South

Korea's

military capability were roughly equal. Therefore, the South
Korean Army could take care of themselves in a war with the

7

• WP, 9 January 1977.

8 . Ibid., 21 May 1977.
9

• Cong. HASC 95-71, 233; WP, 9 January 1977.

10
• IAT, 26 May 1977.
1 ~ Stilwell, "Need U.S. Forces," 23.
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North in case outsiders would not interfere. In such a case,
he claimed, "I would gamble on a southern victor. 1112 However,
vessey predicted, the Soviet Union and China would have no
choice but to support North Korea because of its strategic
importance

to

them.

He

argued

that

Korea

was

also

strategically important to the United States because it set
right in the middle of the Soviet Union, China, and Japan.
Therefore, he stressed that stability in that part of the
world was essential not only to Korea but also to the United
states' national security. On 3 October 1977 before members
of the House Armed Services Subcommittee,

Vessey clearly

expressed his opposition to the withdrawal policy by saying
that "as a military commander, if you want my opinion, I don't
want you to withdraw any forces. 1113 In February 1978 Vessey
reaffirmed his unequivocal opposition before the Senate Armed
Service Subcommittee by saying that "if I had my say, I would
not withdraw. 1114
General John H. Cushman, commander of I Corps (ROK/US)
Group in Korea, argued in his article "Military Balance In
Korea" that the results of war games showed that the South
12• WP, 9 January 1977.
13• Cong. HASC 95-71, 255.
14• Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations: Fiscal
Year 1979. Part 3: Manpower and Personnel. Overseas Troop
D.evelopments for Korea and Related Areas, 95th Cong., 2d
sess., 1978, s. Rept. 2571 (Washington, o.c.: GPO, 1978),
1842. (Hereafter cited as Cong. s. 2571).
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Korean ArmY, even fully supported by United States tactical
·r naval, and logistic support, could not defend Seoul from
a1,
North Korea's surprise attack. 15
He criticized Carter's
pullout policy by arguing that it was based on "an inaccurate
assessment of the actual military balance on the Korean
peninsula. 1116 The general pointed out that the Second Division
had a deterrent function as well as combat function. While the
combat

capabilities

of

the

Second

Division

could

be

transferred to the South Korean army, the deterrent function
could not . 17 He told members of the House Armed Services
Investigation Subcommittee that if the Carter Administration
pulled back its ground troops in the wrong way,
cause "an unwanted and unnecessary war." However,

it would
if the

united States did it right, it would give the Koreans selfconfidence. "Do it right" in his opinion meant that the last
American ground forces should remain in South Korea until the
North realized that they could not take over Seoul by force. 18
Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, United states Navy, Commander
in Chief of American Forces in the Pacific, also stressed the
deterrent value of American ground troops in South Korea by

1 ~ John H. Cushman, "The Military Balance in Korea,"
Asian Affairs 6 (July/August 1979): 362. He was Commander of
I Corps (ROK/US) Group from February 1976 to February 1978.
He was a war game expert.
16. Ibid., 361.
17. Ibid., 364-5.
18. Cong. HASC 95-71, 272.
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arguing that a fully capable Korean Division could never have
the same level of deterrent value that the Second Division
had.19 He argued that the North Koreans regarded the Second
oivision as "a direct indication of U .s. willingness to defend
the south." He said, "I believe the removal of U.S. combat
forces would be perceived by the North as a lessening of the
u.s.

resolve

and

could

increase

the

probability

of

an

attack. 1120 He also warned about a negative Japanese reaction
to the withdrawals because the Japanese historically placed
a great deal of importance on land forces. The pullout of the
second Division could only be perceived as a reduction of
American commitment in that area. 21 The admiral emphasized
that the pullout obviously would unnecessary increase the
level of tension and the possibility of adventurous action in
the part of the Far East.

Before the House Armed Services

Subcommittee in January 1978, he said that "from the military
viewpoint, I would prefer to have the troops stay." 22
General

vessey•s

deputy

Lt.

General

John

J.

Burns

l~ Ibid., 445.
2 ~ Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on
Authorization
for
Military
Procurement.
Research
and
Development. and Active Duty. Selected Reserve. and Civilian
Personnel Strengths: Fiscal Year 1978, 95th Cong, 1st sess.,
1977, S. Rept. 1210 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), 2358.
(Hereafter cited as Cong. s. 1210). The admiral claimed that
North Korea could attack Seoul successfully without the
assistance of China and Russia.
21. Ibid., 2362.
22

. Cong. HASC 95-71, 430.
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expressed his opinion in an interview with John Saar of the
~hington Post. He also preferred that the Second Division
staY in south Korea. He said, "the withdrawal must be managed
to avoid any disastrous change in the military balance on the
Korean peninsula or credibility of the American commitment. 1123
The general, who flew 102 combat mission as a fighter pilot
in the Korean War, added that American air units in South
Korea should be significantly strengthened in order to fill
the military gap that the withdrawal of the Second Division
would create.

24

Meanwhile, one United States officer in Seoul expressed
doubt about the effectiveness of air units' deterrent role by
saying that "warplanes are like geese. They can honk and fly
away. Who really believes that if we don't have the resolve

to keep troops in Korea that we are going to bring them back
if a war starts? 1125
George J. Keegan, jr., a retired U. s. Air Force major
general, also discounted American air units' deterrent role
in Korea. He argued that the bulk of the military targets were
well protected by massive underground bunkers and shelters
and even tactical nuclear weapons could not break them down.
The general claimed that reinforcing air and naval power could

23

• WP, 19 May 1977.

2 ~ Ibid.
2 ~ Ibid.
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not fill the military gap that the withdrawal of American
ground forces would create. He said the Korean pullout "is a
part of the United States world politics of retreat. 1126
General George G.
Forces

in Japan,

gave

withdraw process

and

Loving,

Commander of United States

importance

to

the

phasing

compensatory measures.

The

of

the

general,

stressing the reassessment process of each stage, said that
the united States must be sure occasionally to stop the
process and check what was happening in North Korea as well
as in Northeast Asia, and then adjust the plan in accordance
with changed conditions. 27 His deputy General John Q. Henion,
who also favored
claimed

that

reposition

keeping the Second Division in South Korea,

the

the

United

unit

in

States

had

Korea

in

to

have

addition

a
to

plan
a

to

full

compensatory program in order to show the North that South
Korea was fully supported by the United states. Otherwise, he
advocated, the withdrawals should be delayed. 28
General James F. Hollingsworth,
Corps

(ROK/US)

Group,

former Commander of I

who adopted the forward defense and

massive firepower strategy during his stay in South Korea,
also

emphasized

the

importance

withdrawals by saying that

"I

2 ~ CSM, 22 June 1977.
27
• Cong. HASC 95-71, 302-3.

28• I b'd
1 •

,

303.

of

the

support

time

phasing

the

President Carter's
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proposal to withdraw. However, I agree with President Park's
timing. 1129 The general urged the Carter Administration not to
begin the

initial withdrawal of

6000

troops until Seoul

completed its five-year army modernization program in 1980.
He claimed that the United states should continue to assist
and support in the modernization of Korean armed forces and
the development of defense industries, especially capability
for the production of aircraft and indigenous tanks. He added
that "I think if we got all things that they need now in
place, then we can consider an orderly withdrawa1. 1130
Admiral Robert Baldwin, Commander of the Seventh Fleet,
admitting the fact that the Seventh Fleet was involved in
Korea very heavily, said that Korea was the most sensitive
spot in the whole area of its operations from the east coast
of Africa to the Sea of Japan. The admiral said that he was
not an expert on the army picture in Korea, so he could not
predict the consequences of Carter's pol icy.

However,

the

admiral claimed, he believed that the withdrawals without full
compensation would heighten the risk of war in the Korean
peninsula. 31
General Richard G. Stilwell, retired as the commander in
chief of the United Nations and U. s. Forces in Korea in 1976,

29

. Cong. s. 2571, 1863.

3 ~ I bid.
3 ~ Cong. HASC 95-71, 213-20.
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questioned Carter's policy in an interview with Newsweek's
Tokyo bureau chief, Bernard Krisher. Stilwell noted that Kim
11 sung had never given up his goal of unifying Korea by force
in his lifetime. He also emphasized that air and naval forces
could not

replace

the

deterrent

function

of

the

Second

Division because they were far away from Seoul. For effective
deterrence, he said, "the deterring forces must be positioned
between the enemy and any logical objective. 1132 Stilwell was
also concerned about three possible Japanese reactions to the
pullout

-

substantial

rearmament,

development of nuclear

weapons, accommodation with the Soviet Union - and claimed
that the United States ground troops in Korea should not be
pulled back until North and South Korea achieved a peace
settlement. 33 The general also emphasized in his article "The
Need for U.S. Ground Forces in Korea," published in the AEI
Defense Review in May 1977 that the Second Division played "a
unique, non transferable function in the prevention of war. 1134
He concluded the article with the following rationale for the
maintenance of the Second Division in South Korea:
They are key to the security and well being of
36 million human beings and to the protection of u.
s. interests .••
Their presence provides the only lever that
might force the North to accept the reality of two
Korean states ...
They are valuable - indeed essential - assets
3 ~ Newsweek 89 (6 June 1977): 51.
33• Ibid., 51.
3 ~ Stilwell, "Need U.S. Forces," 23.
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in furthering our major objectives in Northeast
Asia: strengthening the partnership with Japan;
minimizing the Soviet presence; improving relations
with the people's Republic of China; sustaining the
region's economic momentum; fostering a climate in
which the kind of democratic ins ti tut ions we espouse
can
take
root;
and
preventing
nuclear
proliferation •••
Finally, that band of 30,000 is the symbol that
the United states is no less concerned with the
future of the free societies of ~theast Asia than
those of the Atlantic Community.
General Stilwell, an ardent critic of President Carter
on the withdrawal, maintained before the House Armed Services
subcommittee that another war in Korea would be also a "no

win"

scenario

because

of

the

big

powers'

inevitable

involvement. Therefore, he advocated, the United States should
give the concept of deterrence first priority in solving the
Korean problem. 36 He also predicted that the United States
could safely leave South Korea within fifteen years if the
South Koreans kept the same pace of economic development as
they had over the previous fifteen years. 37
American officers, who overwhelmingly opposed Carter's
Korean withdrawal policy, were split into two groups by the
Singlaub affair. Top officials in Washington such as General
George S. Brown and General Bernard
positions

and

defended

the

w.

Rogers changed their

President

while

most

local

commanders apparently still disapproved of the pullout policy.

35

• Ibid., 28.

36
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 198.
37
. Ibid., 203-4.
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It could be explained that officers in Washington, who were
more exposed to political affairs, changed their minds out of
constitutional as well as political considerations while local
coDll11anders still judged the situation from a purely military
point of view. The local commanders' continuing opposition to
the pullout, even after the Singlaub affair, undermined the
carter Administration's ability to carry out its policy.

CHAPTER XII

SCHOLARLY OPIHIOH

President Carter's Korean policy also sparked a debate
among

scholars.

A review of

articles

published

in major

newspapers and periodicals shows that most scholars objected
to the proposed withdrawal. 1 These scholars also influenced
American public opinion. Many Americans began to doubt the
safety of the policy because of those experts' opposition.
Donalds.

Zagoria,

Professor of Government at Hunter

College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New
York, pointed out in two articles, published in the New York
Times, that President Carter's decision to withdraw United
States ground troops from Korea was very much Carter's own
idea. Carter was determined to avoid another war in Asia, and

1 . I have researched 24 scholars' articles on the
Withdrawal which were published in major newspapers and
Periodicals from January, 1977 to July, 1979. None of them
fu~ly supported Carter's Korean policy. Scholars' letters to
editors are treated below as "public opinion."
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his pu11out policy was based on ill advised reasons. 2 Zagoria

argu

ed that Kim Il Sung, who had not given up his ambition of

.

reunification of Korea, had recently showed "a strong hint of
paranoia," might attempt to take over the South if the United
states pulled its troops out of South Korea. He pointed out
that Kim had been preparing for a war since the middle of the
19 6os by pouring huge amounts of money into war industries.
consequently,

the

North

could

capability over the South.
troops were pulled out,

have

a

much

higher

war

Once the United States ground

Zagoria argued, the well equipped

North Korean Army could take over Seoul successfully in spite
of American air and naval opposition. 3 Moreover, the two big
communist powers were not in a position to prevent Kim from
initiating a war against the South because the North had
enough independent military capability. 4 If Seoul fell to the
North, he maintained, the United States would be faced by
three agonizing options: bombing Seoul, bombing other targets
in North Korea, or pressing South Korea agree to a cease-fire
immediately. The first option would require the destruction

2

. Donald S. Zagoria, "Why We Can't Leave Korea, " New
York Times Magazine (2 October 1977): 84-6 and "To Stay or Not
to Stay," NYT, 2 July 1977. Zagoria sent a letter to
Brzezinski on 9 June 1977. He urged the Carter Administration
to reconsider the withdrawal policy. Donald s. Zagoria' s
letter to Zbigniew Brzezinski, White House Central File:
.S..ubject File, Box no. CO-41, Executive CO-82. (Hereafter cited
as WHCFSF.)
3

. Zagoria, "Leave Korea," 88.

4

• Cong. HASC 95-71, 172.
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of seoul, the capital city and population and economic center
of south Korea.
intervention.

The second would risk Chinese and Russian

The third,

which according to

.American policy makers would prefer,

Zagoria most

would make the South

inferior to the North permanently. Therefore, he claimed,"the
least dangerous and painful course for us is to continue to
deter the North from starting a war. 115
Besides

the

risk

of war,

objections and criticisms.
impression that the U.S.

Dr.

Zagoria

cataloged his

Asians would have the negative
was no longer interested in the

Pacific. The Japanese might react with a nationalistic lurch
to the right or left,

followed by rapid rearmament or an

accommodation with the Soviets. China would reconsider SinoAmerican relations and might seek a Sino-Soviet accommodation.
The two Koreas would be engaged in a new arms race, including
nuclear weapons,

over which the United States would lose

control. The Soviets would try to fill the resulting vacuum,
politically

and

militarily.

In

any

case,

an

excellent

bargaining chip which could be used to coax the North into
accommodation with the South would be sacrificed. 6
Finally, the President's policy would not decrease the
risk of "another Vietnam" but increase the risk of American
involvement in a new Asian land war. Therefore, he concluded

5 . Zagoria, "Leave Korea," 89.
6 • Ibid., 89-92.
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that the Administration should change its withdrawal plan from
an "unconditional" to a "conditional one," with some troops
deployed until the two Koreas reached a political settlement. 7
Dr.

Ernest

w.

Lefever,

Director

of

Georgetown

university's Ethics and Public Policy Center, pointed out in
his article "Withdrawal from Korea: A Perplexing Decision"
that the withdrawal policy was decided by Carter and his aides
who

thought

that

the

United

States

should

avoid

any

involvement in Asian conflicts, neither because of domestic
public pressure nor overseas requests.

He argued that this

abrupt and undebated decision would not only have a negative
impact on Asian allies, but it jeopardized the United States'
own

interests in the Far East. He agreed with Dr. Zagoria

that the immediate reactions from Japan, China, Russia, two
Koreas,

and other Asian allies could ultimately affect the

entire global balance of power and significantly damage the
American position in the world. 8
Professor Morton A. Kaplan, Director of the Center for
Strategic and Foreign Policy studies at the University of
Chicago,

7

criticized Carter's new Korean policy before the

. Ibid., 92-95.

8 • Ernest W.
Lefever,
"Withdrawal from Korea:
A
Perplexing Decision," Strategic Review 6 (Winter 1978): 28~5. He was a professional lecturer in international relations
in the Department of Government and a senior associate of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Georgetown
University.
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aouse Armed Services Subcommittee on 1 August 1977 by arguing
"our current policy increases the risk of war. 119 He

that

argued

that

if

a

war

broke

out

in

Korea,

the

Carter

Administration or any successor would have no choice but to
be

involved

because

of

its

essential

global

strategic

situation. 10 or. Kaplan also pointed out possible undesirable
reactions from Japan, a key ally in Asia, as a result of the
withdrawals. He maintained that Japan deployed most of their
troops in the north in order to defend themselves from a
Russian attack and they relied on South Korea to defend them
from

the

other

direction.

The

pullout,

therefore,

would

influence the basic Japanese defense conception and might
excite a rise of extreme nationalism in Japan, which might
create an unnecessary crisis in relations between the United
States and Japan. 11
Edward Luttwak, Associate Director of the Johns Hopkins
Center of Foreign Policy Research, was also concerned about
a negative Japanese reaction. He reminded readers that the
Japanese had always been sensitive to the balance of power in
Korea. Japan could be driven by Carter's decision and the rise
of the Soviet Navy in the North Pacific to turn to "a stance
of neutralism or even accommodation with the Soviet Union out

9

• Cong. HASC 95-71, 175.

10. Ibid., 173-4.
11• Ibid., 172-6.
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of fear for its own security. 1112 He was also concerned about
china. He argued that the Chinese, who publicly supported the
American

pullout,

actually

feared

the

Soviet

Union's

overwhelming influence on North Korea. If the United States
withdrew its forces, Luttwak argued, the balance of power in
the region would be so upset that China would have no ability
to moderate the action of Kim Il Sung. 13
David Nelson Rowe, Professor of Political Science at Yale
university, argued in his article "Danger Spot in the Far
East" that Carter's pullout policy as well as the reduction
of the American security guarantee to Taiwan would drive the
Taiwanese to seek help from the Soviet Union. If Russia got
a submarine base at a Taiwanese deep water port, they could
triple covert submarine operations in the Pacific. And these
developments would force the Japanese to into "armed external
imperialism. 1114
Joseph M. Ha, Professor of International Affairs at Lewis
and Clark College,
Luebbert,

and his research associate,

emphasized

the

Second

Division's

Gregory M.
restraining

influence on both North and South Korea. In an article in the
Asian Survey they argued that the withdrawal might lead to
uncontrolled

minor conflicts, even though a general war was

1 ~ Time 109 {6 June 1977): 29.
13. Ibid.
14. David Nelson Rowe, "Danger Spot in the Far East,"
National Review 29 {22 July 1977): 829-30.
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unlikely.

A renewed Korean conflict would force Japanese

conservatives

to

initiate

a

major

rearmament

program,

especially a naval build-up, and expedite a naval arms race
in that region.

It would also make the two big communist

powers compete for Japanese favor.

A rearmed Japan would

pursue a more independent foreign policy. Moreover, Chinese,
perceiving

a

rearmed

Japan

as

a

threat,

might

seek

a

rapprochement with Moscow. Thus, the Pacific and world balance
of power might be affected and tensions heightened. 15
If the danger were to increase, South Korea would seek
to develop nuclear weapons, even though they had signed the
Non-Proliferation

Treaty.

Thus,

the

United

States

should

reconsider its withdrawal policy, and even after a pullout,
should try to

reduce tension

in the Korean peninsula by

keeping good relations with Japan, China, and Russia and by
influencing North Korea to change its belligerent attitude. 16
Professor Ha further argued elsewhere that the Carter
Administration had three options for Korean policy:
1. a permanent military presence with no attempt
at negotiations,
2. an unilateral withdrawal, by stages or
otherwise,
3. negotiations which, if successful, would be

15
. Joseph M. Ha and Gregory M. Luebbert,
Settlement: The Prospects and Problem," Asian
(August 1977): 735-50.
16• Ibid., 748-51.
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followed by withdrawal. 17
or- Ha argued that if the United States merely wanted to avoid
another war in Korea, the administration could follow the
first option. If the United States simply wanted to eschew any
involvement

in

another

Asian

land

war,

he

administration could follow the second option.

said,

the

But if the

united states would insure peace and stability in the Far
East, he claimed, the Carter Administration must follow the
third. He said, "if we recognize this, we will not trample our
own interests in the pursuit of policies which might yield
only short-term benefits. 1118 He also suggested that the United
states, Japan, China and Russia should play a major role in
reducing regional tensions by encouraging both Koreas to sign
a non-aggression pact and by agreeing that none would support
an aggressor. 19
Astri

Suhrke,

Assistant

Professor

of

International

Relations at the American University, Washington D. c. , and
Charles E Morrison,

Professional Lecturer at John Hopkins

School of Advanced International studies, Washington D. c.,
argued in their article "Carter and Korea: The Difficulties
of Disengagement" that even though Carter's new Korean policy
would fail to reduce tensions between North and South Korea,

1 7. Joseph M. Ha, "Withdrawal from Korea: A Means, Not an
End," Orbis 21 (Fall 1977): 621-2.
18. Ibid., 622.
19• Ibid., 621.
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it was unlikely to create any of the immediate destabilizing
consequences that opponents of carter feared. In the long run,
both scholars anticipated that South Korea's economic growth
would overwhelm the North and force inferior North Korea to
"seek a closer alignment with China or, more probably, with
soviet Russia." If this would occur, they concluded, "it will
no doubt be of very great concern to the Japanese and set the
stage

for

large

power

re-engagement,

rather

than

disengagement, in Korean affairs. 1120
Frank Gibney, Vice President of Encyclopedia Britannica
Inc., pointed out the basic differences between Americans and
Asians concerning Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. troops
from South Korea. In an article in Foreign Affairs he argued
that Americans believed the bad days of the Cold War were
already over, and that they anticipated that the withdrawals
would lessen tensions in Asia. However, Asians worried the
withdrawal policy would actually increase tensions in that
area. He argued that considering America's isolationist mood
after the Vietnam War, the withdrawals would seem "logical and
necessary."

He

added,

however,

the United

States

should

seriously consider "the ripple effect of a round, shiny pebble
from Washington suddenly tossed into a still Asian pond,

2 ~ Astri Suhrke and Charles E. Morrison, "Carter and
Korea: The Difficulties of Disengagement," World Today 33
(October 1977): 366-75.
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causing undulations far beyond the point of impact. 1121 He
pointed out that although American troops made up only a tenth
of NATO strength, like the Korean brigade, they played an
obvious deterrent role. He also pointed out both Japan and
china's nervous reaction to its announced withdrawal policy,
and criticized cater' s unilateral announcement without any
concessions from the other side. Gibney continued to argue
that because the United States air and sea power did not deter
North Korea's attack on the South in 1950, the South Koreans
would not trust in Carter's promise of continued air and naval
supports. 22
Like

Dr.

Suhrke,

Gibney

was

concerned

about

the

possibilities of the South's adventuring against the North
with overwhelming economic and military strength in the long
run. He said that Asians, especially Japanese, feared that the
able and ruthless South Korean President, Park Chung Hee,
might attempt to attack the North with his own arms in the
near future if the U.S. ground troops were removed completely
from north of Seoul. He was also concerned about the dangerous
consequences of Japan's rearmament and nuclear proliferation
in

this

area

Administration

after
should

the

pullout,

and

reconsider

the

said

the

result

Carter
of

the

2 ~ Frank Gibney, "The Ripple Effect in Korea," Foreign
Affairs 56 (October 1977): 160-1.
22. Ibid., 164-6.
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llithdrawals.

23

Gregory

Henderson,

Fletcher School

of

Adjunct

Law and

Associate

Diplomacy,

Professor,

the

Tufts University,

pointed out in an article published in the Washington Post
that carter's withdrawal policy combined with strengthening
Korean capability would not decrease the danger of war in
Korea. He argued that North Korea would not see US$800 million
of new united States weapons as "redressing of a balance
between North and South Korea, but an overwhelming threat."
Therefore, the North also would request Moscow to provide more
sophisticated weapons such as Mig-24s and 25s, and it would
augment tension in the Korean peninsula. 24 In an another
article

in

the

New

York Times,

Dr.

Henderson

suggested

Washington-Pyongyang arms reduction talks. If no progress was
made, he claimed, the Carter Administration should suspend its

pullout plan. 25
Eugene V.

Ros tow,

Professor at

Yale University

Law

School, was suspicious of Russia's attitude. He claimed that
the Soviets always answered setbacks in one theatre with
trouble in another. Rostow recalled that the Korean War broke
out after the Greek, Turkish, and Berlin crises. Thus, in his

23• Ibid., 166-7.
24

• Gregory Henderson, "Koreagate: Essential Questions
Remain," WP, 27 July 1977.
25
• Gregory Henderson, "Toward Korean Peace, " NYT, 10
August 1977 and 17 April 1978.
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view, the United States' rapprochement with China contributed
to the Middle East War of 1973. If the United States would
withdraw the Second Division, he argued, the Soviets might
again train North Korean forces in Siberia, give them advanced
weapons,

and

achieve

the

same

kind

of

surprise

they

contributed to in the Middle East in 1973 and the Korean War.
Therefore, Rostow recommended that the United States keep its
ground forces in Korea intact for the time being. 26
Young Whan Kihl, Professor of Political Science at Iowa
state University, emphasized in his article "Korea's Future:
Seoul's Perspective" that the pullout policy would expedite
Korea's independent development of nuclear weapons in order
to overcome the North's superiority in conventional weapon
systems.

He

pointed

out

President

Park's

plan

for

the

establishment of research centers such as the Korean Institute
of Science and Technology (KIST) as well as his

campaigning

to encourage a number of overseas Korean scientists to return
home. Khil contended that the South Korean Government clearly
opposed a multilateral agreement on a nuclear-free zone for
Korea and said that "Seoul has invested in the development of
its own nuclear capability and indeed may have already crossed

2 ~ Eugene V. Ros tow' s Letter to Secretary Cyrus R. Vance,
28 February 1977, WHCFSF, Box no. C0-41, Executive C0-82. He
sent a copy of the letter to Zbigniew Brzezinski on March 7,
1977.
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1127
the t hreshold of no return on a nuclear time table.
young Sun Ha confirmed in his article "Nuclearization of
SJDall states and World Power Order: The Case of Korea" that
south Korea already possessed enough experts and engineers for
developing nuclear weapons. He also observed that President
park had ordered his Defense Development Agency to study the
possibilities of developing its own nuclear weapons as soon
as Saigon fell in 1975.

Considering South Korea's concern

over its security after the pullout,

its rapid economic

growth, and its capability for developing nuclear weapons, the
author argued, the Seoul government might seriously consider
developing its own nuclear weapon system in order to both
effectively deter Northern attack and use it as a "bargaining
chip" in negotiating the withdrawal schedule with the United
States. 28
L.

L.

Wade,

Professor

of

Political

Science

at

the

University of California, Davis, maintained that if the United
States unilaterally carried out the withdrawal policy, Seoul

2 7.
Young
Whan
Kihl,
"Korea's
Future:
Seoul's
Perspective," Asian survey 17 {November 1977): 1064-76.
28. Young Sun Ha, "Nuclearization of Small States and
World Power Order: The Case of Korea," Asian Survey 18
(November 1978): 1139-43. He was a Ph.D. candidate in the
Department of Political Science, University of Washington,
Seattle, and a pre-doctoral visiting fellow at the Center for
International Studies, Princeton University. According to the
author, South Korea possessed about 1,000 atomic energy
experts including 250 scientists. It expected to increase to
about 3,000 by 1981, and 5,500 by 1986.A U.N. report said that
about 1,300 engineers and 500 scientists would be enough for
making nuclear weapons.
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would build its own nuclear deterrent. He said, "surely this
is the wrong way to conduct foreign policy." Wade also stated
that

south

Korea

was

a

middle-sized

industrial

state.

Therefore, the United States should deal with Korea as it did
with European allies and Japan. 29
Li Lin Chun argued in an article in the Asian Outlook
that carter did not create the withdrawal policy, but merely
implemented the plan more actively than his predecessor.
According to the author, the United states basic strategic
policy is to keep sea power superiority in the Pacific. The
united states participated in two major Asian land wars in
Korea and Vietnam not to keep peace in that area but to
consolidate its sea power because the United States thought
it could not exercise its sea power in the Pacific without
securing defense ports in Asian continents. But after the
Vietnam war, the United States changed its main policy to keep
its sea power in the Pacific without holding defense posts in
the Asian mainland. He argued that "the decision by Carter to
withdraw U.S. forces from Korea was a further step taken to
implement the strategy of giving up land and holding sea power
in Asia. 1130

2 ~ L. L. Wade's Letter to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 19 August
1977, WHCFSF, Box no. CO-41, General CO-82.
3 ~ Li Lin Chun, "Carter's Policy Move Seen by Withdrawal
from Korea," Asian Outlook 12 (June 1977): 16.

149

chun maintained that the two communist superpowers had
changed their goals, strategies and tactics in Asia. He
no t
recalled that the United States pulled out its troops from
Indochina, in hoping that Peking and Moscow would cooperate
to keep peace in that area. But it only led to the downfall
of three democratic countries there.

Chun doubted Carter's

promise to keep peace and security in the Korean Peninsula
after the withdrawal of the troops from South Korea.
author warned that the President should

The

consider the plan

based on military strategy rather than political strategy.
otherwise, He said, "if something unexpected occurs, President
carter may not be able to handle it properly. 1131
These

academic

writings

greatly

affected

the

public

debate on Carter's Korean policy. Their negative views on the
future

of American relations with the major world powers

because
rationale

of

the

for

pullout

the

discredited

withdrawal.

At

the

Carter's
same

announced

time,

these

scholars' views gave Congressional conservatives a theoretical
base for their objections to Carter's Korean policy.
Zagoria and Dr.

Dr.

Kaplan were called to the hearings of the

House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee and testified
that Carter's Korean policy was a

mistake.

It eventually

affected the House Armed Services Committee's approval of the
Stratton Amendment

3 ~ Ibid. , 17.

that

the

Carter Administration

should
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suspend the policy until two Koreas settled a peace agreement.
In addition, these scholars views gave the American public an
impression that most experts outside the government did not
agree with the President on the pullout issue. This made the
public reconsider its support for Carter's Korean policy.

CHAPTER XIII

NEWSPAPERS VIEWS

Before the Singlaub affair occurred, American news media
heavily

covered

the

Koreagate

affair

and

showed

little

interest in the pullout issue. The Singlaub affair changed
these newspapers'

coverage.

The nation's major newspapers

competitively covered the Singlaub affair as well as experts'
views on the issue. In addition, the papers expressed their
own views on the pullout through their editorial pages. Major
American newspapers were evenly divided on President carter's
Korean policy. The conservatively inclined Wall Street Journal
and the Chicago Tribune, as well as the independent Washington
Post and the Detroit News criticized Carter's Korean policy
while the left leaning New York Times and the Chicago Sun
Times, as well as the independent St. Louis Post Dispatch, the
Cleveland Press,

and the Houston Post defended President

Carter. The Los Angeles Times. which favored the President's
Korean policy at first,

changed its attitude later. Those

newspapers, pro and con, attracted

public attention. At the

same time, the heavy coverage made the Carter Administration
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proceed more cautiously.
The Chicago Tribune, one of the most ardent critics of
carter's pullout policy, criticized it as an "ill-informed and
ill-considered policy." in its editorial of 19 June 1977. 1
Through over a dozen editorials for nearly two years from the
singlaub affair to Carter's suspension of the program, the
paper continuously claimed that Carter's pullout policy was
a mistake and should be suspended entirely.

The editors

contended that Carter devised this idea irresponsibly for
purely domestic political reasons because he believed American
people were tired of their military involvement in Asia after
the Vietnam War. 2 They also argued that the problems involved
in the policy went beyond Korea itself, and said, "our troops
in Korea are an important factor in our relations with Japan
and with both Chinas. They are a factor in our credibility
among both our friends and our potential enemies throughout
the world." 3 The paper requested that the President clearly
answer these following five questions in order to convince
Americans that this was not an "ill-informed and ill-advised
policy" before he proceeded too far with the plan.
1. Would the withdrawal cause Japan to become
nationalistic and build large military forces and
increase tensions in the Pacific area?
2. Would it cause Japan to seek accommodations
1. Editorial, CT, 19 June 1977, sec. 2.
2

. Editorials, CT, 25 April 1978, sec. 3 and
1979, sec. 3.
3. Editorial, CT, 28 July 1977, sec. 3.

23 January
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with China and Russia and cease to be a useful U.S.
ally?
3. Would it encourage Russia to move against
china along the Ussuri River?
4. Would it cause South Korea to build its own
nuclear weapons and expedite the dangerous nuclear
proliferation that the U.S. was eager to frevent?
5. What would be the effect on China?
The editors emphasized that many Americans were concerned
about the effects on Japan. Any results of Japanese reaction
would harm American interests. They also argued that if the
president proceed with his plan, the Chinese, who believed
that American ground forces in South Korea were an effective
leverage against Soviet expansion in that area, might sense
a vacuum and build up its military strength in Manchuria in
order to keep the Korean peninsula under their influence. It
might be followed by a Soviet reaction. Therefore, it would
increase the dangers of a military confrontation in that
area. 5 The editors of the Chicago Tribune continued to argue
in their editorial pages that it remained a mystery why the
United States was seeking to pullout its ground troops from
South Korea when its economic and military strength were
crucial to the region. An 10 August 1977 editorial contended
that the Carter Administration was playing a
called "Baffle 'em all."
enough

4•

sec. 4.

to

understand

fool's game

It argued that Carter should be wise
that

he

was

no

longer

an

obscure

Editorials, CT, 19 June 1977, sec. 2 and 4 July 1977,

5• Editorials, CT, 4 July 1977, sec. 1 and 23 January
1979, sec. 3.
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candidate and that his views might terrify the entire world.
The editors repeatedly recommended the President to suspend
the "entirely baffling and foolish idea. 116
The Wall Street Journal also criticized Carter in its
editorial

of 31 May 1977

saying that Carter's unilateral

decision to withdraw American troops from South Korea damaged
.American credibility in the whole world even though it might
not be followed by a new war in Korea. The editorial argued
that it would unnerve not only the Japanese but also the
Chinese who began to see the United States as a new ally and
a needed counterweight to Russia.

This wrong-headed policy

might lead the Chinese reluctantly to turn against the United
states and back toward the Soviet Union.

The editor also

pointed out that the United States was blamed for the military
unbalance between North and South Korea.
editorial,

Washington

had

deliberately

According to the
limited

the

South

Korean Army's offensive capability while promising them the
protection of the United States defense umbrella. Meanwhile,
Russia and China helped North Korea's massive military buildup without such a

restriction.

The editor concluded that

American ground troops should be kept in South Korea "not out
of habit but because they are an anchor of stability that
serves American interests,"

6

which was the same reason United

• Editorial, CT, 10 August 1977, sec. 4.
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states troops had been in Europe for more than 30 years. 7
In its editorial titled "Withdrawal Decision Seen as New
Threat to Peace," on 27 May 1977,
pointed out

that

the

decision was

the Detroit News also
made without

serious

consultations with United States Army officers. The editor
said, "the more we read and hear about the plan for a phased
withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from South Korea, and how the
decision was reached to adopt it, the more it worries. 118

On

28 April the editor of the paper also stated that there was
no sensible reason for the withdrawals at that moment because
it would only "heighten the danger of an outbreak of war,
threaten Japan's security and give the world the message that
America has lost interest in Asia." 9 The editors of the paper
also pointed out several times that Cater made a mistake in
announcing his decision unilaterally without any concession
from the opponents that would help to ease the tensions. lO
After the new intelligence report was issued, the editorial
of 28 June 1979 stated that North Korea had secretly built up
its military power.

The writer asked,

"For what purpose?

Defense against a weakened adversary?" The editorial concluded
that "the plan for American troop withdrawals from South Korea

7. Editorial, WSJ, 31 May 1977.
8 • Editorial, DN, 27 May 1977.
9. Editorial, DN, 28 April 1978.
1 ~ Editorials, DN, 25 April 1978 and 28 June 1979.
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should be scrapped. Peace is simply not a game that one side
can safely play alone."

11

Meanwhile, in its editorial of 2 August 1977, the New
X9rk Times supported Carter's unilateral decision by refuting
charges that the President made his decision unilaterally,
arguing that "the North Koreans had nothing comparable to
trade. " Since the South Korean forces outnumbered those of
North Korea, the editor argued, Carter could not trade with
the North Koreans for a reduction of their forces. The editor
continued to argue that Carter's announced withdrawal plan
actually would reduce

tensions at the DMZ at least for the

next five years because the North Koreans understood that any
minor conflict would make the United States postpone or even
reverse the timetable of the pullout. Even after the pullout,
the editor claimed, deterrence would be continued because the
North could hardly attack the south because of the presence
of powerful American air forces in South Korea. 12
The Cleveland Press fully supported Carter, stating in
its editorial of 23 May 1977 that strong air and naval forces
as well as the United states defense treaty with South Korea
would be enough to deter North Korea from attacking the South.
The editor of the paper criticized the opponents of the
President by claiming that they did not learn any lesson from

1 ~ Editorial, DN, 28 June 1979.
1 ~ Editorial, NYT, 2 August 1977.
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recent history. The editor said, "the Korean War and Vietnam
war proved conclusively that the American public will not
support involvement in a land war on the Asian mainland." The
editor concluded that an attempt to maintain U.S.

infantry

troops in South Korea indefinitely would be "not only wishful
thinking but bad strategy. 1113
The

st.

Louis

Post

Dispatch

also

supported

carter

claiming in its editorials of 7 June and 18 July 1977 that
the withdrawal was an overdue recognition of the fact that
"there is no longer any necessity of maintaining a sizeable
American presence there." The editors argued that the South
Koreans, who had a larger army, greater manpower, and stronger
economy than the North must def end themselves against the
North's

aggression

without

the

aid

of

American

infantry

troops. The editors maintained that the 30,000 American ground
troops were numerically insignificant
effective

military

or

diplomatic

in demonstrating an

purpose.

Moreover,

the

editorial continued, the withdrawals not only diminished the
chances of American involvement in other Asian land war but
also

the

further

loss

of American

lives.

Therefore,

the

editors concluded that the troops should be brought home in
accordance with Carter's proposed withdrawal plan. 14
The Houston Post and the Chicago sun-Times

also fully

l~ Editorial, CP, 23 May 1977.
1 ~ Editorials, St. Louis Post Dispatch, 7 June 1977 and
18 July 1977. (Hereafter cited as SLPQ).
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supported Carter's decision on the pullout, arguing in their
editorials that there was considerable evidence such as the
congressional Budget Office report, which proved that American
ground troops

in South Korea were no

longer needed

for

military purposes but were there for political reasons. 15 The
editor of the Houston Post. emphasizing a tripwire role of
.American troops in South Korea in its editorial of 25 May
1977, said,

"It is time to end this presence that is not

justified by the need and expense. 1116

The Chicago sun-Times

also claimed in it editorial of 21 May 1977 that "it's in this
country's best interest to divorce itself as much as possible
from South Korea's repressive government, without inviting an
attack on the South by Communist North Korea. 1117
The Washington Post, which initiated the Singlaub affair
by

reporting

the general's views,

expressed

its

opinion

through an editorial of 30 May 1977. It contended that the
troop withdrawal itself was not a bad idea. However, the paper
warned the President that if he did not manage the plan "with
exquisite care," other major interests of the United States
such as prevention of nuclear proliferation would be seriously
jeopardized because the South Koreans might seek to develop
their own tactical nuclear weapons as an alternate means of

1 ~ Editorial, CST, 21 May 1977; Editorial, Houston Post,
25 May 1977. (Hereafter cited as HP).
16. Editorial, HP, 25 May 1977.
17. Editorial, CST, 21 May 1977.
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deterrence. The editor conclusively stated that "the simple
slogans of withdrawal are poor guides to the complexities of
the situation on the ground. 1118
The
carter,

Los
fully

Angeles

Times,

supported

his

the
new

most

ardent

Korean

defender of

policy

from

the

beginning of his administration through its editorial pages.
Immediately after Vice President Mondale's Tokyo meeting, the
editorial of the paper on 2 February 1977, pointed out South
Korea• s

far greater economic

and military strength.

They

justified carter's proposed withdrawal policy by saying, "it
is matter of doing the right thing in the right way. " The
editorial continued to say that:
North Korean bellicosity provides some basis for
that fear. But given the impressive military
strength of South Korea and the clear absence of any
soviet or Chinese interest in supporting North
Korean aggression, a renewal of the Korean war that
concluded19 nearly 24 years ago seems extremely
unlikely.
When the Singlaub affair occurred, the paper conceded in
its editorial of 27 May that the general's concern over the
withdrawal was justifiable because military planers always had
to prepare for the worst situation.

What really bothered

military men was that the history of 1950 might be repeated
in Korea. But the editor recalled that the Communist North
could attack easily attack the South in 1950 because the South

18

. Editorial, WP, 30 May 1977.

19
• Editorial, LAT, 2 February 1977, sec. 2.
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ns were virtually unarmed. But South Korea in 1977
J(orea
S sessed a formidable military capability. Moreover, United

~

.

states air and naval units as well as a mutual defense treaty,
which did
security.

not

exist

in

In addition,

1950,

strongly supported

Korean

China and Russia were unlikely to

discard detente and support North Korea's unrealistic attempt
to invade the South. Therefore, the editor concluded, carter's
withdrawal policy was "not unacceptably risky. 1120
When the Senate approved the Byrd Amendment requiring
the President to consult with Congress before proceeding with
further withdrawals, the paper, through its editorial of 31
July 1977, criticized the Senate by claiming that the Senate
was attempting to bind Carter's good foreign policy with "a
judgement that falls short of being supported by the facts. 1121
Two days later, the editor of the paper urged Congress
to support Carter's withdrawal plan by approving the Korean
military aid package submitted by the President. The editor
said, "Congress, we think, ought to cooperate with this plan
by approving the appropriations that will be necessary to make
it work. 1122 However,

the

Los

Angeles

Times

changed

its

attitude after the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the
President suspend his withdrawal plan based on a new 1979

20.

Editorial, LAT, 27 May 1977, sec. 2 .

2 ~ Editorial, LAT, 31 July 1977, sec. 2.
2 ~ Editorial, LAT, 2 August 1977, sec. 2.
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intelligence report on North Korean military strength made by
the CIA and the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency). The paper
urged the President to change his mind by claiming that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff's advice "seems to us the sound course."
The editorial of 28 June 1979 continued to say that:
Many wars, including the North Korean invasion of
1950, begin in miscalculation. If maintaining a
division or so of American troops in South Korea
helps to deter any such new miscalculation, the cost
will be worthwhile. Certainly it would be preferable
to the cost of misreading North Korean political
intentions,
given
that ffuntry' s
apparently
formidable military machine.
Unlike

newspaper

editorials,

most

of

the

nation's

influential columnists strongly supported Singlaub's position
and criticized the President's Korean pullout policy. Kenneth
Adelman, who had been an assistant to Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld during the Ford Administration, argued in his
Chicago

Tribune

column

that

Korea

was

one

of

the

most

important strategic points on earth where major five world
powers

watched

with

keen

interest.

He

said

no

one

in

Washington understood why Carter tried to remove the primary
deterrent force from this sensitive area of the world. He also
argued that the President's policy would please the Soviet
Union

and

particularly

North

Korea,

but

it

would

anger

America's main allies such as Japan, South Korea, and many
Europeans. Moreover, the withdrawal plan would give a negative
impression to a new ally China. It made the United states seem

2 ~ Editorial, LA'.!'., 28 June 1979, sec. 2.
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to have

intention

no

Northeast Asia.
withdrawal

of

stopping

Therefore,

policy

would

Russian

he argued,

certainly

expansion

in

the danger of the

outweigh

the

nebulous

1:>enefits. He concluded that "the troop withdrawal could have
1:>een a wise one, had the necessary diplomatic groundwork been
laid and changes in the international scene been brought about
over time. As it stands, however, it is a rather reckless
course

appealing

in

appearance

through

unjustified

in

substance. 1124
Norman Pearlstine argued in a column in the Washington
fost on 29 May 1977 that the withdrawal policy was not only
unlikely to achieve its goals but it heightened the risk of
war as well as endangered the balance of power in Northeast
Asia. He continued to argue that North Korea's President Kim

Il Sung had never given up his desire to communize the South.
But both Moscow and Peking were unwilling to allow Kim to
attack because they did not want to confront the United States
directly in that area. If the United States removed its ground
troops from South Korea, their concerns would be diminished
and the risk of attack would consequently increase. Therefore,
he maintained, peace and stability in Northeast Asia could
only be kept as long as the troops in Korea acted in the
"tripwire role." Pearlstine, also emphasized that only South
Korea positively responded to the American request for support

2 4. Kenneth Adelman, "Troop Withdrawal: A Reckless Policy
in Korea," CT, 29 May 1977, sec. 2.
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during the Vietnam War by providing about 50, 000 of its
troops.

He

warned

that

the

United

States

might

lose

a

valuable, loyal ally in Asia by proceeding with its policy
unilaterally. The columnist concluded that the United States
troops must be kept in South Korea until both Koreas completed
a political settlement by signing a nonaggression pact. 25
J. F. terHorst, a influential national columnist, agreed
with Pearlstine that China and Russia would not support Kim

Il Sung's invading the South if the Second Division stayed in
Korea. He said, "once the United States leaves, their reason
for denying Kim's claim leaves, too." He was also concerned
that the pullout would heighten tensions between China and
Russia over gaining the control of the Korean peninsula as
well as the Sea of Japan. such a confrontation would sharply
destabilize the region and, of course, would seriously concern
the Japanese whose defense primarily defended upon an American
security promise. He concluded, "U.S. troops are not primarily
in South for its needs but for ours. 1126
Donald Morris, a columnist of the Houston Post, argued
that North Korea's decision as to when to attack the South
would depend not so much on the number of the ground troops
in Korea as on America I s will to def end South Korea.

He

2 ~ Norman Pearlstine, "Why U. s. Troops Should Stay in
Korea," WP, 24 May 1977.
26. J. F. terHorst, "Who Lost Most in Singlaub Firing?,"
llli, 29 May 1977.
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maintained that the United States commitment to South Korea
did not really require the presence of massive ground troops.
aowever, he concluded that the presence of the troops was the
best proof to the North Korean that the United States was
seriously concerning the security of South Korea. 27
Joseph

c. Harsh argued in the Christian Science Monitor

on 26 May 1977 that the troops stayed in South Korea not for
the security of Korea but for the protection of Japan. He
maintained that if South Korea became communized, communists
from the mainland could directly attack Japan unobstructed by
any significant land barrier. Therefore, he claimed, in order
to defend Japan properly, South Korea should be kept as a
strong ally. He predicted that sooner or later Japan would
take over the present America's role in South Korea for its
own security. Until that time, he claimed, "the United States
must stand as the protector and guarantor of South Korean
security." The columnist,

also reminded his readers that

China's influence had been the key to the Korean problem.

He

wrote, "it would be foolish to withdraw American troops from
South Korea if there were any reason for thinking that Peking
wanted another Korean war. But it will be safe to withdraw
these American troops if it is known that Peking has a tight

2 ~ Donald Morris, "Chip Shot, Bad Decision Hurt
Singlaub," Houston Post, 9 June 1977. (Hereafter cited as HP).
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28
rein on Py ongyang. 11
Jack Anderson, a prominent national columnist, expressed
concern about South Korea's development of nuclear weapons as
the result of the United States withdrawal of its nuclear
umbrella as well as its ground troops from South Korea. The
columnist, pointed out President Park's continued intention
of developing Korea's own nuclear weapons.

He cited the

evidence of Park's frustrated attempts to buy a nuclear fuel
plant that could produce plutonium, an essential ingredient
of nuclear weapons.

He also argued that

if South Korea

developed nuclear weapons, Japan obviously would develop its
own nuclear bombs and Peking also would feel obliged to give
its skill to North Korea.

For this reason, he concluded,

"keeping our troops and our nuclear weapons in South Korea may
be the only way the United States can prevent membership in
the nuclear club from getting out of hand. 1129
Michael Kilian,

a columnist of the Chicago Tribune,

argued that "Candidate Carter recklessly promised to withdraw
American troops from the Republic of Korea, ostensibly because
of the human rights situation there." Kilian admitted that
President Park was a dictator. But the columnist claimed that
Park was ruling his country no harsher than did Chicago's late
Mayor Richard J. Daley, who used secret police to check his

1977.

2 ~ Joseph c. Harsh, "The Korean Equation," CSM, 26 May
2 ~ SFC, 28 June 1979.
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opponents and who tried to buy votes on Chicago's West side
during a mayoral election. Kilian emphasized the geographical
importance of the Korean peninsula by arguing that Korea is
not a far off Namibia." He warned the Carter Administration
that "Whatever happens there directly and immediately effects
Japan, China, Russia, and consequently the United States. " The
columnist, comparing the Carter's Korean policy to that of
Truman's, said that Carter seemed not to have learned any
lesson from the Korean War in 1950. He concluded that the
troop withdrawal policy was "ill considered" and Cater could
be accused of "naivete, hypocrisy, and irresponsibility. 1130
Meanwhile, Charles W. Yost, a syndicated columnist and
a former United States Ambassador to the United Nations,
defended Carter's decision in his columns in the Los Angeles
Times on 5 June 1977 and in the Christine Science Monitor on
3 June 1977.

Yost pointed out the significant differences

between the situation in Northeast Asia in 1950 and that of
1977. In 1950, he argued, Stalin was eager to participate in
the post war control of Japan because he believed Japan would
eventually play a great role in the Asian balance of power.
However, his attempt was repeatedly blocked by the United
States. Therefore, Stalin encouraged Kim Il Sung to attack the
South, hoping that an unified communist Korea would affect

3 ~ Michael Kilian, "Korea and the Ghastly Lesson We' re
Forgetting." CT, 24 June 1979, sec. 2 and "Do Korea's Faults
Mean Reds Should Take over," 28 June 1979, sec. 3.

167
Japanese stability. By 1977, however, Japan had already become
a great power economically and politically, and another Korean
war would only give them a chance to be a military big power
again. Therefore, he claimed, the Soviet Union was not in a
position to encourage Kim in such an attack. Yost also pointed
out that the Russians and the Chinese, who were allies in
1950, were no longer allied but hostile each other because of
border dispute. And both communist super powers were fearful
that another Korean war might give the other side an advantage
in the regional balance of power. Moreover, they did not want
to produce an unwanted political confrontation with the United
states by encouraging Kim to attack the South because both
nations

got

significant

benefits

from

their

improved

relationship with the United States. Therefore, he concluded,
It is therefore difficult to imagine either the
Soviet Union or China encouraging Kim Il Sung to
attack the South, or its doing so against the will
of the communist great powers. These broader
considerations seem far more likely to determine the
nature of any real threat in Korea than a narrow
focus on the relative military capabilities of North
and South, and hence fully to justify Preside111
Carter's decision to phase out U.S. ground forces.
The nation's influential newspapers were evenly divided
over the pullout policy. Editors who defended Carter's recall
of General Singlaub also approved his withdrawal policy, while
those who attacked Carter's reaction to the indiscreet general

3 ~ Charles W. Yost, "Northeast Asia: The Real Danger is
Unforeseen Events," LAT, 5 June 1977, sec. 4 and "For Clarity
on Korea," CSM, 3 June 1977.

168
did not support the policy in their editorial pages. Unlike
editors,

columnists

overwhelmingly

criticized

Carter's

decisions on the pullout policy as well as on the Singlaub
affair. Rival newspapers such as the New York Times vs. the
~ashington Post and the Chicago Tribune vs. the Chicago sun
Times

stood

on

opposite

ideological differences,

sides

on

this

issue

because

of

as well as their competition for

reputation and circulation. These papers' competitive coverage
on the Korean pullout policy, pro or con, attracted public
attention. 32 Growing public interest in the policy,

due in

part to the newspapers' heavy coverage, caused Carter to move
more cautiously.

32• George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion
1972-1977 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Research Inc.,
1977), 1113. The poll result showed that 78 per cent Americans
answered that they read and heard about the pullout policy.
More detailed consideration, see Chapter XIV. Public Opinion.

CHAPTER XIV

PUBLIC OPI:NIOlf

Before the Singlaub affair, the American public, by and
large,

did

not

pay

attention

to

Korean

issues

except

Koreagate. The public generally approved of President Carter's
withdrawal policy, partly because most people did not want to
risk involvement in an Asian land war and partly because of
the illegal lobbying scandal and human rights violations by
the Park Administration. However, the Singlaub affair brought
more attention to the Korean withdrawals. As a result, more
Americans understood the realities of the pullout policy.
After the Singlaub affair, Americans expressed their opinions
on the pullout through letters to the editors of newspapers
or periodicals.
Many letters supported the policy, reflecting the "new
isolationism" that was common in post-Vietnam America. Anthony
Kang, Morristown, New Jersey, defended Carter's new Korean
policy and said that South Korea was not vital to American
interests. He deplored that Nixonite Asian scholars misled the
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united States into the Vietnam War and said, "why should we
continue to apply yesterday's Vietnam policy to Korea today?"
He argued that situations of Vietnam and Korea were different
in many ways.

But

they

shared

a

basic

common

factor

in

strategic and political problems. Therefore, he concluded, it
was

natural

that

the

Carter Administration reexamine the

united States Korean policy in accordance with the Vietnam
experience. 1
J.

T.

Van Voorhis,

Chairman of Barnes

&

Brass Co. ,

clarkburgs, West Virginia, who favored the pullout, said, "too
long have we been the source of too much for too many small
countries. 112
Edward

Friedman,

Chairman of the

East Asian

studies

program at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, pointed out
that "not all sources of tension stem from problems in the
North," and argued that the United States should not act as
a global policeman as she had done in 1945. 3
John W.

Howell,jr,

President of Howell & Associates,

Inc., Springfield, Ohio, also criticized the United States'
global

role.

He

wrote, "The U.S.

cannot

police

the world

1 • NYT, 7 July 1977. I have chosen these samples from
various newspapers and periodicals. I selected these based on
people's opinions on the pullout issue, their occupations and
regions. Scholars who expressed their opinions through letters
to the editors were treated with public opinion.
2 • Nation's Business 65 (October 1977): 43.
3 • NYT, 6 November 1977.
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forever. We cannot afford to keep troops all over the world,
especially for a dictator such as Park Chung Hee. 114
other Americans felt that South Korea should be able to
support itself.

Gary Savage, a service coordinator for Flynn

Hill Elevator Corporation in Long Island City,

New York,

favored the Korean withdrawal policy. He pointed out that
nearly three decades of the United States' support for the
Korean Armed Forces was a long enough period for South Korea
to develop its own deterrent capability against the North. 5
Jay C. Wockler, Santiago, California, also argued that
"if south Korea cannot defend itself after 25 years of our
financial and military help, then they are not worth having
as an ally, and we might as well let them go down the drain. 116
Richard E. Galvan, a certified public accountant in Long
Beach, California, who was wounded during the Korean War,
firmly stated that "we should never again fight a land war on
the continent

of Asia. "

He,

strongly def ending

Carter's

pullout policy, said, "air and naval support are okay. Let the
Asiatics supply the infantry. It is less costly to help build
their land forces than supply our own. 117

4• Nation's Business 65 (October 1977) 43.
5

. Ibid.

6

• LAT, 9 August 1979, sec. 2.

7• Nation's Business 65 (October 1977): 42.
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Others defended Carter because they did not like the
tripwire role of the Second Division in Korea. In his article
11

Letter

From

Seoul, "

Weyland

McGleigh

supported

Carter' s

cause. The Korean war was kind of a civil war, he argued, and
another war would be possible whenever one side could conceive
of victory.

If a

war broke out,

the United States would

automatically be involved in a war as long as American ground
troops stationed there.

Therefore,

he claimed,

the United

states should remove its troops from South Korea immediately
and have the Koreans solve their own problems. 8
John M. Kane of Rockville, Maryland, argued that South
Korean security actually could not rely on the presence of
U.S. ground troops in South Korea. He said, "our troops are
simply hostages to South Korea's fears of fighting in North
Korea." He also claimed that the troops in South Korea would
only guarantee Congress's approval

of additional American

troops in the case of confrontation. 9
Others

supported

Carter's

withdrawal

policy

simply

because they objected to Korea's undemocratic government, its
violations of human rights and illegal lobbying. In her letter
to the editor of the Chicago Tribune,

Linda Jones,

Church

Committee on Human Rights in Asia, argued that "the lesson we
need to learn is not from Harry Truman's mistake of troop

8 • America 136 (5 February 1977): 101.
9 • WP, 26 February 1976.
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withdrawal",

but

from

"Iran and Nicaragua,

where we have

supported unpopular dictatorships instead of democracy."

She

added that "continued U.S. support of an unpopular dictator
cannot

but

delay

a

peaceful

solution."

Therefore,

she

concluded, the Carter Administration should give priority to
supporting a

democratic government rather than a

military

.
10
regime.

Christopher M. Choi, Chicago, also pointed out that the
south Korean Government not only violated the basic human
rights of their citizens but also undermined the democratic
process of the United States by engaging in illegal lobbying
activities. He claimed that the Carter Administration should
press the Park regime to restore human rights and democratic
freedoms.

If

President

Park

refused

to

cooperate,

Choi

claimed, the United states should remove its ground troops
from South Korea immediately. 11
Meanwhile,

many

Americans,

inf 1 uenced

by

General

Singlaub's assertions, objected to Carter's new Korean policy.
Fred M. Skipper,jr., Vice President of Wyn Shields Co., Inc.,
North Charleston, South Carolina, sympathized with Singlaub's
cause. He argued that the United states forces should be kept
in South Korea because "the best defense of peace is a strong

10• CT, 10 July 1979, sec. 2.
1 ~ Ibid., 22 December 1976, sec. 4.
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military." 12
A State

Farm

Insurance

Company

agency

manager

in

r,ansdale, Pennsylvania, George J. Atwood who favored a strong
united States commitment to the Pacific area said that "the
u.s. must keep a strong armed force in the Western Pacific.
The threat of war makes this necessary. A continuous vigil
must be kept or we could have another Pearl Harbor. 1113
James Padilla, Manager of Leacom Cablevision Inc.

in

Truth or Consequences, New Mexico, who was also persuaded by
singlaub, criticized Carter's Korean withdrawal policy, He
wrote that:
The cost of moving the U.S. Second Infantry Division
would offset the benefits. South Korea needs
American help in the field, as well as in the air
and on the water. As a citizen, I would rather pay
wi:iatey,rr we are paying, and keep North Korea in
line.
Other Carter critics argued that Americans spent too much
blood and treasure on Korea to give up at that stage. Mark M.
Mercer, Office Manager for Walters Lumber Co., Inc., Chatham,
New Jersey, also expressed his opposition to the withdrawals.
He wrote that "Our pulling out would only lead to the defeat
of the South Korean forces. If we pull out, all our expenses
and efforts to date will have been for nothing. We must stay
until the final goal is reached and the country can be self-

1 ~ Nations' Business 65 (October 1977): 42.
13• Ibid.
14. Ibid.
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protecting. 1115
Harold B. Holtzman, an agent for State Farm Insurance
co., in Hamburg, Pennsylvania, who favored keeping the troops
in south Korea, said,

"I feel we have paid too dearly in

American lives to give South Korea to the communists, which
is what we would do if we pulled out. 1116
Others criticized the President by citing lessons of the
past. Larry L. Warner,jr., San Pedro, Los Angeles, argued that
if the Carter Administration proceeded with the pullout plan,
history would repeat again. He asked the administration how
south Korea could defend against the combined might of North
Korea,

China and the Soviet Union.

He wrote that:

American forces should stay in Korea, standing firm
and fast against the Red hordes. Eternal vigilance
is the price to be paid for liberty. For God's sake
Amef+ca, throw off this cloak of apathy and wake
up.
In 1974, a year before the fall of Saigon, the Chicago
Council of Foreign Relations conducted a poll about American
involvement in another Korean war. It showed that only 14 percent favored United States involvement, while 65 percent of
them were against direct American action for South Korea. 18
A month after the Singlaub affair, from 17 to 20 June

l~ Ibid.
l~ Ibid.
1 ~ LAT, 27 May 1977, sec. 2.
1 ~ Marc Leepson, "Relations with South Korea," Editorial
Research Reports 2 (12 August 1977): 610.
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1977, the Gallup Poll Institute surveyed public opinion about
carter's new Korean Policy.

First,

interviewees were asked

whether they heard or read about the proposal to withdraw
American troops from South Korea during the next four or five
years. Nationwide, 78 percent replied in the affirmative, with
awareness

among

highest

men,

the

college

educated,

Republicans, and those 50 years of age and older. 19
interviewees

who

said

they

had

heard

or

read

Second,

about

the

proposed withdrawal policy were then asked, "In general, do
you favor or oppose this proposal?" The answers were:

Favor . . . . . . . . . . 40 %
Oppose ••...•.•• 38 %
No opinion
22 %

.....

By Sex
Male
Favor . . . . . . . . 42 %
Oppose •...••••• 43 %
No opinion
15 %

. .

.....

By Education
College
Favor . . . . . . . . . .
Oppose ••••.•..•
No opinion . . . . .
Grade ~chool
Favor . . . . . . . .
Oppose ••.••••••
No opinion

.

.

.....

40 %
42 %
18 %

.

High School
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 41 %
Oppose •.••••... 36 %
No opinion . . . . . 23 %

40 %
34 %
26 %

By Region
East
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 40 %
Oppose ......... 37 %
No opinion
23 %

.....

Female
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 39 %
Oppose .••.•.••• 32 %
No opinion . . . . . 29 %

Midwest
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 42 %
Oppose •••.••.•• 39 %
No opinion . . . . . 19 %

19 Gallup, Gallu:12 Poll, 1133 .
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soutb
Favor . . . . . . . . . 36 %
Oppose .•••••••• 40 %
24 %
No opinion

West
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 44 %
Oppose ••••.•••• 36 %
20 %
No opinion

By Age
i4 y~ars
18
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 46 %
Oppose ••••••••. 30 %
No opinion . . . . 24 %

i9 years
i!2
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 38 %

.

.....

-

.

-

49 y~ars
30
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 39 %
Oppose •••....•. 41 %
No opinion . . . . . 20 %
By Politics
ReQublicans
Favor . . . . . . . . . .
Oppose ••.....••
No opinion . . . . .
Inde12endent
Favor . . . . . . . . . .
Oppose .••••••••
No opinion . . . . .

32 %
51 %
17 %

.....

-

Oppose . . . . . . . . . 44 %
No

opinion

.....

18 %

50 ye~;t: and over
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 41 %
Oppose . . . . . . . . . 35 %
No opinion . . . . . 24 %
Democrats
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 47 %
Oppose •.•••..•• 30 %
No opinion . . . . . 23 %

36 %
41 % 20
23 %

The results showed that opinion among the various group
was remarkably even with some difference by sex, education,
age, region, and politics. More females than males favored
Carter's withdrawal policy. The middle two age cohorts opposed
the policy while Americans in the younger and older age groups
supported the President's decision. By education, the more
people were educated, the less they backed the President.
Regionally, Southerners were least likely to back Carter's
Korean policy, while Westerners mostly supported the policy.

By politics, Carter's own party members generally approved the

2 ~ Ibid., 1133-4. Record of Gallup Poll accuracy shows
that the error margin from 1970 to 1976 was 1.2 percentage
Points.
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Korean

pullout,

while

Republicans

strongly

opposed

it.

Meanwhile, more Independents agreed with the Republican's view
rather than that of Democrats. On the whole, American public
opinion was evenly divided over Carter's proposed withdrawal
policy.
In the late July 1977, after the Carter Administration's
further efforts to demonstrate that there was no risk of war
even after the pullout,

a New York Times -

showed that

of Americans

withdrawal

52

percent

policy,

while

only

34

CBS News Poll

disapproved Carter's
percent

backed

the

t 21
Presi'd en.
A month later, the Nation's Business asked its readers
whether they favored the pullout or not. The answers were that
75 percent of readers who expressed an opinion did not support
carter's new Korean policy, while only 25 percent of them
favored the withdrawals. 22
Meanwhile, an NBC News poll in August showed that 45 percent favored the withdrawal, while 37 percent opposed it and
the rest were undecided. 23
Thus, the various polls after the Singlaub affair clearly
explained that

Carter's

Korean withdrawal

policy was

not

2 ~ NYT, 29 July 1977. The survey was based on telephone
interviews conducted from 19 to 25 July 1977 with 1,447
adults. It suggested a 5 percentage error margin. The rest,
14 percent, had no firm answer.
2 ~ Nation's Business 65 (October 1977): 42.
2 ~ DN, 30 March 1978.
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popular among American citizens. It also showed that the more
educated middle class and admittedly conservative Americans
believed after the Singlaub affair that Carter's decision on
the withdrawal of the troops from South Korea was too risky
to support.
The pullout policy,

which had given an advantage to

carter during the presidential campaign of 1976,

suddenly

became a burden to the President when he was preparing to seek
his second term in 1980. If he were to suspend the policy, it
would be welcomed by most military officials and Congressional
conservatives. At the same time,

it would raise political

problems with liberal Democrats who had fully backed Carter
in the 1976 election. 24 If the President decided to stick with
the policy, he had to overcome strong public objections, which
might

jeopardize his

second term.

Therefore,

the

Korean

withdrawal policy became an "Achilles' Heel" to President
Carter after the Singlaub affair.

2 ~ LAT, 21 July 1979.

CHAPTER XV

KOREAGATE AND THE KOREAN AID PACKAGE

The Korean lobbying scandal helped Carter to make the
withdrawal policy as a major 1976 presidential campaign issue.
Ironically,

it blocked the

Congressional

approval

of the

Korean aid package which was necessary to manage the pullout.
There were three groups of Congressmen who opposed aid for
Korea. The first group opposed the troop withdrawal policy
itself.
rights

The

second group disliked

violations.

The

last

and

President
most

Park's human

serious

group

of

Congressmen feared that they might be suspected of receiving
bribes from a South Korean agent,

Park Tong Sun,

if they

supported it. 1 Congressional leaders, who believed that the
aid bill could not pass under such circumstances,
laying

the

military

aid

bill

before

the

delayed

Congress

until

December 1977. This delay had forced President Carter to slow
down the withdrawals.

1 • LAT, 27 July 1977.
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Park Tong Sun was a South Korean businessman who was
believed

to

earn millions

of

American rice to South Korea.

dollars
He

Georgetown Club in Washington D.C.

per

founded

year
the

exporting

fashionable

in 1967 and spread cash

around Washington to buy favors for his country.
believed to spend about a

million dollars

a

Park was

year to buy

influence on Capitol Hill. He entertained Congressmen in his
Georgetown Club, which became a favorite gathering place for
Washington dignitaries, made campaign contributions, arranged
trips to South Korea, and,

in some cases, simply paid cash

outright. 2
In its early days, the case of Park Tong Sun appeared to
be purely a Washington scandal: a wealthy businessman bribed
several Congressmen with money and gifts to buy friends for
his

country. 3

But

the

case had ballooned

into

a

serious

international problem when Kim Hyung Wook, the former head of
the South Korean Intelligence Agency (KCIA), testified before
the House Subcommittee on International Organizations on 22
June 1977 that the Park Tong Sun affair was an "official plan"

2•

3

The Economist 263 (25 June 1977): 39.

WSJ,
22
September
1977.
For
the
detailed
considerations, see the Washington Post, 3 March 1975, 23
March 1975, 27 July 1975, 15 October 1976, and 24 October
1976. Park involved in the illegal lobbying since the late
1960s. But the Department of Justice did not begin serious
investigation until 1975. The scandal attracted the American
public when the Washington Post on 15 October 1976 reported
that the Justice Department was investigating an unprecedented
Congressional corruption.
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of the south Korean Government. 4
Moreover, when the House Ethics Committee disclosed on
10

July

1977

that

congressmen were

at

least

involved

115

in the

Congressmen
Park Tong

or

sun

former

scandal,

congress moved to investigate the lobbying scandal in order
to clarify the scandal and to regain their traditional public
reputation.

Congress,

particularly

the

House,

had

become

increasingly sensitive to allegations that a large number of
its members received Park's money and gifts. 5

Therefore, the

House Ethics Committee hired the former Watergate special
prosecutor Leon Jaworski to head its investigation. 6
As soon as he took over the case, Jaworski requested that
the

state

Department

support

efforts

to

obtain

Park's

testimony and to obtain records related to his activities. 7
On 23 August Park Tong Sun was charged on 36 felonies. All of
them related to an alleged influence buying operations in the
United States. 8
President Carter,

Secretary of State Vance,

Attorney

General Griffin B. Bell and leaders of both houses of Congress
such as House Speaker Tip

.
5.
6
.
7.
8.
4

o 'Neill

warned the south Korean

NYT, 23 June 1977; WP, 23 June 1977.

NYT, 11 July 1977 •
SFC, 21 July 1977.
WP, 8 September 1977.

NYT, 9 September 1977.
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Government that failure to cooperate with American efforts to
investigate the Park Tong Sun affair would not only strain
diplomatic

relations

with

the

United

States

but

also

jeopardize Congressional approval for the Korean military aid
package.

9

In response to United States pressure for Park's return
to

Washington,

the

South

Korean

announced its non-involvement

Government

in the case on

officially
7 September

without mentioning whether they would allow Park return to
the United States. It claimed that Seoul never appointed Park
Tong sun as its agent and "what he did or did not do was not
done with the foreknowledge, approval or cooperation of the
government of the Republic of Korea. 1110
Seoul officials repeatedly denied official involvement
in the case and said, "As a fully sovereign and law governed
nation, Korea finds no ground or no reason to turn over any
of its national merely on the ground that he is suspected of
having violated foreign law. 1111 President Park Chung Hee also
continued to refuse to talk with American officials about the
case, ironically citing Park Tong sun's human rights. 12

9

. NYT, 4 October 1977; WP, 9 September 1977.

10

• WP, 8 September 1977.

11• Ibid., 9 September 1977.

12. Ibid.
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American officials were particularly concerned that the
illegal lobbying affair could jeopardize Carter's withdrawal
plan. Therefore, they emphasized to South Korean officials the
rising anger in Congress over Seoul's stubborn refusal to
cooperate, and urged them to send Park to Washington to answer
bribery and conspiracy charges resulting from the federal
grand jury indictment. 13
In response to the South Korean refusal to return Park
Tong

sun

Republican

to

Washington,

of

New

York,

Congressman
submitted

an

Bruce

F.

amendment

Caputo,
aimed

at

cutting off US$110 million of United States economic aid to
south

Korea.

At

the

same

time,

Congressman Andrew Jacob

submitted an amendment to cut all South Korean economic aid
from the budget resolution. 14
In explaining the proposed amendment,

the Congressman

said that US$110 million of United States Food for Peace aid
should be cut because "through this program Park Tong sun
perpetrated his frauds against this Congress. 1115
Even though the House overwhelmingly defeated Jacob's
Amendment by 268 to 120, Caputo's Amendment was defeated by
an unexpectedly close vote of 205 to 181. 16

.
14.
15.
16.

13 WSJ,
22 September 1977.
Ibid .
Ibid •
Ibid .
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since

the

Korean War,

South Korea

had

enjoyed warm

support from healthy majorities in both houses of congress.
:EVen frequent reports about human rights violations made by
the seoul Government had not seriously harmed Korea's status
as

a

Congressional

favorite.

However,

the

result

of

the

caputo' s

Amendment clearly showed that the Park Tong Sun

scandal

and

Seoul's

stubborn

refusal

to

cooperate

had

seriously damaged traditional Congressional attitudes in favor
of south Korea. 17 This

also made

it clear that

if Seoul

continued to reject United states demands, Congress would not
be in a mood to vote the Korean military aid package which was
essential to proceed with Carter's pullout program. 18
Under these

circumstances,

Carter

formally

requested

Congress on 21 October 1977 to enact the bill and authorize
him to transfer US$800 million worth of military equipment
mainly held by the Second Division in Korea to the South
Koreans without reimbursement.
O'Neill,

In his letter to Thomas P.

the Speaker of the House, Walter F. Mondale,

the

President of the Senate, and the Senate Majority leader Robert

c.

Byrd,

the

President

reiterated

his

determination

to

withdraw the troops from South Korea within five years. And
then, he explained why he proposed the bill. He said, "the
legislation I am proposing is designed to help make certain

17. Ibid., 28 October 1977.
18• Ibid., 9 September 1977.
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that Korean defense capabilities are not weakened by our
ground

force

withdrawal. "

In

order

not

to

endanger

the

security of South Korea as well as East Asia, the President
emphasized,

it was essential to turnover the United States

owned military equipment to the South Korean Government. 19
A week later,
Zablocki,

Chairman

on 27 October,
of

the

House

Congressman Clement J.
International

Relations

committee, announced that Congress would not act on Carter's
request for the weapons turnover because there was no hope of
passing such a bill, given Seoul's refusal to cooperate with
the

Congressional

affair.

Zablocki

investigations
said he was

into

the

sorry that

Park

Tong

sun

Carter made the

request at that sensitive moment, and said, "there is no doubt
in my mind that under the present circumstances,

without

progress toward cooperation in the Korean investigations, it
would be impossible to get some legislation. 1120
Meanwhile,

Zablocki' s

committee

unanimously passed

a

resolution requesting Seoul to "provide complete access to all
facts relevant" to the Congressional investigations into the
Park Tong sun scandal. 21

l~ PPP 2 (21 October 1977): 1822-33; WCPD 13 (24 October
1977): 1576-7; DSB 77 (12 December 1977): 852-3.
2 ~ CQWR 35 (29 October 1977): 2322; WP, 28 October 1977;

NXT, 27 October 1977 and 28 October 1977.

2 ~ NYT, 28 October 1977; WP, 28 October 1977.
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rn his news conference, Chairman Zablocki said that the
Korean aid package could not be discussed in Congress until
seoul

cooperated with American investigations

on alleged

influence buying. At the same time, the chairman echoed a fear
that had been expressed by his fellow Congressman that they
JDight be forced to vote against any form of Korean aid in
order to prove that they had not been involved in the Park's
scandal. 22
congressman Edward J. Derwinski, Republican of Illinois,
who was an ardent supporter of Korea, said that the resolution
was "over kill." But he did not oppose the resolution. 23
House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill said he also had no plan
to bring the weapons transfer proposal to the House floor
unless

the

South

Korean

Government

made

Park

Tong

Sun

available to the House investigations. He said if Seoul did
not permit Park to testify to the investigations on the
scandal, they would face the risk of loss of American military
aid. He said, "We need Tong Sun Park over here. Unless he's
returned, you're in dire trouble. 1124
Senate Majority leader Robert c. Byrd, who opposed the
appointment

of

a

special

prosecutor,

argued

that

Park's

scandal was "overblown" and that Park himself exaggerated his

H.E,

22• CQWR 35 (29 October 1977): 2322; NYT, 28 October 1977;
28 October 1977.
23. HTI, 28 October 1977.
24. NYT, 23 January 1978; WP, 28 October 1977.
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own importance in Washington to impress his government. But
ayrd acknowledged the negative mood of Congress about the
Korean

scandal.

congressional

He

votes

was

concerned

on

any

future

that

it

Korean

could
aid

affect

package.

Meanwhile,

Byrd urged leaders of Asian countries to press

seoul

cooperate

to

with

the

American

investigation

by

emphasizing that "the stability of the whole area could be
jeopardized by the failure of the Government of South Korea
to act in this regard." 25
Chairman of the House Ethics Committee, John J. Flynt,
Jr. ,

Democrat of Georgia,

who presided over the three-day

hearing from 21 to 23 October 1977, concluded that the bribery
effort was an "official plan" of the South Korean Government.
Yet to know the full truth he needed Korean cooperation. He
made it clear an interview with a reporter that "cooperation
meant helping to obtain the testimony of Tong Sun Park." 26
On

31

October

1977,

The

House

of

Representative

unanimously passed a resolution requesting Seoul to cooperate
"fully

and

without

reservation"

in

the

Congressional

investigations into the Korean influence buying scandal. 27
At this point,

the South Korean Government began to

realize that any further attempt to stonewall Congress would

2 ~ CQWR 35 (29 October 1977): 2322; NYT, 23 October 1977.
2 ~ NYT, 24 October 1977 and 27 October 1977.
2 ~ Ibid., 1 November 1977.
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not only seriously damage the diplomatic relations between the
two countries but also impede approval of the military aid
package. Therefore, as soon as the House passed the resolution
unanimously,

Seoul

suggested

to

the

United

States

that

negotiations be resumed at the diplomatic level to find a
solution for the Park Tong Sun affair. Finally after eight
weeks of intense negotiations, the South Korean Government
agreed to send Park to Washington to testify before Congress
,
' t y. 28
under fu 11 1mmun1

In the meantime, even before the Park Tong Sun scandal
was settled, former Korean Ambassador Kim Dong Jo's illegal
lobbying activities in Washington aggravated the situation.
Kim was Seoul's Ambassador in Washington from 1967 to 1973 and
then became national security adviser to President Park. His
bribery of various Congressmen was revealed to the public when
a former Korean embassy press secretary, as a witness at the
House Ethics Committee hearing of October 1977, testified that
he saw the ambassador stuffing a briefcase with money to pass
to members of Congress. 29
In his interview with a Newsweek reporter, Kim Dong Jo
denied illegal lobbying activities and his connections with
the KCIA.

He said,

"they are not only untrue,

28•

but also

WP, 31 December 1977 and 27 February 1978. Park
returned to Washington on February 26, 1978 for Congressional
testimony.
2 ~ NYT, 27 October 1977; WP, 27 February 1978.
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ridiculous .•• I never tried to influence American Congressmen
or officials by conducting such lobbying activities." The
former ambassador also claimed that his onetime secretary told
a lie before the committee in order to justify his seeking
political refuge in America. Kim said,
I have never carried a briefcase in my life, let
alone stuffed it with cash. I don't know why he is
telling these lies. My g~113s is that he is trying
to justify his defection.
Leon Jaworski strongly urged the State Department to make
Kim available to investigators of the alleged bribery scandal.
He repeatedly claimed that without the testimony of Kim Dong
Jo the investigation of Koreagate would not be satisfactorily
completed. At the same time, he suggested that a threat to cut
off aid might persuade the South Korean Government to allow
Kim to provide sworn testimony. 31
Secretary Vance asserted that the Carter Administration
could not press the South Korean Government to return the
former ambassador to Washington because he had diplomatic
immunity in accordance with international agreements. However,
the Secretary expressed his hope that Seoul would waive these
rights and help with the Congressional investigations of the
case by permitting Kim to testify before the House Ethics

3 ~ WP, 27 February 1978.
3 ~ NYT, 11 May 1978 and 1 June 1978.
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coJD111i ttee. 3 2 Unlike Park Tong Sun case,

the South Korean

Government refused even to discuss the matter with American
officials, and declared that in accordance with international
convention Kim would not go to Washington. 33
Adlai E.

Stevenson,

Chairman of the Senate's Select

committee on Ethics, also urged the South Korean Government
to permit the Committee to investigate its former Ambassador
Kim by alleging that he was ready to block United States
economic aid to Seoul including a US$500 million loan for two
nuclear reactors. 34
On 10 May 1978 the South Korean Government officially
refused to allow ex-envoy Kim to testify before the House
Ethics Committee. 35 In his interview with the Han Kook Il Bo,
a Seoul newspaper, on 21 May, Foreign Minister Park Dong Jin
reconfirmed Seoul's position of blocking any Congressional
attempt to hear Kim's testimony in connection the alleged
bribery scanda1. 36
Meanwhile, the House International Relations Committee
on 24 May unanimously passed a compromise resolution, 31 to
O, warning Seoul that it could lose United States economic

32. Ibid., 9 February 1978 and 11 May 1978 .
33 Ibid •

.
34.

Ibid., 26 February 1978, sec • 4.

35. Ibid., 11 May 1978.
36 Ibid., 22 May 1978.

.
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aid if former Ambassador Kim Dong Jo was not available to
testi'fy. 37 0 n
resolution,

31

May

the

f u 11

House

passed

a 1 so

th e

on a 321 to 46 vote, warning the South Korean

Government that the United states might cut off economic aid
if

did

they

not

cooperate

with

the

Congressional

investigations of the former ambassador. 38 Congressman Jim
wright of Texas, the majority leader, said "this resolution
is a very clear message." Congressman Clement J.
Chairman of the House International Relations,

Zablocki,
said,

"the

resolution is unequivocal in its message - that only the full
cooperation of the South Korean Government is acceptable."
Thomas

P.

O'Neill

also

made

it

clear

that

an

"evasive

for

Seoul's

response" by Seoul would not be tolerated. 39
On

22

June

the

House,

in

retaliation

continued refusal to have Kim testify, voted, 273 to 125, in
favor of cutting off US$56 million economic aid to South Korea
under the "Food for Peace" program, the only form of economic
aid then provided to South Korea. 40 The State Department,
however,

expressed its strong objection to the resolution

because the resolution might require American diplomats to be

37• Ibid., 25 May 1978.
38. Ibid., 1 June 1978.
39. Ibid.
4 ~ Ibid., 23 June 1978. On 10 August the Senate refused
to agree with the House to keep South Korea out of the Food
for Peace Program. CQWR 36 (1978): 2201.
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exposed to similar investigations by other nations. They were
also concerned that
Government

would

further pressure on the South. Korean

seriously

deteriorate

its

diplomatic

relations. 41 Some Congressmen from farm states also opposed
the

resolution

farmers.

by

claiming

that

it

would

hurt

American

42

Meanwhile, the South Koreans believed that US$56 million
worth of aid would affect their booming economy very little.
south Korea preferred to lose economic aid rather than to be
coerced into violation of international conventions and to
suffer an insult to its dignity as a sovereign state. 43
In the meantime,

the White House announced that the

carter Administration would begin to withdraw ground troops
from South Korea whether Congress approved the weapon transfer
bill or not. 44 on 9 December 1977 the carter Administration
submitted to Congress a twelve-page report in respond to the
Byrd Amendment requiring a
situation.

In that report,

periodic review of the Korean
the State Department reaffirmed

that the withdrawal plan would be done on schedule. The report
pointed

out

that

the

administration

desperately

needed

4 ~ Ibid.
42• Ibid.
43

• Ibid., 23 June 1978 and 25 June 1978, sec. 4.

4 ~ NYT, 28 October 1977; WP, 28 October 1977. Jerrold
Schecter, Press aide to Carter's national security advisor,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, announced it.
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congressional approval of the Korean military aid bill in
order to fulfill the pullout plan without the risk of war. It
also pointed out that South Korea had tremendously improved
its

military

capacity

for

defensive

war.

Therefore,

the

proposed pullout would not threaten the security of South

Korea.

45

on 8 February 1978 Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, in
his response to
operations

questions before the House

Subcommittee,

urged

Congress

International

not

to

cut

off

military aid to South Korea by linking the illegal lobbying
scandal with the withdrawal plan. The Secretary claimed that
the Congress should decide military aid to South Korea based
on

its

security

needs,

not

on

the

needs

of

a

domestic

investigation. 46
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown also urged Congress not
to

link

the

military

aid

bill

with

the

Korean

lobbying

scandal. Appearing before the House International Relation
Committee, Brown said, "we condemn such actions as a serious
misinterpretation of our governmental processes and of the
mores of the American people. At the same time, we must not
let the Tong Sun Park affair obscure our basic national
interests in Korea. 1147

.
.
.

45 NYT, 13 December 1977;
46 NYT,
9 February 1978.
47
NYT, 23 February 1978.

Hf, 13 December 1977.
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At

the

same

time,

two

reports,

opposed

to

linking

military aid with the scandal, were submitted to the Congress
by its members. on 9 January 1978 in their eighty-five-page
report submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, and Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey, urged Congress not to link the Korean military aid
bill to the bribery scandal. The report emphasized that "longterm united States political alignments in the whole East
Asian region must not be

jeopardized for

the

short term

objectives of the scandal investigation. 1148
Another report,

adopted by the House Armed Services

subcommittee on 26 April by a seven to one vote, also urged
congress to approve the military aid package regardless of the
lobbying scandal in order to protect the remaining American
troops rather than to aid South Korea. The report requested
the President to postpone the pullout schedule if Congress
failed to approve the US$1. 9 billion military aid package
including the US$800 million transfer bill. 49
At the same time, inquiries on Koreagate seemed nearly
over. After almost twenty months of investigation by the House
and ten months by the Senate, Congress could get the whole
picture

of

the

lobbying

scandal.

Moreover,

the

mood

of

Congress had changed. By the end of April Congress wanted to

4 ~ Humphrey Report, 5.
49

• Cong. HASC 95-61, 4-6.
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finish the investigation process as quickly and quietly as
possible

because

further

congressional reputations,
I{orea.

investigations

only

would

harm

as well as relations with South

50

on 2 May the House International Relations Committee
approved the US$800 million transfer to the South Korean
Government. 51 on 11 May the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
also approved an amendment stating that the Second Division
could transfer their weapons and equipment to the South Korean
Army and train them in its use. 52 On 15 May the Committee
passed the Korea military aid bill. It included the transfer
of US$800 million worth of American military equipment, US$275
million for supporting South Korean military modernization
plan, and US$90 million for ammunition stockpiles. 53 on 24 May
the full House, for the first time, voted overwhelmingly, 247
to 142, not to interfere with President Carter's withdrawal
plan without mentioning the military aid package. 54
On 20 July in his letter to Senate Majority Leader Robert
C. Byrd, Carter requested him to help clear the way for the

5 ~ NYT, 22 May 1978. The evidence showed that 30
Congressmen and former Congressmen received money from Park
Dong Sun as contributions or gifts.

.

51 NYT, 11 May 1978; .c.Qlffi36 (6 May 1978): 1111.

.

52 NYT, 12 May 1978 .

.

53 CQWR 36
(10 June 1978): 1465 •

.

54 NYT, 25 May 1978; CT, 25 May 1978 .
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proposed

pullout plan by passing the

Korea

military aid

package. At the same time, the President suggested that the
proposed period would be "sufficiently flexible to accommodate
developments" on Korea. 55
on 26 July the Senate passed the Foreign Military Aid
bill, 73 to 13, including the Korea aid package and sent it
to the House. 56 On 20 August the House approved the bill
authorizing the President to transfer up to US$800 million in
defense equipment and services to South Korea through 31
December 1982 "in conjunction with the withdrawal of the 2nd

u.s.

Infantry Division" from South Korea. 57
Finally,

security

on 7 September Senate-House Conferees on the

assistance

authorization

bill

adopted

the

House

provision, with the single proviso that all military equipment
transfers be made in proportion to the rate of U.S.

troop

withdrawals. 58
When

news

of

Koreagate

first

broke,

the

affair was

regarded simply as a weal thy Korean businessman's immoral
activity. Kim Hyung Wook's testimony, which revealed the South
Korean

Government's

created

.
56.
57.

a

serious

direct

involvement

international

problem.

55 COWR, 36 (1978): 1921, 2044 .
Ibid., 2001 .
Ibid., 2045 .

58 Ibid., 2562 •

.

into

the

Because

scandal,
of

the

198

scandal, congress reluctantly delayed the Korean military aid
bill, which was essential for the President to manage the
pullout. This forced Carter to delay the program. Eventually,
it gave the President one more year to study the Korean
situation before he made a final decision.

CHAPTER XVI

PRESIDENTIAL RECONSIDERATION

While Congress was delaying the vote for military aid to
south Korea, partly because of the Korean bribery scandal and
partly because of Congressional reluctance to vote for troop
withdrawals,

the

President

decided

on

21

April

1978

to

mitigate the original pullout program for the first time since
he took power. In a written statement, the President said, "
In view of the crowded legislative calendar, and also because
of other matters concerning Korea, there is a possibility that
the Congress may not act now on this proposal. " Therefore, the
President said that he ordered withdrawal of only one combat
battalion of 800 troops rather than a proposed full combat
brigade of 3,400 troops by the end of 1978. However, he added
that non-combat elements of 2, 600 would be removed on schedule
and his intention to carry out the full withdrawal within five
years would be not changed. In his statement, Carter described
his decision as a "prudent" measure, adding that approval of
the Korean military aid package was a necessary ingredient in
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the withdrawal strategy. 1
The

decision

to

slow

down

the

pullout

program

was

announced at the same time the Soviet Union shot down a Korean
airliner which was off course near Murmansk,

where soviet

naval and rocket forces were concentrated. However, the White
House denied there was any connection between its decision and
the Korean incident. 2
Senator

Charles

Percy,

Republican

of

Illinois,

who

proposed an amendment requiring the President to consult fully
with Congress before withdrawing the troops from South Korea,
applauded

the

announcement:

"by

adjusting

the

withdrawal

schedule, the President will gain additional time to make a
full reassessment of U.S. pol icy in South Korea. 113 Chairman
Zablocki of the House International Relations Committee also
praised

Carter's

anticipating

decision

that

the

to

slow

President's

down

decision

the

program,

would

press

Congress for immediate action on the military aid package. 4
Meanwhile, Senator John H. Glenn, Chairman of the Asian
Subcommittee
continued

to

of

the

assail

Senate
the

Foreign

Relations

administration's

Committee,

overall

policy,

claiming that the President mistakenly attempted to withdraw

1 • PPP 1 (21 April 1978): 768; WCPD 14 (24 April 1978):
768.
2

.

NYT 1 22 April 1978; WP, 22 April 1978.

3

.

CT, 24 April 1978 .

4

.

WP, 22 April 1978.
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troops without supplying the promised military aid to South
Korea. He added that the partial withdrawal without proper
compensatory measures would give a bad impression to American
allies. It would seem that the United States "is pulling back
proper precautions. 5

all over the world" without taking

On 26 April the House Armed Services Committee, in direct
challenge to Carter, passed the amendment proposed by Chairman
Samuel

S.

Stratton,

requesting

the

President

keep 26,000

American ground troops in South Korea until North and South
Korea ended "the state of war" by signing a peace treaty.
Stratton' s
withdraw

amendment
any

troops

also

requested

from

South

the
Korea

President
without

not

to

getting

Congressional approval of the Korean military aid package. 6
On 11 May the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also
approved an amendment requiring Carter to submit to Congress
with "a comprehensive report on the viability of each troop
pullout from south Korea four months in advance. 117
At the end of May, National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski, who was an ardent supporter of Carter's pullout
policy, visited China for three days to discuss normalization
of

Sino-American

Unexpectedly,

in

relations
Peking,

he

5 • Ibid.
6 . Ibid., 27 April 1978.
7 . NYT, 12 May 1978.

as

well

faced

as

Korean

issues.

strong obj actions

from
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Chinese leaders to the U.S. withdrawal program. 8
On 26 July the Senate passed the Percy amendment by a
eighty one to seven vote. It warned that further withdrawal
of the troops from South Korea might "seriously risk upsetting
the military balance in that region." The amendment again
requested the President to consult fully with the Congress. 9
On the next day, however, at the eleventh Annual Security
consultative Meeting at the Naval Amphibious Base in Coronado,
California,

Defense

Secretary

Brown

reconfirmed

that

the

pullout would be carried out within five years despite the
senate warning. 10
on

1

August

the

House,

while

approving

the

Korean

8 • NYT, 26 May 1978; CT, 26 May 1978. Brzezinski believed
that the U.S. should use China as a lever against Russia. He
stopped in Tokyo on the way home and told Prime Minster Fukuda
that he and Chinese leaders did not agree on the pullout.
Chinese objections might have affected his views on the
policy. He also stopped in Seoul on 25 May 1978 and delivered
Carter's personal letter to President Park reaffirming that
the U.S. commitment to South Korea would not change regardless
of the pullout.
9 • LAT, 28 July 1978; COWR 36 (29 July 1978): 1921.
Senator Charles H. Percy described his amendment as a "strong,
strong message" to the President from the Senate. He also
claimed that the vote margin showed the clear evidence that
the Senate was "deeply concerned" about Carter's Korean
policy. Senator Sam Nunn added language to the amendment that
President Carter should report to the Congress on the
pullout's possible effect on South Korea's deterrent ability
and the anticipated reaction from the North. The amendment
also requested the President to submit an additional report
to the Congress which would explain South Korea's possible
independent nuclear weapon capability. It also asked the
President to report the Congress about the impact of the
pullout on the U.S. relations with Japan, China, and Russia.
l~ LAT. 28 July 1978.
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military aid package, passed an amendment proposed by Edward
J. oerwinski, Republican of Illinois, 219 to 189. Like the
percy

Amendment,

it

cautioned

Carter

that

his

Korean

withdrawal policy might seriously risk disturbing the military
balance in the Far East. The amendment also requested the
president

to

undertake

"full

advance

consultation

congress. 1111 Meanwhile, the House rejected,

with

212 to 189, an

amendment offered by Samuel Stratton to prevent further troop
withdrawals

from

Korea

unless

the

President

obtained

congressional approval first. 12
After that, Congressional attempts to block the proposed
withdrawal policy calmed down. The carter Administration, with
the Congressional approval of the Korean military aid package,
prepared to transfer weapons and equipment of the Second
Division to the South Korean army in the connection with the
pullout of United States ground troops.
administration

agreed to

sell most

In addition,

of the

the

sophisticated

weapons that were requested by South Korea, except sixty F-16
fighters,

in

order

to

strengthen

Seoul's

military

capability. 13
On 7 November 1978, hoping to maintain a deterrence
against the North during and after the withdrawals, the Carter

1 ~ CQWR 36 (5 August 1978): 2044.
12• NYT, 2 August 1978.
1 ~ WP, 23 November 1978.
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Administration hastily activated the combined American - south
Korean command which had been designed for several years to
better

coordinate

their

emergency in Korea. 14

military

operations

in

case

of

At the same time, the United States

deployed a new squadron of 12 F-4 jet fighters to a United
states air base in South Korea in order to bolster air defense
in accordance with the American compensation plan. 15
In the meantime, information was obtained which indicated
that the entire withdrawal policy might need to be rethought.
At the beginning of January 1979 the Army Times disclosed a
new United States Army Intelligence Agency new report on North
Korean military capability, ostensibly based on "intercepted
communications

between

North

Korean

units,

satellite

photography and reports by South Korean agents. " The report
concluded that North Korea's military capability was far
greater

than

previously

estimated.

Moreover,

they

were

offensively equipped and deployed. 16 The Army's new figures
on North Korea capability were as follow:

1 ~ NYT, 7 November 1978; WP, 7 November 1978. General
John W. Vessey, Commander of American forces in Korea and U.N.
command, was appointed as the new commander of the combined
forces. His deputy was a Korean four star general, and staff
members were equally divided between two countries.
1 ~ WP, 7 November 1978.
1 ~ NYT, 4 January 1979; Norman D. Levin and Richard L.
Sneider, "Korea in Postwar u. S. Security Policy," in The U. s. South Korean Alliance, Evolving Patterns in Security
Relations, ed. Gerald L. Curtis (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, 1983), 53.
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Previous figurel1977l
430,000
Army
28
Divisions
1,900
Tanks

New figure
440,000 - 500,000
41
17
2,600

As soon as the new report was issued, the Pentagon's
forty

analysts

started

a

major

study

of

new

satellite

photographs and other data that the Army agency provided. CIA
Director Stansfield Turner also ordered the CIA and DIA
(Defense Intelligence Agency in the Pentagon)

to reassess

North Korea's combat strength based on the new data. 18 At the
same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to reappraise the
military balance between North and South Korea based on the
new Army intelligence report in order to determine whether
they still could support Carter's withdrawal plan. 19
On 9 February Carter announced in his news conference
that he was holding "in abeyance" any further troop reduction
until he and his intelligence agencies reassessed North Korean
military capability based on new intelligence data and other
factors such as the impact of Sino-American normalization,
Chinese opinion, and the perspective of the dialogue between
South and North Korea. 2 O Two months later, Both the CIA and
the DIA reported to the President that the numbers of North

1 ~ NYT, 4 January 1979 and 21 January 1979.
18• Ibid., 21 January 1979.
1 ~ WP, 20 January 1979.
2 ~ PPP 1 (February 1979): 24 7-8; WCPD 15 (9 February
1979): 247-8.
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Korean troops reached about 600,000, over one fourth larger
than the previous estimate. Having reviewed new information
provided by the CIA and the DIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
April 1979 formally advised Carter to suspend the pullout plan
until 1981. In their report, the Chiefs told the President
that "both the increased size of the North Korean military and
its recent muscle flexing make withdrawals too risky at this
time. " 21
Meanwhile, the army's new intelligence report revived
congressional criticism of Carter's withdrawal policy. In his
letter to the President on 3 January 1979, Stratton urged
carter to hold any further pullouts until his subcommittee
reassessed the situation based on the Army's new report. 22 He
also claimed to hold hearings in the House on the Korean
pullout

plan

in

order

to

discuss

the

new

intelligence

information. 23
On 23 January 1979 the Senate Armed Services Committee
Pacific study Group, senators Gary Hart, Harry F. Byrd, Sam
Nunn, and John G. Tower, sent a report to President Carter

21. NYT, 18 July 1979; WP, 25 June 1979.
22• NYT, 4 January 1979.

2 ~ House Armed services Committee, Investigations
Subcommittee on Korean Withdrawal, Hearings on Impact of
Intelligence Reassessment on Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From
Korea, 96th Cong. 1st sess., 1979, committee Serial HASC no.
96-16 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979), 1-101. The subcommittee
~eld hearings on 21 June and 17 July 1979 to asses revised
intelligence information on North Korea; NYT, 21 January 1979.
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urging him to suspend the pullout. They pointed out that the
new

intelligence

information

made

Carter's

withdrawal plan "too risky" at that time.

proposed

The ref ore,

they

concluded that the pullout schedule should be halted until the
risks

were

reassessed

based

on

the

new

intelligence

information. 24 The report said,
The withdrawal of u. s. ground forces from the
Republic of Korea should be discontinued. The new
U.S. intelligence reassessment of North Korean
military strength leads us to conclude that even
planned improvements in South Korean forces will
not compensate for withdrawal of the U.S. 2nd
Infantry Di vision. The reassessment casts grave
doubt upon the validity of earlier judgments about
the nature and stability of the Korean military
balance
that
formed
the
basis
of
the
administration's decision in May 1977 to withdraw
U.S. ground troops form Korea
It is the
judgement of the Study Group that to proceed at this
time with additional U.S. troop withdrawals from
Korea would neither serve the security interests of
the United Sta~~ nor contribute to stability in
Northeast Asia.
On 22 June Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, also
issued a report asking the President to halt his withdrawal
plan until South Korea could be assured of its own defense
against the North. He argued in his report that North Korea's
advantage would decline in the next decade while the South's
advantage would rise because of its far stronger economy and

2 ~ NYT, 24 January 1979; WP, 24 January 1979. They were
all members of the Senate Armed Service Committee.
2 ~ Senate Committee on Armed Services, Korea: The U.S.
l,roop Withdrawal Program, Report prepared by the Pacific Study
Group, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 23 January 1979 (Washington, D.
C.: GPO, 1979), 1.
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iarger population. He predicted that the South could defend
itself against the North without American help "in the not
distant future."

Therefore,

he concluded that the United

states should reserve its troop withdrawal policy considering
the information on North Korea's military capability and
maintain its troops until the South achieved the military
balance with North. 26 He said,
A recent intelligence estimate has reappraised the
North Korean situation and concludes that its forces
are considerably stronger than previously believed.
It is my judgement based on this new information,
that the risks involved in continuing the troop
withdrawal demand that we reserve our poliS~ and
maintain the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea.
congressional approval of the Korean military aid bill
encouraged the Carter Administration to carry out the policy.
It reenforced air defense in South Korea and prepared to
transfer weapons and equipment to the South Korean Army. But
the Army's new Intelligence report again blocked the smooth
process of the policy. The new report was so critical, it
forced the President to undertake a basic reconsideration of
his withdrawal policy.

Moreover,

this new report revived

Congressional objection to Carter's Korean policy. Therefore,
Carter had no alternative but to retreat from his Korean plan.

2 ~ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop
H..ithdrawal from the Republic of Korea: An Update 1979, Report
Prepared by Senator John Glenn, 96th Cong., 1st sess., June
1979, LC 79-604232 (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979), 1-2.
2 ~ Ibid.,

1.

CHAPTER XVII

SOUTH KOREAN REACTIONS

The South Korean leaders, who had experienced the Korean
war and so always feared another invasion from the North, were
dismayed by Carter's election in 1976 because of his campaign
pledge to pull out American forces.

Government officials,

military officers, scholars, even opposition political leaders
were worried at the prospect of President carter's new Korean
Policy.
As soon as Jimmy Carter was elected as the 39th President
of the United states, the ruling Democratic Republican Party
concluded its congratulatory statement by saying that they
hoped President-elect Carter would "understand South Korea's
security problems and the threat of invasion by North Korea
and would maintain friendly relations. 111
Kim Dong Jo, a former Foreign Minister and then a senior
security advisor to President Park, carefully expressed his
hope that the new Carter Administration would not change its

1 . NYT, 4 November 1976, 26.
209

210

Korean policy drastically even though President-elect Carter
vowed to remove American ground troops and atomic weapons from
the south Korea during the presidential campaign. 2
A few days before the inauguration, President Park Chung
Hee expressed his opinion at a televised news conference. Park
stated that he did not object the pullout itself,

but the

united States should not remove its ground troops from South
Korea until the North agreed to sign "a non-aggression pact"
that South Korea had already proposed in 1974. 3
In

an

interview

with

Andrew

H.

Malcoln,

a

special

correspondent to the New York Times, South Korean Minister of
culture and Information Kim Seong Jin emphasized the important
role of United states ground troops in Korea.
Korea's chief spokesman,
seriously

consider

"the

Kim, who was

stated that the Americans should
expansionist

tendencies

of

the

Communists" in the Far East. 4
After having failed to gain Vice President Mondale's
acceptance of an invitation to Seoul when he visited Tokyo on
1 February 1977, 5 South Korean officials understood that they
could not change President Carter's mind. Thus, they began to

2•
3

WP, 4 November 1976, 22.

. NYT, 13 January 1977, 2.

4•

Ibid., 16 January 1977.

5 • Stephen Barber, "Why Mondale Skipped Seoul," FEER 95
(11 February 1977): 31. Carter vetoed Mondale's visit to
Seoul.
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study ways to cope with the situation. Among the most drastic
of their considerations was

the decision

to build a

new

capital city about sixty miles south of Seoul for security
considerations. This would be done within five years, the same
period that Carter proposed to pullback American ground troops
6

home.

In the meantime,

the South Korean Government,

having

realized that the Japanese also feared a proposed American
pullout, attempted to cooperate with the Japanese Government
in delaying the United States withdrawal plan. In the

hope

of more amicable relations with the new Japanese Government
of Premier Takeo Fukuda, on 27 December 1976, Seoul released
three

Japanese

businessmen

who

were

sentenced

servitude for life for spying in South Korea. 7

to

penal

on 7 January

1977 Seoul proposed "a three nation security committee" with
Japan and United States, hoping that it could develop into a
collective security system like NATO in Europe. 8
In February, Seoul sent forty-three Congressmen led by
Kim Jong Phil, the former prime minister, to Tokyo to attend
an annual meeting of the two countries'

6

lawmakers.

On 16

NYT, 12 February 1977. Primary reason for the
relocation of the capital was to reduce the rapidly rising
population in Seoul rather than to consider its security.
Because of the timing of the announcement, it brought great
fears among the South Koreans. So the government withhold the
Plan later.
7
8

• WP, 28 December 1976.
• Ibid., 8 January 1977.
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yebruary

286

of both

delegates

and

Jllinisters

-

243

countries'

Japanese

adopted a

legislators

lawmakers

resolution

-

including

43
7

Korean
cabinet

expressing their

"deep

concern" over the proposed United States withdrawal policy. 9
The resolution stated that:
Delegations from both countries highly evaluate the
deterrent to war which American troops in Korea have
provided and express deep concern that, in the
absence of a North - South Korea nonaggression pact,
or objective proof that peace has been firmly
established in the Korean peninsula, any reduction
of American ground forces would be an invitation to
instability in the Korean peninsula ... as WfJl as
to instability in Northeast Asia as a whole.
The

Korean

delegates

proposed

to

include

in

the

resolution an official request from both governments for a
postponement of the pullout until South Korean forces could
defend the nation themselves. But Japanese delegates, while
backing up President Park's call for a

nonaggression pact

between the two Koreas as a precondition for the pullout,
rejected the Korean proposal claiming it was an issue between
the United States and South Korea. 11
When President carter confirmed his withdrawal policy
officially at the press conference of 9 March 1977, President
Park made

up

his

mind

to

end

his

country's

security reliance on the United States,

9

. LAT, 17 February 1977.

l~ Ibid.

11
• I bid., 27 February 1977.
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practical steps to foster the development of a self sufficient
military capability against the North's threat. 12
president

Park

established

the

promotion of the Arms Industry,

Enlarged

In June

Conference

for

a special high level body

which consisted of cabinet members, military officials, and
business leaders in order to expedite the development of the
defense industries. The committee decided that South Korea was
to produce

all

its

own

arms

except

highly

sophisticated

electronic equipment such as aircraft within four or five
years.

13

At the same time, Seoul reconsidered a covert nuclear
weapons program which was cancelled in the early 1976 because
of strong diplomatic pressure

from the United States and

canada. 14 officially, President Park denied Korea's plan for

l~ NYT, 20 March 1977.
l~ Ibid., 10 October 1977; FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 10.
South Korean Government put the defense budget of 1978 at
about US$2 billion, about 35 percent of the total budget. It
totaled 6.4 percent of the GNP. It was expected to climb to
7 percent of the GNP.
14• WP, 4 November 1978; LAT, 4 November 1978 and 13
November 1978. According to these papers, President Park, who
feared for his country's security because of President Nixon's
decision to pull 20,000 troops out of South Korea in 1972, set
up the covert nuclear weapon program. But the program was
cancelled because Belgium refused to provide South Korea with
a nuclear fuel laboratory equipped to handle plutonium after
the India's surprise nuclear test of 1974. France cancelled
the sale of the reprocessing plant to South Korea in January
1976 under intense diplomatic pressure from the United States
and Canada. But President Park openly vowed to develop an
atomic bomb if the United States removed its nuclear weapons
from South Korea.
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nuclear weapons. 15

However, a senior aide to President Park

pointedly hinted that the policy could be changed. He told the
reporter of the Washington Post firmly:
As a matter of principle we should have the freedom
to take necessary actions within our ability to
ensure our own survival .•• As to the question of
nuclear weapons develfgment, we would consider the
matter on that basis.
on 30 June 1977 Foreign Minister Park Dong Jin officially
told the Korean National Assembly, during the debate on the
withdrawals, that South Korea could develop atomic bombs if
they believed that their country's survival was at stake. 17 on
2 July the Assembly passed a resolution asking President
carter to reconsider his decision of the withdrawal.

The

Korean Congressmen expressed their thanks to the United States
for its military support, but criticized Carter's new Korean
policy.

They

in

stressed

their

resolution

that

"the

withdrawal of 33,000 American ground troops threatens peace
in Korea,

destroys

the

balance

of

power and

discredits

American commitments overseas." They also asked Washington to
provide them with enough compensation for their armed forces
to defend the nation against any attack from the North. 18

.
16.
17.
18.

15 CSM, 15 July 1977.
WP, 27 May 1977 .
NYT, 1 July 1977.

Ibid., 3 July 1977 •
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In 1978 Seoul changed its original plan for nuclear power
plants by doubling the size of their program. They decided to
invest more than US$70 billion by the year 2000 in building
forty-three nuclear plants, a capacity almost equal to that
of the United States in 1978. 19 By doubling nuclear projects,
seoul wanted not only to cope with the energy crisis of the
1ate 1970s but also to influence Carter's withdrawal decision
indirectly.
officials

South Korean officials believed that American
obviously

understood

that

a

peaceful

nuclear

capability could be easily changed to military purposes. 20
In the meantime, the South Korean Government, hoping that
the two big communist powers could restrain North Korea from
causing tension, began to launch a careful campaign to broaden
relations with China and the Soviet Union by giving them
signals

that

Seoul

was

eager

to

exchange, and sports activities.

explore

trade,

cultural

In October 1978 Kim Kyung

Won, a chief foreign affairs adviser to President Park, told
the press in Hong Kong that Seoul was ready to open diplomatic
relations

with

repeatedly
Government.

China.

mentioned
In

by

December

Subsequently,
high

this

officials

Foreign

Minister

message

of

the

Park

was

Korean

Dong

Jin

officially encouraged businessmen to get in touch with their
Chinese

trade

partners

and

not

to

be

concerned

with

1 ~ LAT, 19 November 1978.

HE,

2 ~ Jack Anderson, "Seoul Hints at Developing A-Weapons,"
28 June 1979.

216
ideological

differences

between

the

two

countries.

One

official said, "we are enough of a substance as a country now
that eventually China - and Russia, too - will realize it is
nonsense not to deal with us. 1121
At the same time, President Park proposed to North Korea
the exchange of goods, civilian technology and capital in an
attempt to reestablish political negotiations that had been
suspended since August 1973.
exchanges

and

cooperation,

Through such broad economic
Seoul

hoped

to

reduce

the

possibility of military confrontation between the two Koreas
after the pullout. 22 on 16 December 1978, two months before
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's visit to Washington, the south
Korean Government urged the Carter Administration to seek
Chinese help in reopening talks with the North. 23

On 19

January 1979 President Park proposed new peace talks to North
Korea during a nationally televised news conference. He said
that South Korean officials were ready to meet with officials

2 ~ WP, 30 December 1978. For the first time, in September
1978, the Soviet Union allowed a South Korean Cabinet member
(Shin Hyon Hwack, Minister of Health and Social Affairs) and
two journalists to visit Moscow. Jae Hoon Shim, "Kisaeng and
Making up," FEER 102 (6 October 1978): 15-6.
2 ~ NYT, 23 June 1978.
2 ~ Ibid., 17 December 1978. At the end of January 1979
~hen Deng Xiaoping visited Washington, Carter asked him to
influence Kim Il Sung to prevent any military movement against
the South. Deng told the President that North Korea would not
initiate an aggression in the Peninsula. He also said that if
he pressed kim, the North would turn to Russia. Thus, China
Would lose its influence. See Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith.
Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982): 205-6.
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of the North at "anyt 1· me, anywhere, and without any
conditions" for reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. 24
rn the next month, both sides met at the Panmunjom truce site
and agreed to reopen the North-South Coordinating Committee,
which was set up in 1972 for discussing political issues
between the two Koreas and had been suspended since 1973. 25
In

the

meantime,

most

South

Koreans

watched

the

inauguration of the Carter Administration with anxiety but
hoped its new Korean policy would not affect their national
security seriously. The Hankook Ilbo, a major Seoul newspaper,
described the new President as "no ordinary President." The
more conservative Chosun Ilbo commented in its editorial that
"it would be worthwhile watching how Carter's idealism fitted
in with the realities of politics. 1126
The South Koreans, who were waiting for a favorable word
from President Carter, were disappointed to hear that Carter
turned down a Seoul Government request for Vice President
Mondale to visit Seoul on the way to Tokyo, a two hour flight
from Seoul . 2 7

They were even more surprised when Vice

President Mondale, who had promised European leaders to give
full support to NATO in order to defend them against the

2 ~ NYT, 20 January 1979.
2 ~ NYT, 13 February 1979 and 16 February 1979; WP, 18
February 1979.
2 ~ FEER 95 (4 February 1977): 24.
2 ~ Ibid. 95 (11 February 1977) 31; NYT, 29 January 1977.
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collllllunist threat only a few days before, came to Tokyo and
announced the withdrawals

officially.

This

led the South

Koreans to believe that the Carter Administration changed the
united States' global strategy from "Europe first to Europe
only."

Therefore,

Administration

they

might

confrontation with

were

abandon

the

North,

concerned

that

them

in

case

just

as

the

the
of

carter
military

United states

abandoned South Vietnam in 1975. 28
Vice President Mondale's announcement of the withdrawal
combined

with

the

stunning

revelation

of

the

Seoul

Government's new capital plan produced tremendous fears among
seven million Seoul

residents,

many of whom had suffered

severely from the Communist North during the Korean War.
Immediately after the news was revealed, the price of stock
dropped sharply and all real estate transactions were frozen.
President Park tried to calm such fears by promising them to
definitely defend the city in the event of attack from the
North, but his words could not put to rest wide-spread fears
among his people. 29
Opposition to Carter's withdrawal policy created a rare
national

consensus

in

South

Korea.

From

top

government

officials to a shoe shine boy, everybody was skeptical and
seriously worried at the prospect of a new American Korean

28. Cong. HASC 95-71, 210.
29
. NYT, 12 February 1977.
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policy which might threaten their country's survival.

They

JcneW that North Korean forces were within easy striking range
of seoul. Once United States ground troops were removed, they
understood, it would be impossible for the United States to
save south Korea from the invaders from the north. One citizen
said, "the geography explains a lot about this country. How
would people

in Washington feel

if there were 10 Russian

divisions sitting as close as Dulles Airport? 1130 A shoe shine
boy in a Seoul tea room said,

"No,

I

don't want American

troops to leave." A more affluent customer, who expressed his
objection to the U.S. pullout, told a correspondent of the
Christian Science Monitor:
I've been through the first Korean War and I'm not
afraid to die if it means a better life for my
children. But there is no sense dying in a useless
war. If the North Koreans invade, certainly the
Americans will bomb them. And if Seoul is taken
certainly we will take
back. By that time how
many of us will be dead?

Jr

The South Koreans suspected the rationale explained by
Mondale

in Tokyo that South Korea's growing economic and

military strength made the presence of American troops in
Korea unnecessary. One citizen said,
We just don't see how the U.S. can justify their
force reductions here on the grounds of our
developed economy •.• How does our economy compare
with Germany's? You don't hear anything about an
American withdrawal from there. It just seems that
the U.S. cares more about Europe than it does about

3 ~ USNWR 82 (6 June 1977): 18.
3 ~ CSM, 25 July 1977, Eastern edition.
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Korea. 32
Dr. Kim Jun Yop, Director of Korea University's Asiatic
Research Center,

also questioned the real purpose of the

pullout. He said,
First of all, to an outsider, it is not clear at all
what the purpose of withdrawal really is ••• I do
not believe that Washington has yet offered a
satisfactory explanation of why the troops had
better be withdrawn. To save money? To improve
security? To support democracy? To promote detente?
To appease Pyong Yang? To please Korea's critics?
What conceivable, rational purpose could be really
served by '1\thdrawal is a question I find impossible
to answer.
Many South Koreans also worried about the loss of the
second Division's deterrent function. A retired Korean Major
General, Kim Chum Kon, Dean of Graduate School of Business and
Public Administration at

Kyung Hee University

in

Seoul,

emphasized the deterrent role of the Second Division. He said
that "when U.S. troops are deployed along the main invasion
route, they cannot be avoided in the event of an attack.
That's the deterrent value. 1134 A senior aide to President Park
said,
If the concept of deterrence is valid in Europe ••.
it is even more valid on the Korean peninsula. There
has been no actual war in Europe since World War II.
But North Korean tanks smashed across the 38th
parallel five years after World War II in open
defiance of the line of division agreed upon between

3 ~ FEER 97 (5 August 1977): 13.
33• Zagoria, "Leave Korea", NYTM (2 October 1977): 18.
3 ~ Time 109 (6 June 1977): 29.
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the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 35
south Korea's Primer Minister Choi Kyu Hah regarded the
united States troops in South Korea and in NATO as "two
pillars of policy" that deter the Soviets aggressions from the
both sides.

He argued that the Soviet Union was

acting

cautiously because they could not adventure either eastward
or westward. He alleged that if the United States would remove
the troops from South Korea, Russia would feel free to behave
,
l
,
more aggressive
yin
Europe. 36

Many Koreans were also perplexed at the unilateral nature
of carter's pullout decision. They did not understand why he
got nothing in return from the North. Foreign Minister Park
Dong Jin said, "withdrawal could have been used as one of our
most important bargaining chips in settling the Korean issue."
He continued to argue that carter gave a tremendous advantage
to North Korea by fixing the period of the withdrawal over the
next five years. He said, "to say everything in advance sounds
honest.

But when the

other side doesn I t

apply the

same

honesty, I'm afraid we end up the losers. 1137
South Koreans pointed out Carter's decision was illtimed. They were already in the midst of army modernization
program that would be completed by the beginning of the 1980s.

3 ~ CSM, 25 July 1977, Eastern edition.
3 ~ Time 109 (6 June 1977): 32.
3 ~ USNWR 83 (18 July 1977): 54.
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TheY believed that the best American policy was to wait and
iet its development go forward until the South Korean Army
could reach parity with the North. One of President Park's
aides said,
we are in the process of becoming stronger •••
we
have to make adjustments now, initiate changes. The
withdrawal raises totally unnecessary additional
risks that shouldn't arise. When South Korea will
improve its armed forces to ,itch the North, that
will be the time to withdraw.
Like other Koreans, dissidents opposed to President Park
believed that American withdrawal would increase the risk of
war. Father Jack Corcoran,
quite

familiar

with

an American missionary, who was

dissidents,

said

that

almost

all

dissidents were against the withdrawa1. 39 Even Kim Dae Jung,
the leading dissident, declared his opposition to the pullout,
while in jail, claiming that it might encourage Kim Il Sung
to

attack

the

South. 40

Former

President

Yoon

Bo

Sun

emphasized that Kim Il Sung could not be trusted. He said,
"they are beyond common sense. An American withdrawal might
not prompt an immediate invasion, but it could cause the North
to rethink the possibility. 1141

3~

NYT, 7 August 1977.

39
. CT, 5 September 1977, sec. 3.
4 ~ David Rees, "South Korea Needs U.S. Troops," Daily
I.elegraph (10 May 1977): 16.
41

• NYT, 16 January 1977.
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Lee

Chul

sung,

newly

elected

Chairman

of

the

New

oemocratic Party which was the leading opposition party in
south Korea, urged the Carter Administration to withhold its
pullout decision until South Korea could achieve military
balance with the North. 42 At the same time, he expressed his
concern

that

president

Washington's

Park's

human

excessive

public

rights violations

pressure

over

together with a

campaign for the pullout might provoke a strong nationalistic
reaction from both the repressive Park's regime and the South
Korean people. This could give President Park further excuses
to clamp down on the freedom that opponents still enjoyed. 43
In order to discuss the above problems with political and
government leaders of the incoming Carter Administration, Lee
decided to visit Washington in January 1977. 44

In New York,

on March 8, Lee again expressed his view that even though he
did not favor the permanent presence of United States troops
in his country, he hoped the United States would keep its

42. Ibid.
4 ~ Economist 262 (5 February 1977): 71.
4 ~ John T. Connor to Vice President Walter F. Mondale,
12 January 1977, NSC Memorandum 782, WHCFSF co 41. co 82-2,
FG 38; Kim Jun Yop, Director of Asiatic Research Center in
Korea University, to Zbigniew Brzezinski,31 January 1977, NSC
Memorandum 807. WHCFSF co 41. co 82-2, FG 6-12. According to
Nsc Memoranda 782 & 807, the NSC staff regarded Lee Chul sung
as an instrument of President Park's Government and not a
Korean
dissident.
Yet
because
of
his
legislative
responsibilities, they decided to allow him to make a brief
c~urtesy call on the Vice President, but politely turned down
his request to see Dr. Brzezinski.
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ground troops until South Korea could assure its security. He
added, "such time is at least 10 years away. 1145
Yu Chin

o,

a former chairman of the chief opposition

party, remembering the U.S. pullout of 1948 and the late Dean
Acheson's

statements,

said

"the United States should not

repeat the mistakes it made just before the start of the
Korean War 27 years ago. 1146
Kim Hyung Wook, a former director of the South Korean
central Agency who revealed details of the Park regime's
covert

operation

for

buying

influence

in

United

states

congress, claimed in Washington that the South Korean forces
were too weak to face the North Korean Army. He said, "the
presence of U.S. ground troops in Korea is the only effective
deterrent

force

against

North

Korean

aggression. • .

Their

withdrawal from Korea at this time is wrong. 1147
The human rights campaigners, who believed withdrawal
would increase the risk of war, were very concerned about
Park's anticipated curbs on their activities once American
pressure was

removed

and South Korea

had

a

self-reliant

defense. One Christian mentioned an old Chinese saying that
"two people can be in the same bed but with different dreams."
He went

on

to

say

human

45. NYT, 8 March 1977.
4 ~ WP, 24 May 1977.
47• NYT, 6 June 1977.

rights

campaigners

agreed

with
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president Park on the pullout, but for different reasons. 48
one dissident, who experienced

prison life for criticizing

the government, expressed his objection to the withdrawals.
He said, "in comparison with North Korea our country is free,
even

though

I

criticize...

In

South

Korea,

we

have

the

possibility of Democracy one day. 1149 The Families Association
of Prisoners of Conscience in Korea delivered a statement that
the withdrawal would give Park cause to control the nation
more tightly:

"we are worried that the withdrawal of U. s.

troops from Korea will cause further suppression of the people
along with strengthening of the dictatorship. 1150 A Korean
professor explained what worried the critics of President
Park:
Many of the President's critics look to
States Government and American press for
their struggle. They are concerned that
States troop withdrawal will leave them

the United
support in
the UnJted
alone.

Many Koreans perceived that Carter linked the pullout
with Koreagate and human rights violations. They regretted
that Carter did not separate these issues and their country's
security.

One

citizen

complained

about

Carter's

pullout

decision by arguing that:
Ninety

per

cent

of

Koreans

are

48. Frederick A. Meritz, "Koreans See
Rights Safeguard," CSM, 3 June 1977.

in

love

u.s.

with

Presence as a

49

• CT, 5 September 1977, sec. 3.

50

• WP, 30 March 1977.

5 ~ Meritz, "A Rights Safeguard," CSM, 3 June 1977.
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Americans, but now American boyfriend forgets us.
we don't understand. We wonder why you blame all
this Koreaga~ on us, when it was just one man,
Tongsun Park.
Former President Yoon Po Sun,

who was

on trial

for

criticizing Park's dictatorship, told a New York Time reporter
that "we can't ask the United States to go simply because
inadvertently they helped to maintain Mr. Park's dictatorial
machinery.

And we can't help the North Korean cause

just

because we don't like what Mr. Park is doing. 1153 He warned
that if the United States left South Korea because of Park's
violations of human rights, it would challenge "America's own
liberal values of human rights and democracy. 1154 The seventynine-year old resolute foe of Park continued to say that:
You
are
bound
to
help
us. . .
It
is
your
responsibility because there are no boundaries on
humanitarianism. But ggove that you have a special
relationship with us.
The carter Administration's public pressure on the South
Korean Government over human rights violations was the most
baffling and irritating issue to President Park. Moreover,
Park was especially afraid of his fellow citizens' impression
that Carter decided to withdraw American ground troops from
South Korea because of his violations of human rights, since

52. Nick Trimmesh, "Even South Korea's Dissidents Want
the u.s. to stay," cr, 5 September 1977, sec. 3.
5 ~ NYT, 7 March 1977.
5~

Ibid.

5 ~ WP, 30 March 1977.
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this

kind

of

negative

impression

could

jeopardize

his

political life. 56 Therefore, Park reconfirmed that the human
rights issue was not relevant to his country and made it clear
that he would not free political prisoners to please Carter. 57
park's aides also repeatedly denied human rights violations
in south Korea. They claimed it was a "biased opinion" of the
united States.

Many officials believed that some kind of

restriction on political activities was necessary because of
their unique situation, trying to develop their economy while
continuously

coping

with

the

North's

threat.

They

also

regarded the Carter Administration's open pressure on the
human rights issue as a challenge to their legal system and
interference

in their domestic political affairs. 58

mild-mannered Deputy Prime Minister Nam Duck Woo,
educated

in the United States,

defended his

Even

who was

government's

restrictions on opponents' activities. He told a correspondent
of the Time that:
There is not one developing country in the world
where Western democracy really works. The government
in a developing country must give guidance,
direction,(and) stability. It is the only way to
grow. If students are in the streets all the time,
everybody~ nervous, business suffers. We cannot
afford it.

5 ~ FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 12.
5 ~ WP, 24 June 1977.
5 ~ NYT, 13 March 1977 and 20 March 1977; FEER 96
June 1977): 12.
5 ~ Time 109 (6 June 1977): 32.
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In the meantime, Carter's removal of General Singlaub
stunned the South Koreans because most of them understood that
the general was a man who knew most about North Korea because
of his position as senior UN command delegate at the Panmunjom
peace talks. Singlaub's dire prediction that the pullout would
1ead to war in Korean peninsula was splashed across the front
pages of all Korean newspapers and received heavy TV and radio
coverage for several days. 6

°

Former President Yoon told a

reporter that General Singlaub "spoke for all of us." Park
Joon

Kyu,

Democratic

the

Policy

Committee

Republican

party,

Chairman
ridiculed

of
the

the

ruling

general's

dismissal. He said, "if punishment is necessary, why shouldn't
Carter

recall

General

Vessey,

who

is

the

Supreme

U.S.

Commander here? 1161
Editors of Seoul daily newspapers wrote long articles
about Singlaub's thirty year military career. They argued that
the general spoke correctly and the White House did not have
as good a sense of North Korean capabilities as the United
States Command in South Korea. 62 An editor of the Seoul Daily
Newspaper, who saw the Singlaub affair as a power struggle
between Washington and the Seoul command, said, "it's Vessey' s

6 ~ WP, 21 May 1977; FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 12.
6 ~ Ibid.
6 ~ CSM, 31 May 1977.
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white flag, isn't it? 1163
The Singlaub affair led to street demonstrations and
rallies throughout Seoul. On 22 May more than 500 Christians,
including many critics of President Park,

met at Saemunan

church in downtown Seoul in order to support Singlaub' s cause.
They

prayed

for

a

reversal

of

Carter's

decision

on

the

pullout. Reverend Kim Jong Dae praised Singlaub for "pointing
out a very grave flaw" in President Carter's policy. Reverend
Kim Kwan Suk, Secretary General of the Korean National Council
of Churches and a

leading human rights campaigner, made a

speech before the audience saying that "we tried to express
our misgivings and uneasiness about the troop withdrawal •••
If it's possible, we would like to reverse the decision. 1164 He
later met Under Secretary of State Habib and explained Korean
church leaders'

fears

over the possible North communist's

aggression after the withdrawal. At the meeting, he also asked
for

Carter's

strong

commitment

to

human

rights

in

South

Korea. 65
At the same time,

hundreds

of other Christians,

who

carried banners and placards declaring "Absolute Opposition
to the Withdrawal of U.S.

Forces" or "The Withdrawal Would

Threaten the Church," assembled at the residence of United

6 ~ FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 12.
6 ~ WP, 24 May 1977; llli,
1977): 29.

23 May 1977; Time 109

6 ~ WP, 26 May 1977; CST, 26 May 1977.

(6 June
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states Ambassador Richard L.

Sneider to protest carter's

pullout decision. 66
Opposition to the withdrawal had created a rare consensus
in south Korea, and even Habib's confirmation of America's
continuing commitment to South Korea could not ease discontent
there. A cartoonist of the Cho

Sun Il Bo, a Seoul conservative

daily newspaper, depicted the mood among the South Koreans in
its front page cartoon. It showed a bewildered Korean holding
carter's

letter

promising American

commitment

after

the

pullout while thousands of troops were seen going home. The
Korean complained, "only this letter? 1167
Indicating the South Koreans' fear over the withdrawal,
a senior Park aide told a New York Time reporter that "if we
had our way, the United States would bring in an additional
two di visions. 1168 A South Korean Air Force general claimed
that two thousand aircraft would be needed to compensate for
the withdrawal. 69 The local Korean papers also claimed that
South Korea would need at least US$25 billion to finance a new
five year army modernization plan in order to keep military
balance with the North without the presence of American ground

6 ~ WP, 27 May 1977; Time 109 (6 June 1977): 29.
67• NYT, 7 August 1977.
68• NYT, 25 May 1977; Newsweek 89 (6 June 1977): 49.
69. Stilwell, "Need U. s. Forces," AEI Defense Review (May
1977) : 23.

231

troops in South Korea. 70
The Korean Christian Ad-hoc Policy Committee, which was
supported

by

about

400

ministers

belonging

to

eighteen

protestant denominations, placed a half page advertisement in
the

Washington

Post

appealing

for

the

aid

of

American

churchmen in changing Carter's policy. They emphasized in the
declaration that all churches in North Korea were wiped out
and many church workers and believers were killed by the
communists.
Christian

Moreover,
believers

they
were

reminded
murdered

Americans
brutally

by

that

many

Northern

communists during the Korean War. The declaration stated that
"because we know all too well the inhumanly brutal nature of
the Communists,

we do not regard the murder of the good

citizens of Cambodia as simply some other person's business."
The committee concluded its declaration by saying that they
would continually oppose the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
South Korea until permanent peace would be settled in the
Korean peninsula "according to God's will. 1171
In October,

Reverend Kim Kwan Suk and sixteen other

Korean church leaders, who were participating in a meeting of
Korean and American church leaders in New York,

tried to

persuade their American counterparts William P.

Thompson,

President of the National Council of Churches (NCC), Claire

7 ~ CSM, 25 May 1977.
7 ~ WP, 14 June 1977.
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Randall, General Secretary of the NCC, and other American
church leaders to oppose the planned withdrawal. But they were
very disappointed to find that in reality many American
ministers favored Carter's troop withdrawal policy and refused
to support the Korean church leaders proposa1. 72
Unlike other communities, the Korean business community,
which had heavily relied on foreign capital and trade, was not
affected seriously by the pullout policy. At the beginning of
the Carter Administration, many businessmen expressed their
concern over a possible cut in foreign loans and a future
shrinkage of the Korean economy. With considerable anxiety a
corporate lawyer told a Washington Post reporter:
The retreat of American troops increases the risk
of war... With the President and the Congress
showing they don't want to help South Korea. We
wonder if the Ame,:jcan banks will want to keep on
lending us money.
As time went on, however,

there were few signs that

foreign businessmen and bankers were shying away from doing
business in Seoul. The world's conservative bankers had never
abated their business in Seoul. The country's economy was the
fastest growing in the world during the 1970s,

7 ~ CSM, 17 November 1977.
73.

WP,

24 May

1977.

averaging
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nearly 11 per cent real growth per year. 74
Some Korean big businessmen

even expected that

the

pullout would require more business investment in the defense
industry. Kim Woo Choong, President of Dae Woo Industrial
company, who believed the withdrawal would actually expedite
the development of the Korean defense industries, expected
that foreigners would not cut their business because of the
proposed pullout. Kim told a reporter from the Washington Post
that foreign investors, whom he had met, did not express any
worries. Kim said, "businessmen are very realistic. They're
worried

about

return

equity.

Who

is

leaving?

More

are

coming. 1175
As Kim expected,

American investors never cut their

business in Seoul. Zoltan Merszei, President of Dow Chemical
Company, who planned a US$250 million project in South Korea
told a Wall Street Journal reporter that:
There isn't even a wait-and-see attitude. People are
looking to do things here. We feel that South Korea
offers us the opportunity and the return on
investment we're s~~ing. So we think Korea is a
good place for Dow.

74• WSJ, 30 August 1977. In 1976, South Korea's GNP jumped
15.2 per cent to US$25 billion. According to a confidential
report of the World Bank issued earlier 1977, South Korea had
been transformed from "one of the poorest developing countries
to a semi-industrialized nation."
7 ~ Ibid.
7 ~ Ibid.
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Du Pont also planned to open a liaison office in Seoul
in late August 1977. William Dizer, General Manager of its
Tokyo office, told a reporter from the Wall Street Journal
that:
We've been thinking about this for several years.
I don't think the troop withdrawal has even been a
factor in our decision. We've been verr, much
impressed with the progress in South Korea. 7
At this point, South Korean business leaders did not have
any difficulty in borrowing the necessary money from foreign
investors. Kim Woun Gie, Governor of the Korean Development
Bank, even complained with pleasure that foreigners were so
eager to lend money to Korean borrowers that there was much
more credit than could be used. 78 By the end of 1978, about
1,500 American firms opened business in South Korea and its
trade reached to US$7 billion and was rapidly growing. 79
During the first year into the Carter Administration,
there was still no sign of anti-Americanism in south Korea,
despite strong objections to the pullout. Nick Thimmesh, a
Chicago Tribune correspondent, depicted the mood of Seoul:
The South Koreans cling to the U.S. to the point of
dependency. There are more hurt than angry that Mr.
Carter announced weakening of the relationship ••.•
The gratitude South Koreans feel for the U.S.
remains strong. There are no "Yankee, Go Home!"
sings, no declarations from dissidents that the U.S.

77• Ibid.
7 ~ Ibid.
7 ~ DSB 79, (February 1979): 30-1.
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is a fickle exploiter. 80
Bernard Weinraub, a New York Times special reporter, also
expressed a similar opinion. He said,
Although American officials are worried about antiAmerican sentiment, the South Koreans express more
sorrow and puzzlement than anger and insist th<il
the reasons for the pullout are incomprehensible.
By the middle of 1978, however,

relations had become

strained. In April 1978 when State Department announced an
American

table

tennis

team's

plan

for

attending

an

international tournament in Pyong Yang in the following year,
suddenly

rumors

spread

out

Seoul

that

the

Carter

Administration was considering three-party talks - the United
States and the two Koreas - an idea which was submitted by
President Tito of Yugoslavia to President Carter, but rejected
by Seoul. 82 The South Koreans, remembering what happened in
South Vietnam after the Paris peace talks, were again worrying
that the United States might abandon their country as she did
in Vietnam after the peace talks in Paris. This event together
with the humiliation of Koreagate and the Blue House bugging
incident, 83 in which the CIA was alleged to have bugged the

.

80

sec. 3.

Nick Thimmesh,

"U. s. Stay," CT,

5 September 1977,

8 ~ NYT, 7 August 1977.
8 ~ WP, 20 April 1977.
8 ~ American papers reported that the CIA activated
electronic surveillance of the Blue House, the presidential
residence in Seoul, since 1970. The reports said that the CIA
Placed a listening device inside the Blue House and got
information about the illegal lobbying affairs. The State
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south Korean presidential residence, produced anti-Americanism
in south Korea. William Chapman, Special correspondent of the
~ashington Post in Seoul, reported this mood in Seoul:
The current jitters follow a series of events that
have combined to provoke rare signs of antiAmericanism in South Korea. It began with the troop
withdrawal announcement, continued through the
humiliating Tongsun Park affair, and came to a head
in the reaction to the alleged bugging of President
Park Chung Hee's official mansion, the Blue House:s-4
In May 1978, Dr. Brzezinski visited Seoul on the way to
his home from China in order to calm the South Koreans' loud
protests over the pullout plan. In Seoul, he tried to assure
Koreans that they did not have to worry excessively about a
possible North attack after the pullout by pointing out to
them the fact that South Korea's US$40 billion economy was
four times larger than that of the North and its population
was twice the North's.

Of course,

South Koreans were not

pleased to hear his explanation of rationale of the pullout.
Park Cheong Hoon, Chairman of the Korean Trade Association,
told a reporter from the New York Times that:
Once you withdraw forces completely, North Korea
will be tempted to attack. Brzezinski is not a
better judge than our generals facing the North •••
They have all the intelli%~ce reports on the North
Korean military build up.
The South Koreans who feared another war in the peninsula

Department officially denied it. But it aggravated antiAmericanism in South Korea. NYT, 19 June 1977.
8 ~ NYT, 25 April 1978.
8 ~ Ibid., 30 May 1978.

237
strongly objected to Carter's pullout policy even before
carter took the oval office. As the process went on, however,
the Koreans realized that they could not change Carter's
policy and tried to prepare themselves for self defense. They
gave unanimous support to their government's campaign for a
self sufficient military capability by approving a 40 percent
increase in the defense budget. 86 It strengthened President
Park's political position and gave momentum to expedite the
development of South Korean defense industries, which were
started in the early 1970s when President Nixon removed 20,000
American troops from South Korea.
The South Korean Government reconsidered a covert nuclear
weapons program and doubled the number of planned nuclear
power plants in order to influence Carter's new Korean policy.
At the same time, the government began cautiously to change
its traditional security reliance on the United States, and
tried

to

reach

accommodation

with

communist

countries,

including North Korea by exploring trade and cultural and
sports exchanges. This campaign was partly successful, and
Seoul was able to invite the Eastern block as well as the West
to the Seoul Olympics in 1988.
Meanwhile, President Carter's unilateral announcement of
the withdrawals served to plant anti-American sentiment in the
Korean

public

mind.

Before

8 ~ LAT, 1 September 1979.

the

withdrawal

policy

anti-
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.Americanism had been almost nonexistent in South Korea since
the end of the

Korean War.

This was

aggravated by the

humiliation of Koreagate, the Blue House bugging affair, and
the Kwangju crisis of May 1980. 87

87. Jae Hoon Shin, "Gunfire Ends the Insurrection," FEER
108 (30 May 1980): 9-10. In the Kwangju incident, the South
Korean Government calmed an insurrection by force. casualties
numbered anywhere between 200 and 300. Radical Korean college
students have claimed that the United States, which had an
operational responsibility for the Korean Army, allowed them
to crush this peaceful demonstration for democracy by force.
They also maintained that casualties numbered about 2,000.

CHAPTER XVIII

CARTER'S TRIP TO KOREA AND SUSPENSION OP THE PULLOUT

While Seoul officials were approving Park Tong Sun's
return

to

Washington

carefully

floated

President

Carter and

problems
Carter,

of
who

the

an

for

Congressional

testimony,

idea

of

meeting

a

summit

President Park

rejected

between

in order to discuss

proposed withdrawal

earlier

they

plan.

Seoul's

But

request

President
that

Vice

President Mondale visit Seoul on the way home from Tokyo at
the beginning of his term, ignored the idea. 1
In

July

1978,

however,

President

Carter

expressed

interest in a possible meeting for the first time in a news
conference, saying that he had no plans to invite President
Park to the United States but had no objection to meeting
him. 2 At the end of 1978, partly because the Korean lobbying
scandal was

almost over and partly because congressional

1 . NYT, 8 January 1978.
2 • PPP 2 (20 July 1978): 1330.
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objection to the withdrawal had calmed down after passage of
the Korean military aid package,

the President considered

visiting Seoul and using the proposed weapons transfer as
1everage

to

improve

human

rights

in

South

Korea.

Carter

informed the Koreans that he intended to visit Seoul after the
.
't 3
Tokyo economic
summ1.

As soon as Carter's plan to visit Seoul was announced,
three leading Korean opposition leaders, a former President,
Yun Po sun, a religious leader, Ham Suk Heon, and a former
President candidate, Kim Dae Jung,

sent a letter to Carter

asking him to help with freeing about 400 political prisoners
and repealing emergency decrees that blocked Korean political
freedoms since 1972. 4 But, after realizing that their request
was

not

officially

recognized

by

the

White

House,

the

opposition began to criticize President Carter while opposing
his trip to Seoul. 5
Meanwhile, one month before Carter's official visit to
Seoul,

the South Korean Government abruptly freed sixteen

opposition figures to improve the political climate. 6 At the
same time,

however,

the Seoul Government began to prevent

leading opponents from participating in any dissident meeting

.
4
.
5
.
3

6

.

WP, 8 November 1978.

NYT, 27 May 1979.
Ibid., 14 June 1979 •
Ibid., 27 May 1979.
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designed to stop carter from coming to south Korea. 7 The
Education Ministry ordered university authorities to shorten
the spring term in order to bar students'

demonstrations

during carter's stay in Seoul. Kim Young Sam, new head of the
leading opposition New Democratic party, strongly criticized
the

government's

over-reaction.

He

remarked

that

"the

government is going crazy. 118
As

Carter's visit

came

nearer,

there was

a

wave

of

repression including house arrests. Kim Dae Jung who was freed
in December 1978, but then was put under house arrest, said
that

"we

are

suffering

from

so-called

Carter

shock.

We

expected the human rights situation to improve at least before
President

Carter's

visit,

but

just

the

opposite

has

happened. 119
Meanwhile, on June 20, Carter told a Japanese reporter
that he would meet not only President Park but also opposition
party leaders as well as religious leaders and others to
discuss ways of improving human rights in South Korea. At the
same time,

the President,

admitted that a

new CIA report

confirmed that North Korea had a stronger military capability
than previously estimated.

He also told reporters that he

would discuss that matter with President Park and his local

.
8
.

7

9

.

Ibid., 19 June 1979 •
Ibid., 22 June 1979 .
Ibid .
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commanders in south Korea before he made any further decision
concerning the pullout. 10
Carter reaffirmed that he had made no decision on the
pullout issue yet in his letter to Whan Hyon So, the president
of the Oriental Press in Korea. Carter said, "I want to take
look at the situation, talk to President Park, and consult
with Congress" before he made up his mind.
added,

The president

"whatever decision is made, one thing is clear: Our

commitment

to

the

security

of

the

Republic

of

Korea

is

unshakable. 1111
On 29 July, unlike previous Presidents, Carter arrived
in Seoul at night12 and spent the first night with American
soldiers

at

Camp

Casey,

the

headquarters

of

the

Second

Division, north of Seoul and twelve miles south of the DMZ.
He did this in order to show the South Koreans his desire to
keep a certain distance from President Park. 13

In a brief

speech at Camp Casey after jogging with American soldiers for
three

miles,

the

President

hinted

that

he

would

press

l~ PPP 2 (20 June 1979): 1111; WCPD 15 (23 June 1979):
1148.

l~ PPP 2 (23 June 1979): 1153; WCPD 15 (2 July 1979):
1153.
1 ~ WP, 30 June 1979.
1 ~ PPP 2 (30 June 1979): 1202; NE, 30 June 1979. Carter
met Park Chung Hee at Kimpo on the evening of 29 June. And
then, he went to Camp Casey where he stayed overnight at the
residence of General Robert C. Kingston, Commanding General
of the Second Division.
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president Park to improve human rights conditions in South
I(orea by emphasizing the fact that 50,000 young Americans lost
their

lives

for

"equality,

justice,

freedom,

and

the

preservation of basic human rights" for the South Koreans
during the Korean War. 14
The next day, Carter attended at a welcoming ceremony at
Yoido Plaza. The President was warmly greeted by about soo,ooo
citizens who lined a four-mile route through downtown Seoul.
President Carter, who encountered only massive police security
in Tokyo a few days before, was very impressed by the big
welcoming crowd. Near the Seoul City Hall, he abruptly got out
of his open roof limousine to shake hands with people in the
crowd. 15
At the first meeting at the Blue House after having
completed the exciting thirty-minute motorcade in downtown
Seoul, President Park directly challenged Carter's withdrawal
policy, hoping that the President would formally announce the
suspension of his plan. Carter, who had already been pressed

1 4: NYT, 30 June 1979; WP, 30 June 1979; LAT, 30 June
1979; PPP 2 (30 June 1979): 1201-2; WCPD 15 (9 July 1979):
1201.
1 ~ LAT, 30 June 1979. A month later, on 31 July, at a
town meeting at Bardstown, Kentucky, Carter told American
citizens how much he was impressed, saying that "I just came
from South Korea just 2 or 3 weeks ago, I have never had such
an outpouring of a welcome in my life. There were literally
millions of people on the street expressing their thanks to
America for guaranteeing the independence and freedom of the
people of South Korea." PPP 2 (31 July 1979): 1349; WCPD 15
(6 August 1979): 1349.
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by domestic and foreign leaders about the pullout issue, did
not want it raised again by President Park. Secretary Vance
described the situation later in his book, Hard Choices:
When he reached Seoul, he found to his intense
annoyance that President Park intended to raise the
issue with him directly. He asked us to prevent this
from happening, since he already knew Park's views.
However, despite our warnings, Park began the first
meeting between the two men with a forty five minute
statement on the dangers that the troop withdrawal
policy created for his country and the region. We
could almost feel the temperature in the room drop
as Park continued, through an interpreter, his
assault on the policy. Sitting between the President
and Harold Brown, I could feel the contained anger
of the President, but there was not~ing to be done
but let the drama play itself out.
Carter ignored Park's presentation on the pullout issue.
Instead,

he

took

up

mainly

the

violations under the Park regime. 17

issue

of

human

rights

The President pointed

out that Park's violations of human rights were undercutting
American

public

support

for

the

United

States

security

commitment to South Korea. 18 President Park tried to defend
his strong rule by arguing that some restrictions on human
rights was inevitable in his country in order to defend the
nation against an aggressive North Korea

as well

as

to

expedite economic development. 19

16. Vance, Choices, 129.

17• Ibid., 130.
1 ~ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of
the National Security Adviser. 1977 -1981 (New York: Farrar,
Straus, Giroux, 1983), 128.
1 ~ NYT, 30 June 1979; LAT, 30 June 1979.
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That afternoon, Secretary Cyrus Vance, Ambassador William
H. Gleysteen, and Assistant Secretary Richard

c. Holbrooke

gave a firm warning to President Park through his aides that
if he wanted to avoid a personal rupture with Carter, Park
should not press him about the pullout policy. They also made
it clear that the policy would be decided not in Seoul but in
Washington after consul tat ions with Congressional leaders. The
message got through, and the state dinner was successful. 20
At the state dinner toast, President Park did not mention
the

troop

withdrawal

and

only

criticized

North

Korea's

military buildup. He could not help noting, however, that "the
clouds of war still hang over the Korean peninsula." He also
expressed thanks for American cooperation in the development
of his country and expressed his hope that Carter's state
visit to South Korea would consolidate friendship between two
countries. 21
In his response to Park's statement, Carter emphasized
that "the United states has been,

is,

and will remain a

Pacific nation and a Pacific power." He also reaffirmed that
the United States commitment to South Korea's security would
be "strong, unshakable, and enduring." The President, praised
South Korea's economic accomplishments, said that South Korea
proved the fact that "a free economy is the clearest road to

2 ~ Vance, Choices, 130.
2 ~ PPP 2 (30 June 1979): 1202-4: WCPD 15 (9 July 1979):
1202-4.
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shared prosperity and a better life for all." And then told
the Koreans that improvement of human rights should keep pace
with the country's dramatic economic progress. He said,
There is abundant evidence in Korea of the dramatic
economic progress a capable and energetic people can
achieve by working together. I believe that this
achievement can be matched by similar progress
through the realization of basJ~ human aspirations
in political and human rights.
On
leaders,

Sunday

morning,

Carter

met

twelve

Korean

church

including Kim Kwan Suk, President of the National

council of Christian Churches of Korea and a leading anti-Park
campaigner,

at

the

William Gleysteen. 23

residence

of United States Ambassador

At the evening reception, carter had a

twenty-three-minute talk with Kim Young Sam,

Chairman of

Korea's New Democratic Party. They discussed issues of human
rights and political freedom. Carter did not, however, meet
Kim Dae Jung, Seoul's most prominent dissident, who was forced
to stay at home. 24 Meanwhile, Secretary Vance handed in a list
of over 100 names of political prisoners to Foreign Minister
Park

Dong

Jin

calling

for

an

investigation

and

their

release. 25

.

22

1205.

.
24.

PPP 2 (30 June 1979): 1205; WCPD 15 (9 July 1979):

23 WP, 1 July 1979;

~, 2 July 1979, sec . 2.

NYT, 2 July 1979 and 3 July 1979 •

2 ~ NYT, 2 July 1979; LAT, 2 July 1979. It was the first
time that the United States submitted a list of political
prisoners to South Korea or any ally asking that they be
freed.
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During the forty-three-hour visit,

Carter officially

reaffirmed that his withdrawal policy remained unchanged, but
he privately told President Park that he was studying a delay
of the pullout of 19,000 of the 31,000 ground troops, and also
hinted that his administration was seriously considering the
total suspension of the program. 26
In the joint communique issued at the conclusion of
meetings with President Park on 1 July 1979, Carter left open
the possibility of a further pullout of the troops from South
Korea. However, he reaffirmed that the United States would
keep the Mutual Defense Treaty with Seoul and protect the
Koreans

under

United

States•

nuclear

umbrella.

In

the

communique, Carter and Park proposed a three-way parley to Kim
Il Sung in order to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
At the same time, the Presidents ordered Secretary of State
Vance and Foreign Minister Park to get in touch with the
Foreign Minister of North Korea "in an appropriate manner. 1127
Two weeks later, on 17 July, the South Korean Government
announced the release of eighty-six political prisoners, the
largest release of dissidents since 1975, in accordance with
Carter's recommendation during his visit to seou1. 28

2 ~ WP, 2 July 1979; CT, 1 July 1979; LAT, 1 July 1979.
2 ~ PPP 2 (30 June 1979): 1208; WCPD 15 (9 July 1979):
1205; ~ , 3 July 1979; LAT, 15 July 1979. Three days later,

on July 3, North Korea rejected the proposed three way talks
claiming that the reunification was a domestic issue.
2 ~ NYT, 18 July 1979; ~ , 17 July 1979.
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Three days later, on 20 July 1979, after having completed
withdrawal of only 3,670 troops including one 674-man combat
unit, 29 Carter formally announced that he would suspend the
Korean pullout plan based on new intelligence assessments of
North Korea's military strength and other factors, such as the
steadily growing Soviet military power in East Asia. In his
statement, read by Security Advisor Brzezinski, the President
declared that withdrawal of the Second Infantry Division "will
remain in abeyance." Carter also revealed in his statement
that he would not discuss the issue for the rest of his term
by saying that "the timing and pace of withdrawals beyond
these will be reexamined in 1981. 1130
As soon as Carter announced his decision to suspend the
proposed withdrawal plan, the Los Angeles Times, the most
ardent defender of Carter's pullout policy, declared its full
support for the decision by claiming in its editorial of 25
July that "it is the right decision. 1131
There is no evidence that Carter's trip to Seoul affected
the Korean withdrawal policy. Carter already had made up his
mind to suspend the pullout before he reached to Korea. His
official visit to Korea was designed to provide a face-saving
setting for the suspension of the withdrawal policy. At the
29• CT, 21 July 1979.
3 ~ PPP 2 (20 July 1979): 1275-6; WCPD 15 (23 July 1979):
1275-6; DSB 79 (September 1979): 37.
3 ~ Editorial, LAT, 25 July 1979.
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same time, Carter believed that he could use the possibility
of suspension as leverage to improve human rights in South
Korea.

Therefore,

political

Carter outrightly gave

prisoners

he

wanted

Park a

released.

It

list

of

was

an

unprecedented diplomatic action by the United States. Carter's
message got through and Park released political prisoners in
accordance with Carter's request. Overall, Carter's trip to
Seoul was successful.

He announced the suspension of the

pullout policy under relatively favorable circumstances.

CHAPTER XIX

JAPANESE REACTIOHS

The Korean peninsula has been regarded as

"a dagger

pointed at the heart of Japan" because the two countries are
located

less

than

one-hundred

miles

apart

with

strong

geopolitical and psychological ties. 1 Therefore, the Japanese
have historically been sensitive to the implications for their
nation's security of the situation in the Korean peninsula.
The

1977

Japanese

edition

of

government

Japanese

Foreign

publication,

stated

Policy.
that

an

annual

"the

Korean

Peninsula is a very important region whose peace and security
is vital to Japan's own security. 112 Moreover, close economic
ties with South Korea established during the 1970s made the
Japanese especially nervous about President Carter's intention

1 . WP, 28 December 1976.
2 . Yashuhisa Nakada, "The Korean Peninsula and Japan's
Security, the Resurgence of Japanese Politico - Military Roles
in the 1980s." WHCFSF. General CO 82-2. CO 78,
In his
article, Nakada recommended that U.S. ground troops continue
to stay in South Korea. This article was sent to Brzezinski
on 12 May 1977 by William R. Kintner, President of Foreign
Policy Research Institute in Pennsylvania.
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to withdraw the Second Division.

In 1976 Japan enjoyed a

US$900 million favorable balance of trade out of total US$3.8
billion bilateral trade with South Korea. They had invested
US$2. 8 billion in South Korea,

which was Japan's

largest

market in Asia and was second only to the United States as a
destination for Japanese exports. 3
Because the Japanese benefited greatly from the statusquo in the Korean peninsula, they did not want the situation
destabilized by the withdrawal of United States ground troops.
Therefore,
victory,

immediately
Japanese

after

officials

Carter's
expressed

November
deep

election

concern

over

Carter's proposed withdrawal policy. They emphasized that the
pullout might not only destabilize the Korean peninsula but
also threaten the security of Japan. 4 Japanese Vice Defense
Minister Takashi Maruyama, who voiced outspoken opposition to
the pullout plan, claimed that even when South Korea became
strong enough to defend the country themselves, the presence
of

U.S.

ground

prerequisite

troops

for

would

be

retaining

"an

absolutely

stability"

on

peninsula. 5 Foreign Minister Iichiro Hatoyama,

essential

the

Korean

reminded the

United states that its withdrawal in 1948 caused the Korean
War,

said,

"If you look at history,

it is a fact that war

3 • WP, 13 November 1976 and 17 February 1977.
4 . Ibid., 13 November 1976.
5 . Ibid.
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occurred once in Korea because of withdrawal of U.S. troops
there. Hence, our anxieties. 116
At the beginning of December 1976, the Tokyo Government
urged the President-elect not to make any sudden withdrawal
decision. Prime Minister Takeo Miki said, "it is conventional
Japanese thinking that drastic changes in the military balance
in the Korean Peninsula are unfavorable to peace and security
there. 117

However,

in the middle of January 1977, Foreign

Ministry officials, who agreed with Defense Ministry officials
that any drastic change of the United States• Korean policy
would threaten Asian political stability, began to say they
were not in a position to oppose Carter's new Korean policy.
They said, "what we want is some kind of U.S. guarantee for
stability there. 118
At the meeting with Vice President Mondale, Japanese
leaders expressed their opinion that "the withdrawals would
serious mistake. 119 They emphasized that any sudden,

be a

drastic troop withdrawal could create a military imbalance in
Korea and it would not only threaten the security of South
Korea but also endanger Japan's security. However, Japanese
officials, who understood President Carter would not rescind

.
7.
8
.
6

LAT, 1 February 1977.
NYT, 2 December 1976.

Ibid., 16 January 1977 •

9. Vance, Choices, 128 .
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his pullout plan, tried to lengthen the United States pullout
schedule. Japanese officials told Mondale that they were not
in a position to oppose an American plan itself, but it should
be done "slowly, gradually and after consultation with Japan
and the South Korean Government. nlO Even after the meeting,
Japanese officials publicly expressed their hope for the
mitigation of the plan by declaring that they understood the
pullout of all troops from South Korea would be taken over
"many, many years. 1111
However, Japanese officials made it clear at a meeting
with the vice president that they did not want to discuss with
the United States delegates the specific timetable and number
of soldiers to be withdrawn, partly because they could not
alter American policy and partly because they knew the South
Koreans were very sensitive to outsiders•s interference in
their security problem. 12

Foreign Minister Iichiro Hayotama

said, "the rate at which the 42,000 U.S. troops are brought
home is essentially a matter for Washington and Seoul to
negotiate. 1113 Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda,

emphasizing the

larger issue of the United States role in regional stability,
also said, "any withdrawal is a matter for the United States

.
.
12.
13.

10 WP, 2 February 1977.
11 NYT, 4 February 1977.
Ibid •
WP, 1 February 1977.
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and

South

Korea

and

not

a

subject

in

which

Japan

can

interfere. 1114 Immediately after the meeting with Mondale, the
Prime Minister sent a

warning letter to other government

agencies that "noisy opposition to the withdrawal would be
unwise. 1115
The official Japanese policy of being noncommittal to the
pullout was clearly displayed when Fukuda rejected President
carter's proposal for a broadened Japanese political role in
international affairs. At the Washington Summit Conference
Fukuda expressed his grave doubts about the withdrawals. He
said it would upset the military balance and consequently
threaten peace and stability in Northeastern Asia. Fukuda also
made it clear that Japan would not take any role
security

of

South

Korea. 16 Japanese

pullout had remained noncommittal.

policy

in the

regarding

the

When Defense Secretary

Brown explained to them the results of the consultations with
Seoul officials in July 1977, Foreign Minister Hatoyama told
Brown that "we don't have any disagreement at a11. 1117
While Japanese officials were noncommittal officially,
many of them privately expressed their worries about the
pullout to the news media. Even Prime Minister Fukuda himself

1 ~ LAT, 17 February 1977.
15. WP, 8 July 1977.
1 ~ NYT, 22 March 1977.
l~ WP, 28 July 1977.
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expressed his doubt about Carter's plan of strengthening South
Korean Army and United States Air Force in South Korea in
order to keep stability in the Korean peninsula. He said,
"that's

what

I

think

Carter has

in mind. 1118 One

Foreign

Ministry official told a correspondent of the U. s.

News &

world Report that:
We'll continue to explain to the u.s our own
opinions and concerns as well as the concerns of
other Asian countries. So if it is true that the
U.S. is revising its Asian policy, Japan's view and
the view~ 9 of Asia will
be understood
and
reflected.
Ambassador Fumihiko Togo, who served as Deputy Foreign
Minister before he came to Washington, addressed the annual
meeting of the Mid-Atlantic Regional Organization of Asian
Studies

at

Princeton University.

He

said

that

the

troop

withdrawal should be reconsidered so as not to upset the
balance of power in the Korean peninsula,

emphasizing the

United States' role in keeping peace and stability in the Far
East. 20
Many Japanese Defense Ministry officials also expressed
their suspicions about the United States' promise that it
could keep peace and stability on the Korean peninsula after

1 ~ LAT, 28 March 1977.
1 ~ USNWR 83
Western Japanese
the U.S. to play
it is doing now,

(18 July 1977): 54. The reporter asked one
expert that "What role do the Japanese want
in Asia?" The expert answered, "exactly what
no more and no less."

2 ~ NYT, 31 October 1977.
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the pullout without securing assurance from Moscow or Pyong
Yang.

Moreover,

pullout

offered

they believed that the rationale for the
by

the

United

States

was

"inadequate"

considering the fact that the Soviets had steadily increased
their air and naval strength in the Far East while American
naval and air forces in the Pacific declined. 21
Many Japanese security experts regarded the Soviet Union
as a potential major enemy and doubted America's will to keep
the balance of power in the Far East. They opposed the pullout
by warning that the Soviet navy would dominate Japan's air and
sea routes
withdraws

if the United States undertook further troop
in

Asia. 22

They

were

concerned

over

Russian

expansion into South Korea after the U.S. pullout. They argued
that such a move would not only increase a threat to Japan's
security but also disturb its oil supply line from the Middle
East. 23
President Carter's pullout policy combined with the rapid
Soviet military build up in the Far East produced a major
defense debate in Japan. This received the greatest attention
in the news media after a Soviet Mig-25 landed in Japan on 6

21• Ibid., 1 August 1977.
2 ~ WP, 28 July 1977.
2 ~ NYT, 12 February 1978.
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September 1976. 24 An editorial in the Mainichi Shinbun of 16
January 1978 pointed out that President Carter's decision to
withdraw the troops from South Korea was part of America's
long term policy of "separation from Asia. 1125
Two days later, the Nihon Keizai reported a similar view
that the United States was beginning to separate from Asia
while the Soviet Union was building up its military power in
the Far East. The paper also reported a Japanese defense
official saying that "today Korea and tomorrow Japan ••. the
United States' separation from Asia is real. 1126
The Asahi Shinbun, the world's largest newspaper with
twelve million circulation, on 25 February 1978 pointed out
that the United States commitment to Japan had weakened. An
editorial stated:
The U.S., while showing concern over the Soviet
naval build up in the Far East, is still moving to
diminish its presence in Asia ••• As a result, the
Japanese commitment .~ 7 is apparently becoming less
important to America.

2 ~ Oida Kejo, "The Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Troops from
South Korea and Our National Security" (in Japanese), KoKubo
27 (January 1978): 9; NYT, 22 March 1977. On 6 September 1976
a Soviet Mig-25 was landed at a Japanese civilian airport by
a defecting Soviet pilot. It was undetected by Japanese radar.
That event greatly dismayed Japanese leaders because it proved
the weakness of the Japanese defense system. It fueled the
defense debates in the news media at that time.
2 ~ Bernard K. Gordon, "Loose Cannon on a Rolling Deck:
Japan's Changing Security Policy," Orbis 22 (winter 1979):
975, cit., Mainichi Shinbun, 16 January 1978.
26. Ibid., 969, 975, cit., Nihon Keizai,
, 18 January 1978.
27• Ibid., 975, cit., Asahi Shinbun, 25 February 1978.
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on 30 March the paper warned the Japanese that Japan faced
the most difficult challenge to its security since the Second
world War. 28
The Tokyo Shinbun speculated on a possible Soviet naval
invasion of the northern island of Hokkaido. At the same time,
the Yomiuri Shinbun claimed that the Japanese could no longer
trust America's will to defend Japan. The newspaper alleged
that the United States was planning to move its Pacific
seventh Fleet to the Atlantic in the event of confrontation
in Europe. 29 Pointing out the fact that American predominance
in the Pacific was ending because of growing Russian naval
power in the Far East, the Yomiuri Shinbun urged the Japanese
Government to rethink its traditional security ties with the
United States. 30 The Sankei Shinbun also pressed Japanese
political leaders to reconsider their defense policy, pointing
out that the Soviet Union had quickly increased its military
power in Asia. 31
Most Japanese defense officials agreed with the news
media's viewpoints. Shin Kanemaru, Director General of Japan's
Defense Agency, expressed his concern over Russia's strong
military buildup. He said, "Russian warships and other vessels

28

• Ibid., 968, cit., Asahi Shinbun, 30 March 1978.

2 ~ NYT, 14 May 1978.
3 ~ Gordon, "Loose Cannon," 973, cit., Yomiuri Shinbun,
4 February 1978.
3 ~ Ibid., 970, cit., Sankei Shinbun, 10 February 1978.
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make such frequent appearances in the Sea of Japan these days
that we might as well refer to those waters as the Sea of
Russia. 1132 In comparing the military power of Japan with that
of

the

Soviet Union,

Kanemaru,

pointing

out

that Russia

deployed 2,000 aircraft in the Far East while Japan possessed
only 400 aircraft,

said that Japan had nothing more than

"bamboo spears against machine guns. 1133
The annual Japanese defense "White Paper" of 1978, unlike
the previous papers,

regarded the Soviet Union as Japan's

principal potential enemy. The paper stated that "given this
increase in Soviet forces

in the area,

the United States

seventh Fleet did not have the strength to fully protect
Japan's vital sea

lanes. 1134 Mr.

Atsuyuki Sassa,

a

defense

adviser at Japan's Defense Agency and a chief of the study
group which helped produce the White Paper,

expressed his

concern about the strength of Soviet power in the Far East.
He told a correspondent of the New York Times that "even if
they did not use nuclear weapons,

their forces are strong

enough to destroy us, especially hitting our sea lanes. 1135
Many

other

Japanese

experts

also

urged

the

Fukuda

Administration to set up a more independent defense posture.

.
33.
34.
35.

32 NYT, 14 May 1978.
Ibid •
Ibid., 29 July 1978 •
Ibid •
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Tadae Takubo, Editor of the Foreign News Department of the
Shigitsushin,
carter's

argued in an article in the Chuo Koron that

pullout

policy

was

an

extension

of

the

Nixon

Doctrine, which had aimed to press Japan to bear more defense
responsibility

commensurate

with

its

economic

power.

He

maintained that the Japanese Government had to make use of
that opportunity to build up a self-reliant defense capability
as well as to reach accommodation with the Communist great
powers. 36
In his article, "The Withdrawal of U. s. Troops from South
Korea and Its Problem" published in Sandai Hogaku, Hitegiro
Kodani agreed with Takubo that the real goal of the policy was
to urge Japan to spend more on its own defense. He pointed out
that the credibility of American security promises had sharply
declined

among

the

Japanese

after

the

Vietnam

War.

He

maintained that Japan had to break away from its traditional
security

reliance

on

the United

States

and

establish an

independent defense capability. Moreover, he claimed, for its
security Japan should ultimately assume the American defense
role in South Korea. 37

3 ~ Tadeo Takubo, "The Real Meaning of the Withdrawal of
U.S. Troops from South Korea" (in Japanese), Chuo Koron 92
(March 1977): 246-8.
3 7• Hi tegiro Kodani, "The Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from
South Korea and Its Problem" (in Japanese), Sandai Hogaku 11
(December 1977): 330-2.
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Oida Kejo also emphasized the importance of the Korean
Peninsula to Japan's security in an article in the Kokugo
(National Defense). He wrote, "the withdrawal is not only a
Korean problem, but also is ours." Kej o claimed that the U.S. Japanese Security Treaty should be reconsidered and Japan had
to strengthen the Self-Defense Force

(SDF,)

especially by

considerable expansion of naval and air forces.

Thus, they

could cope with any threats from the western coast as well as
from the northern border. 38
In an article published in the Jiyu,
political

commentator,

was

concerned

about

Takashi Den,
the

a

potential

Japanese economic losses due to the proposed withdrawal. In
order to protect that profitable market, he maintained, Japan
had to continue its investments boldly in South Korea even
after the pullout in order to prevent North Korea's military
attack on the South. 39
News media debates and discussions over the national
security greatly influenced public opinion. A Yomiuri Shinbun
nationwide poll

in April

1978

showed

only 21

percent of

Japanese believed that the United States would keep the joint
security treaty in the event of war while 38 percent doubted

3 ~ Oida Kejo, "The Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from South
Korea and our National Security" (in Japanese), Kokubo 27
(January 1978): 22-4.
3 ~ Takashi Den, "Significance of U.S. Troops in Korea
and Important Choices of the Concerned Countries" (in
Japanese), Jiyu 19 (March 1977): 23-4.
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the United States•s will to honor the treaty. 40

The debate

sparked a new campaign to heighten awareness of the national
defense issue. It consequently led the Japanese to reconsider
building up the Self-Defense Force, which had been regarded
as "taboo." An Asahi Shinbun nationwide poll at the beginning
of 1978 showed that 77 percent of the Japanese supported the
existence of the SDF,

and many of them urged the Japanese

Government to strengthen the SDF. 41 The Defense Agency's own
poll

in the same period showed the highest record of 83

percent approval of the SDF since the end of World War II. 42
Partly because of the encouraging results of these polls
and

partly

influenced

by

Carter's

pullout

policy,

Prime

Minister Takeo Fukuda brought up the defense issue in his 1978
Administration Policy Speech at the opening session of the new
Diet. 43 In the debate about the defense issue, surprisingly,
the opposition Komeito
considered pacifist,

(Clean Government Party) ,

changed

its traditional

declared its support of the SDF. 44

generally

attitude and

The Japanese Government

4 ~ NYT, 14 May 1978.
4 ~ Gordon, "Loose Cannon," Orbis 22 (Winter 1979): 972.
42. Ibid.
43. NYT, 14 May 1978. This was the same time as the
President's state of the union address in the United States.
Mentioning the defense issue in Administration policy speeches
was very rare because supporting the SDF in the Parliament was
a "taboo" in Japan.
4 ~ Ibid.
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increased its defense budget by 12.4 percent, amounting to
US$8.76 billion, without facing any severe objections,

and

allocated

and

US$2

billion

sophisticated weapons. 45

to

buy

new

aircraft,

ships,

At the same time, Japan's National

Defense Council decided to buy 100 F-15 fighters and 43 P-3C
anti-submarine patrol planes, at the cost of US$4.5 billion,
from the United States over eight to eleven years. This was
the biggest aircraft order Japan had ever made. 46
Meanwhile, voices for reconsidering Japan's traditional
reliance on the United States for its security became louder.
The

Japanese

Government

tried

cautiously

to

reach

accommodation with Communist countries such as China and North
Korea. 47

In attempting to have a dual diplomatic relations

with the two Koreas, the Japanese Government, while officially
supporting Seoul, sent a delegation led by Congressman Chuju
Kuno, who was a member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party,
to Pyong Yang. They instructed the delegates to issue a joint
communique to back up the North Korean position that all
foreign troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea should be
removed. 48

4 ~ Ibid., 12 February 1978.
4 ~ Ibid., 29 December 1977. According to Gordon, Japan
chose the F-15 because of its "look down" radar and its
defense superiority against invading aircraft.
47. Ibid., 1 August 1977.
48• LAT, 9 September 1977.

264

In order to improve relations with China, the Japanese
Government approved the Japan-China Long Term Trade Agreement
for eight years in February 1978. Moreover, Tokyo planned to
provide a huge low interest loan program to China to expedite
economic
needs.

cooperation

by

solving

China's

foreign

currency

But being faced with the Organization for Economic

Cooperation

and

Development's

(OECD)

regulation

that

the

lowest interest limit on such loans was from 7. 25 to 7. 5
percent,

the

Japanese

Government

unprecedentedly

decided

directly to deposit more than US$1 billion in cash in the Bank
of China in Peking at a 6 percent interest rate. In October
1978 Japan moved closer to China by inviting Chinese Vice
Premier Deng Xiaoping to Tokyo and by signing the Peace and
Friendship Treaty with China. 49
As a result of Carter's withdrawal policy, the Japanese
realized that they could not rely on the United States for
their national security. It led the Japanese to understand
the importance of their Self-Defense Force which had been
ignored by the Japanese public. As a result, Tokyo could build
up the Self Defense Force without any public opposition. At
the same time, the Japanese Government also began cautiously
to accommodate the communist super powers, especially China.
They signed Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peaceful Understanding
prior to the normalization of Sino-American relations. At the

4 ~ CSM, 14 December 1978.
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same time, the Japanese concretized dual diplomatic relations
with North and South Korea to enhance their security and
economic interests.

CHAPTER :X:X

CONCLUSION

President Carter's Korean withdrawal policy was one of
the most controversial foreign policy issues during his entire
Administration.

Dr.

Nam

Joo

Hong

claimed

America's Commitment To South Korea,
policy was Nixon's legacy.
policy was

partly

a

in

his

book,

that Carter's pullout

It is true that the withdrawal

continuation

of

the

so-called Nixon

Doctrine that the United states would no longer take a front
line security role for the defense of Asian allies. However,
Carter proceeded with the policy based on his own initiative
and for his own purposes rather than as an extension of the
Nixon Doctrine. Carter introduced this idea when he was an
almost unknown presidential candidate fighting for national
recognition. Carter read American public opinion as disgusted
by negative images of South Korea,

as well as opposed to

further American involvement in any Asian conflict because of
the aftermath of the Vietnam War. He successfully made the
Korean withdrawal a major campaign issue in differentiating
himself from other presidential candidates.
266
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Carter's withdrawal policy contained several weak points
from the start. First, he did not seek out the opinions of
military experts before making his campaign promise. Second,
the campaign pledge became a major United States foreign
policy without serious consultation with military experts,
Congress, and leaders of the concerned countries. Third, he
boxed himself into a corner on the issue when he prematurely
announced the policy. His administration had not sufficiently
studied all possible options and ramifications.
From the beginning of the Carter Administration, there
was discontent with the policy within the government, and it
faced

some

opposition

from

Congress.

However,

voices

of

opposition to the policy were not strong enough to attract
public attention until the Singlaub affair occurred.
President Carter, who was concerned about the growing
opposition to the pullout within his administration as well
as outside the government,

needed to take strong action

against General Singlaub in order to prevent further open
opposition to his foreign policy from subordinates. The abrupt
summons of the general was intended to show that Carter had
made up his mind already and would not change it. At the same
time, the President expected to calm down growing opposition
within his administration by punishing Singlaub severely.
In dealing with the Singlaub affair, however, Carter made
a serious mistake by recalling the general to the White House.
He should have ignored the general's remarks published on the
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front page of the Washington Post or should have had Defense
Secretary Harold Brown or Chief of Staff of the
Bernard W.
general

u. s.

Army

Rogers take care of the case by removing the

from his

Korean post quietly.

President carter I s

unnecessary overreaction caused the heavy media coverage of
the Singlaub affair as well as the withdrawal policy itself.
It was followed by a full scale debate in Congress on his new
Korean policy, as well as a lengthy academic discussion on the
issue.
By humiliating the patriotic and professional general,
Carter gave the American public the negative impression that
he

had

broken

predecessor,

his

campaign

promise

that,

unlike

his

he would welcome open discussion on American

foreign policy. Moreover, Carter's tolerance for Ambassador
Young's maverick activities in the United Nations while he was
punishing Singlaub planted in American minds the negative
image that the President applied a double standard in dealing
with public officials.
At
American

the

same

public

time,
of

the

Singlaub affair

President

Truman's

recall

reminded
of

the

General

MacArthur during the Korean War and incited public debates on
the

Korean

issue.

As a

result,

the American public,

who

tacitly approved Carter's new Korean policy when it had been
given little attention, began to realize the disadvantages as
well as advantages of the pullout policy. Many Americans then
urged the Carter Administration to consider the issue more
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cautiously. Various polls demonstrated this opinion shift.
The Singlaub affair gave Congressional conservatives the
momentum to rebut Carter's pullout policy. During the Vietnam
War,

Congressional

administration's
opposition.

conservatives

policy

But,

in

while

dealing

liberal
the

with

supported
Democrats

the

were

withdrawal

in

policy,

ironically, they changed their positions and liberal Democrats
tried

to

defend

the

administration

conservatives attacked

it.

while

Congressional

Among Congressional

opponents,

Congressman Samuels. Stratton, Chairman of the House Armed
Services

Investigations

Subcommittee,

played

the

most

important role in rallying Congressional opposition to the
Carter Administration's one sided handling of the pullout
policy. His proposed amendment, attempting to stop the further
withdrawal of 26,000 American ground troops until North and
South Korea achieved a political settlement,

could not be

approved by the full House. But Stratton's campaigns against
the pullout were influential enough to attract Congressional
attention

to

the

issue,

and

it

destroyed

the

Carter

Administration's policy momentum.
Moreover,

military

officers

and

security

experts•

overwhelming opposition to the policy became a heavy burden
for the President.

In addition,

overseas allies' warnings,

especially from Japan and the new ally, China, could not be
ignored by Carter.
As

Carter

well

understood,

considering

the

growing
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opposition within and outside the government,

the Korean

withdrawal policy, which had provided him with an advantage
in the 1976 election, could be used to criticize him in the
next election.

As a

matter of fact,

Carter,

who did not

produce any remarkable domestic policy achievements, wanted
to demonstrate his expertise in foreign policy by ending the
threat of American involvement in an Asian land war with the
removal of all ground troops from South Korea. By the middle
of

1979,

however,

Carter

had

achieved

several

notable

diplomatic successes by completing the Panama Canal Treaties,
the Camp David Agreement, the normalization of relations with
China, and the signing of the SALT II. 1

Therefore, he did

not have to wrestle with the controversial pullout policy that
had become less important to him politically.
In addition,

The South Korean Government's threat to

develop nuclear weapons for its survival after the American
pullout embarrassed the President because it could directly
cause the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the
world. As every United States President before him had fought
to restrict nuclear weapons, Carter did not want to go down

1 • Panama Canal Treaties signed on 7 September 1977 and
it was ratified in April 1978. On 15 September 1978 Carter
announced normalization of diplomatic relations with China and
their official relations began on 1 January 1979. Premier
Begin and President Sadat signed the Camp David Agreement on
26 March 1979. Carter signed SALT II at Vienna summit on 18
June 1979. But it was not approved by the Senate because
conservatives believed that the treaty would give the Soviets
a first strike potential. See Brzezinski, Power and Principle,
82, 194-195.
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in history as the President who expedited the expansion of
nuclear weapons throughout the world because of his Korean
withdrawal policy.
Having considered all these factors, Carter had no choice
but to suspend his withdrawal policy. However, it was not easy
for him to announce the suspension of the policy because he
repeatedly and

strongly confirmed his

intentions

to

the

American public. Of course, the suspension of the policy would
please Congressional conservatives, the military, scholars,
and many American citizens who favored the status quo on the
Korean peninsula, but it had the potential disadvantage of
raising political problems with liberal Democrats who fully
backed him in the 1976 election. Fortunately, Congressional
delay on the Korean aid package because of the Koreagate
affair gave him an excuse to slow down the schedule. Even
after Congress approved the Korean military aid package in
August 1978, Carter did not attempt to restore his original
pullout schedule. Instead, he adhered to the delayed schedule.
An early 1979 Army intelligence report on the North Korean
strength, and the CIA and the DIA's confirmation of the Army
report gave the President a face saving excuse to suspend his
pullout policy.
In his visit to Seoul, Carter believed he could use the
suspension of the policy as leverage to improve human rights
in South Korea. He openly pressed President Park to improve
human rights and urged Park to restore democratic process. At
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the same time,

Carter proposed to North Korean leaders a

three-way conference. If it was successful, Carter thought,
he could produce another Camp David achievement in the most
sensitive area in Asia. If the North rejected his proposal,
it would provide him with a good excuse to suspend the pullout
policy.

As Carter expected,

President Park yielded to his

pressure and freed eighty-six political prisoners as soon as
he returned home, while Kim Il Sung rejected his proposal for
a three-way conference. Thus, in July 1979, Carter announced
the

suspension

of

the

Korean

withdrawal

policy

under

relatively favorable circumstances.
The

fiasco

of Carter's

Korean proposal

should

teach

politicians that it is dangerous for presidential candidates
to use national security issues in their campaigns without
access

to

classified

information

and

without

broad

consultations with experts and concerned foreign leaders. In
the middle of the 1970s, South Korea, an emerging economic
power, was expected to assume more defense responsibilities.
But the country was not yet strong enough to stand on its own
feet.

Moreover,

considering the tremendous tension between

North and South Korea, the rapid buildup of Soviet naval power
in the Pacific, followed by the Soviet-Vietnam Treaty of 1978,
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and the Chinese border war
with Vietnam in February 1979, 2

Asia was not as stable as

2 • Levin, and Sneider, "Korea in Postwar," 53.
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Carter believed. With his Korean policy Carter had jumped into
Asian affairs with both feet before even knowing how deep the
water was.
As a result of the pullout, anti-Americanism, which was
almost non-existent in South Korea since the end of the Korean
War, was inflamed. On the other hand, Carter's initiative had
some constructive effects. It impelled South Korea to expedite
the development of defense industries. Thus, the South Koreans
were able to achieve a more independent defense capability.
Although Carter's action may have been premature, it did lay
the groundwork for the future withdrawal of American forces
by encouraging Korea and Japan to do more

in their own

defense. At the same time, the pullout policy encouraged South
Korea toward a more independent diplomacy.

Relations with

other communist countries were actively improved, with added
gains in the widening of trade relations. Although they would
not be diplomatically formalized until the late 1980s, these
changes began to take shape a decade earlier.
In South Korea Carter's withdrawal policy created a very
rare national consensus in opposition to the policy and it
temporarily strengthened President Park's political position.
Paradoxically,

the decision to suspend the pullout, which

freed South Koreans from worries of another war, allowed them
to continue to campaign strongly against President Park's
dictatorship,

to demand the restoration of democracy,

and

ultimately to topple Park after seventeen years' rule in South
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Korea.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Original Sources
Congressional Sources
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services.
Investigations Subcommittee. Hearings on Review of the Policy
Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea.
95th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1977-8. HASC no. 95-71.
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978.

u. S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services.
Investigations
Subcommittee.
Hearings
on
Impact
of
Intelligence Reassessment on Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from
Korea.
96th Cong.,
1st Sess.,
1979. HASC no. 96-16.
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services.
Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw U.S. Ground Forces
from Korea. Report Prepared by Samuels. Stratton, Chairman
of Investigation Subcommittee. 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 26 April
1978. HASC no. 95-61. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978.
U.S.
Congress.
House.
Committee on
International
Relations. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Hearings
on Economic and Security Assistance in Asia and the Pacific.
Foreign Assistance Legislation: Fiscal Year 1979. 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1978. LC 78-601897. Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1978.
U. s. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services.
Hearings on Authorization for Military Procurement. Research
and Development. and Active Duty. Selected Reserve. and
Civilian Personnel Strengths: Fiscal Year 1978. 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1977. s. Rept. 1210. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services.
Hearings
on
Department
of
Defense
Authorization
for
Appropriations: Fiscal Year 1979. Part 3: Manpower and
Personnel, Overseas Troop Developments for Korea and Related
Areas. 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1978. s. Rept. 2571. Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1978.

275

276

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services.
Hearings
on
Department
of
Defense
Authorization
for
Appropriations: Fiscal Year 1980, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979.
S. Rept. 428. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services.
Korea: The U.S. Troop Withdrawal Program. Report prepared by
the Pacific Study Group. 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 January
1979. LC 79-601124. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.
U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea. Report
prepared by Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn. 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 9 January 1978. LC 78-602436. Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1978.
U.S. Congress. Senate. committee on Foreign Relations.
U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea: An Update
1979. Report prepared by John Glenn. 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
June 1979. LC 79-604232. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979.
U.S. Congress. Force Planing and Budgetary Implications
of u. s. Withdrawal from Korea: Background Paper of u. s.
Congressional
Budget Office.
May 1978.
LC 78-602389.
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978.
Congress and the Nation: 1977-80. vol.
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1981.
Congressional Directory. 95th
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977-80.

&

5, Washington,

96th Congs.

4

vols.

Congressional
Quarterly
Weekly
Report.
4
vols.
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1977-80.
Executive Documents
White House Central File: Subjective File. Box No. co41; Executive, CO 82; General, CO 82; Confidential, CO82-2,
Executive, co 82-2, General, CO82-2, 1977-80. Atlanta,
Georgia: Jimmy Carter Library, 1977-80.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Jimmy Carter. 4 vols. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977-80.
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977-80.

4 vols.

U.S. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin.
4 vols. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977-80.

277

U.S. Army. Department of the Army Historical Summary,
comp. by Karl E. Cocke and seven committee members. 4 vols.
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978-1981.
Newspapers
Chicago Sun Times. 1977-81.
Chicago Tribune. 1977-81.
Christian Science Monitor. 1977-81.
Cleveland Press. 1977-81.
Detroit News. 1977-81.
Houston Post. 1977-81.
Los Angeles Times. 1977-81.
New York Times. 1975-81.
San Francisco Chronicle. 1977-81.
st. Louis Post Dispatch. 1977-81.
Wall Street Journal. 1977-81.
Washington Post. 1975-81.

Secondary Sources
Articles
Adelman, Kenneth. "Troop Withdrawal: A Reckless Policy
in Korea." Chicago Tribune, 29 May 1977, Sec. 2.
Alpern, David M. and Lea Donosky. "All about Koreagate."
Newsweek 90 (1 August 1977): 17-8.
Anderson,
Jack.
"Carter's
Washington Post, 29 June 1979.
-------------"Generals
Chronicle, 5 July 1977.

Korea
Warned."

Rights

Problem."

San

Francisco

--------------. "Nuclear Dominoes." SFC, 28 June 1979.

278
• "Park's Power."~, 29 June 1979.
"Seoul Hints at Developing A-Weapons."
WP, 28 June 1979.
Awanohara, Susumu. "Japan on Alert for a Carter Shokku."
Far Eastern Economic Review 97 (16 September 1977): 10-1.
-----------------. "Fukuda Caught in China Web." FEER 95
(4 February 1977): 8-9.
Baker, James T. "Korea Today: History's Tragic Feast."
Christian Century 95 (25 January 1978): 72-7.
Barber, Stephen. "Congress Eyes Carter's Plan." FEER 97
(5 August 1977): 12-3.
---------------. "Koreagate Gets to the Boil." FEER 98
(4 November 1977): 40-1.
---------------.
March 1978): 33.
--------------February 1977): 31.

"Park's Song and Dance." FEER 99
"Why Mondale Skipped Seoul."

~

( 17

95 ( 11

--------------- "Confronting a New Reality." FEER 103
(2 February 1979): 10-1.
Boettcher, Robert. "The Mini-Summit in Seoul: Whose
Agenda Will Prevail?" Christianity and Crisis 39 ( 14 May
1979): 114-6.

Bonavia, David. "A Surprisingly Sudden Thaw." FEER 103
(2 February 1979): 10-1.
Buchanan, Patrick J. "The General Deserves Respect." CT,
26 May 1977, Sec. 3.
Carter, Jimmy. "Why We're Withdrawing Troops from South
Korea." Commanders Digest 20 (21 July 1977): 2-11.
Clugston, Michael. "World War III:
Maclean's 92 (28 May 1977): 26-8.
Cohen Jerome A.
Times, 2 March 1977.

Fact or Fiction?"

"Putting the Heat on Seoul." New York

---------------. "Will Carter's Visit to Seoul Promote
Human Rights or Dictatorship?" Christian Science Monitor, 21
June 1979.

279
Coleman, Herbert J. "Boost in Japan's Military Funding
Pressed by GAO." Aviation Week & Space Technology 106 (27 June
1977): 24.
Conine, Ernest. "Jimmy Carter's Nuclear Backbone." Los
Angeles Times, 13 November 1978, Sec. 2.
-Crozier,
Brian.
"Korean Reminders:
The Protracted
Conflict." National Review 31 (27 April 1979): 529.
Cushman, John H. "The Military Balance in Korea." Asian
Affairs 6 (July/August 1979): 359-69.
Deats, Richard L. "Carter's Korean Visit: Abetting a
Dictator." Christian Century 96 (30 May 1979): 604-6.
Den, Takashi. "Significance of U.S. Troops in Korea and
Important Choices of the Concerned Countries" (in Japanese).
Jiyu 19 (March 1977): 18-30.
Gibney, Frank. "The Ripple Effect in Korea."
Affairs 56 (October 1977): 160-74.

Foreign

Gillingham, Paul. "Letter from Panmunjom." FEER 105 (10
August 1979): 110.
Godsell, Geoffrey. "Korea Aid in Jeopardy So Carter Keeps
Troops." CSM, 24 April 1978.
Gordon, Bernard K. "Loose Cannon on a Rolling Deck?
Japan's Changing Security Policies." Orbis 22 (Winter 1979):
967-1005.
Graves, Ralph. "Concern about Rights and Troops." Time
109 (6 June 1977): 32-5.
Ha, Joseph M. and Gregory M. Luebbert. "A Korean
Settlement: The Prospects and Problems." Asian Survey 17
(August 1977): 735-52.
Ha, Joseph M. "U.S. Withdrawal from Korea: A Means, Not
an End." Orbis 21 (Fall 1977): 607-22.
Ha, Young Sun. "Nuclearization of Small States and World
Power Order: The Case of Korea." Asian survey 18 (November
1978) : 1134-51.
Hager, Barry M. "Park Indictment Strains U. s. - Korea
Ties." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 35 (10 September
1977): 1916-8.

280
--------------"Scandal
Could Harm
Relations." CQWR 34 (18 December 1976): 3337-9.

u. s.

-Korea

Halloran, Richard. "Why Would Korea Do Illegally What It
Could Do within the Law?" Hll, 25 June 1977, Sec. 4.
Han, Sung Joo. "South Korea 1978: The Growing Security
Dilemma." Asian survey 19 (January 1979): 41-50.
Harrington, Floyd. "Land of the Morning Calm." Soldiers
32 (March 1977): 42-4.
Harsch,

Joseph

c.

"The Korean Equation." CSM,

26 May

1977.
----------------"Peking's Influence the Key
Withdrawal from s. Korea." Houston Post, 1 June 1977.
----------------July 1979.

to

"Problems in Human Rights." CSM,

3

Haruna, Mikio. "The Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from South
Korea and Military Balance in Northeast Asia" (in Japanese).
Kokusai Mondai 209 (August 1977): 10-23.
Harvey, Pharis. "Missing the Moment in South Korea."
Christianity and Crisis 39 (10 Feb 1979): 306.
Henderson, Gregory. "A New Round
Game." CSM, 31 January 1979.
1978.

in the Two Koreas'

------------------. "Toward Korean Peace." NYT, 17 April

Hoar, William P. "Congress Runs from a Major Scandal."
American Opinion 21 (June 1978): 5-10, 93-102.
Hoffman, Nicholas Von. "The Korean Question." Spectator
(9 July 1977): 8-9.
Holbrooke, Richard. "A Sense of Drift: A Time for Calm."
Foreign Policy no. 23 (Summer 1976): 97-111.
Holt, Pat M. "Troops
Changed." CSM, 3 May 1978.

Abroad:

Oh,

How

Congress

Has

Horrock, Nicholas M. "Park May Be a Dull Witness, After
All." NYT, 26 February 1978, Sec. 4.
Jameson, Sam. "Brown's Asian Visit Paves the Way for
Koreanization." LA'.r, 31 July 1977, Sec. 4.

281
------------- "U.S. Military Sees Need to Balance Korea
Pullout." .I.Al'., 19 April 1977.
Kamm,

Henry.

"Carter and South Korea." NYT,

11 · March

1977.
Karnow, Stanley. "The Park Scandal: A Diplomatic crisis. "
WP, 20 September 1977.
Keegan, George J. "Keegan on Korea." CSM, 22 June 1977.
Keerdoja, Eileen.
March 1979): 18.

"Talkative General." Newsweek 93

(5

Kejo, Oida. "The Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Troops from
South Korea and Our National Security" (in Japanese). Kokubo
27 (January 1978): 8-24.
Kihl, Young Whan. "Korea's Future: Seoul's Perspective."
Asian Survey 17 (November 1977): 1064-76.
Kilian, Michael. "Do Korea' s Faul ts Mean Reds Should take
It over?" CT, 28 June 1979, Sec. 3.
--------------"Korea and the Ghastly Lesson We' re
Forgetting." CT, 24 June 1979, Sec. 2.
---------------.
"S. Korea's success
Continued?" CT, 26 June 1979, Sec. 2.

Story:

To

Be

Kodani, Hitegiro. "The Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from
South Korea and Its Problem" (in Japanese). Sandai Hogaku 2
(December 1977): 309-33.
Kondracke, Morton. "South Korea with
Republic 177 (17 September 1977): 12-6.
Kraft, Joseph.

Sympathy."

"The Foreign Policy Tyro." WP,

New

13 June

1978.
Lee, Young Ho. "U.S. Policy and Korean Security." Korea
and World Affairs 3 (Summer 1979):183-96.
Leepson, Marc. "Relations with South Korea." Editorial
Research Reports 2 (12 August 1977): 597-616.
Lefever, Ernest
September 1977.

w.

"Opening a

Korea

Gate."

NYT,

30

-----------------. "Withdrawal from Korea: A Perplexing
Decision." Strategic Review 6 (Winter 1978): 28-35.

282
Li, Lin Chun. "Carter's Policy Move Seen by Withdrawal
from Korea." Asian Outlook 12 (June 1979): 14-20.
Malcolm, Andrew. "Seoul 's Rule Backed by Army of Agents.
NYT, 3 May 1977.

11

McGleish, Weyland. "Letter From Seoul." America 136 (5
February 1977): 99-101.
McGovern, George. "The U.S. Risk in Korea" American
Enterprise Institute Defense Review (May 1977): 2-13.
Middleton, Drew. "Carter's Seoul Talks
Influence Troop Pullout." Hll'., 30 June 1979.

Expected

to

Minard, Lawrence. "Guns Instead of TV Sets?" Forbes 121
(20 March 1978): 71-2.
Moritz, Frederie A.
CSM, 15 June 1977.

"Will South Korea Go for A-Arms?"

Morris, Donald. "Cheap Shot, Bad Decision Hurt Singlaub."
HP, 9 June 1977.
Oberdorfer, Don. "Carter's Decision on Korea Traced to
Early 1975." Hf, 12 June 1977.
Oh, John K. C. "South Korea 1976: The Continuing
Uncertainties." Asian Survey 17 (January 1977): 71-80.
Oka, Takashi. "South Korea Says a Reluctant Good-bye."
CSM, 27 July 1977, Eastern edition.
------------. "Why Koreans Want U.S. Combat Troops. 11 CSM,
25 July 1977, Eastern edition.
Ornstein, Norman J. "Lobbying For Fun
Foreign Policy no. 28 (Fall 1977): 156-65.

and

Policy."

Orr, Bill. "Computing Under the Gun in the
Kingdom." Datamation 23 (September 1977): 101-4.

Hermit

Park, Bong Shik. "Korea and the U.S. from the Korean
Viewpoint." Korea and World Affairs 3 (Winter 1979): 463-70.
Park, Dong Jin. "Korea and the United States: An Enduring
Partnership." Asian Affairs 6 (January/February 1979): 13947.
Park, Yung H. "Japan's Perspectives and Expectations
Regarding America's Role in Korea." Orbis 20 (Fall 1976): 76184.

283
Pearlstine, Norman.
Korea." WP, 24 May 1977.

"Why U.S.

Troops

Should Stay

in

Pepper, Thomas. "South Korea: A New Kind of Ally." Asian
Affairs (November/December 1978): 75-87.
Pillsburg, Michael. "A Japanese Card?" Foreign Policy
no. 33 (Winter 1978): 3-30.
Poneman, Daniel B. "Korea: Maintaining our Distance."
Harvard Political Review (Winter 1977): 8-9.
Ranard, Donald L. "The U.S. in Korea: What Price
Security?" Worldview 20 (January/February 1977): 23-37.
Rees, David. "South Korea
Telegraph (10 May 1977): 16.

Needs U. s.

Troops."

Daily

Richardson, Ron. "Carter Deals from the Same Pack." FEER
105 (July 1979): 20-1.
---------------. "The Image and the Reality." FEER 103
(23 February 1979): 16-7.
Ringward, George. "The Concessions South Korea Wants from
Carter." Business Week (2 July 1979): 38.
Rogers, Robert F. "Korea: Old Equation, New Factors."
Orbis 19 (Fall 1975): 1115-25.
Rowan, Roy. "There's Also Some Good News About South
Korea." Fortune 96 (September 1977): 171-6.
Saar, John. "Background on the Singlaub Affair." WP (3
June 1977): 27.
---------"Singlaub's
Pullout." WP, 21 May 1977.

Colleagues

Also

Oppose

GI

---------- "U.S. General: GI Pullout Would Heighten War
Risk." WP, 9 January 1977.
----------. "U.S. General: Korea Pullout Risks War." WP,
19 May 1977.
Shaplen, Robert. "Letter from South Korea." New Yorker
54 (13 November 1978): 173-222.
Shim, Jae Hoon. "Brzezinski Floats a Peace Plan ..•• " FEER
100 (2 June 1978): 21.

284
--------------. "Gunfire Ends the Insurrection." FEER
108 (30 May 1980): 9-10.
"Kisaeng and Making-up. "

FEER 102

(6

October 1978): 15-16.
Smith,
Bruce A.
"Koreans Seek New Military Air
capability." Aviation week & Space Technology 3 (22 October
1979): 62-3.
Southerland,
Daniel.
Pullout." CSM, 20 May 1977.

"Carter's

Plans

South

Korea
~

Srodes, James. "Koreagate Stays on the Boil. "
(13 January 1978): 29-30.

99

-------------. "The Strain Begins to Show." FEER 97 (30
September 1977): 22-3.
------------"Lobbying: Korean Probe Worries Asia."
FEER 94 (29 October 1976): 27-8.
-------------. "Lobbying: Pressure Turns on Seoul." FEER
94 (12 November 1976): 24-5.
"Cash for the Congressmen." FEER 94

(19

November 1976): 28.
Spurr, Russell. "A Chill Wind from Carter's Washington."
FEER 96 (6 May 1977): 25-6.
--------------. "The Jitters on Freedom's Frontier." FEER
96 (6 May 1977): 26-8.
--------------.
June 1977): 10-2.

"Seoul in Weapons Race." FEER.

Stentzel, James. "Korea: Time to
Nation 224 (19 February 1977): 197-9.

Trust the

96

(10

People."

---------------. "Bad News for President Park." Nation
224 (22 January 1977): 77-9.
Sterba, James P. "Repression Fails
Korean Opposition." NX.'.r, 1 July 1979.

to

Silence South

Stilwell, Richard G. "The Need for U.S. Ground Forces in
Korea. " American Enterprise Institute Defense Review (May
1977): 14-28.

285
Suhrke, Astri and Charles E. Morrison. "Carter and Korea:
The Difficulties of Disengagement." World Today 33 (October
1977): 366-75.
Szulc, Tad. "Carter's Korean Catch-22." New York 11 (1
May 1978): 10-4.
Takubo, Tadeo. "The Real Meaning of the Withdrawal of
U.S. Troops from South Korea" (in Japanese). Chuo Karon 92
(March 1977): 240-8.
terHorst, J. F. "Who Lost Most
Detroit News, 29 May 1977.

in Singlaub Affair?"

Thimmesch, Nick. "Even South Korea's Dissidents Want the
U.S. to Stay." CT, 5 September 1977, Sec. 3.
Thompson,
August 1977.

Scott.

"Why South Koreans Worry."

CSM,

22

Towell, Pat. "Carter's Korea Troop Withdrawal Faulted."
CQWR 36 (25 February 1978): 542-4.
----------"Carter Troop Withdrawal Plan Attacked."
CQWR 35 (28 May 1977): 1075-6.
----------"Should the U.S. Withdraw
Korea?" CQWR 35 (4 June 1977): 1105-8.

Troops

from

Wallace, James N. "Koreans to Carter: Yankee, Stay Here!"
U.S. News & World Report 87 (2 July 1979): 22.
-----------------. "In Korea, War Goes on Underground."
USNWR 84 (6 November 1978): 36.
Weidman, Judy. "Wai ting for the Other Shoe to Drop. "
Christian Century 95 (2 August 1978): 724-5.
Weinraub, Bernard. "Withdrawal of American Forces Still
a Sticky Issue." NYT, 26 February 1978, Sec. 4.
Weintraub, Peter. "Park Gives in to Gun Law." FEER 98 (11
November 1977): 14.
---------------1977): 26-9.

"Park's Power Game." FEER 97 ( 12 August

----------------- "Critical Days in Kim's Pyongyang."
FEER 94 (5 November 1976): 11-4.

286
----------------"Seoul
Snubs
Pyongyang• s
Movement." FEER 95 (4 February 1977): 9-10.

Peace

----------------"Carter Poised for Seoul Shuffle."
FEER 99 (10 March 1978): 11.
Whymant, Robert. "Panmunjom: Cutting Kim Down to Size."
FEER 93 (3 September 1976): 8-10.
---------------. "Park Takes a Long Look at carter. 11 FEER
93 (6 August 1976): 11-2.
-Willenson, Kim. "A New Korean Conflict." Newsweek 89 (6
June 1977): 49-51.
"Park's Lobby Hobby. 11

Newsweek 9 o

(5

September 1977): 37.
Wilson, George C.
WP, 20 May 1977.

"Tough, Blunt, No-Nonsense Soldier."

Yost, Charles W. "For Clarity on Korea" CSM, 3 June 1977.
--------------"Northeast Asia: The Real
Unforeseen Events." LAT, 5 June 1977, Sec. 4.

Danger Is

Zagolia, Donalds. "Korea: To Stay or Not to Stay." NYT,
2 July 1977.
-----------------. "Why We Can't Leave Korea." New York
Times Magazine (2 October 1977): 17-8, 86-95.
"A Lost Command." Newsweek 89 (30 May 1977): 17.
"Asian's Biggest Worry: Will Carter Jettison Them?" USNWR
83 (18 July 1977): 51-4.
"Carter Accused of Overreacting on General" DN, 25 May
1977.

"Carter's Delicate Balance on South Korea.
no. 2533 (8 May 1978): 62-4.

11

Business Week

"Carter's Koreanization Plan." New Republic 176 (11 June
1977): 5-6.
"Carter's New World Order." USNWR 82 (6 June 1977): 178.

"Civil Rights for
September 1977): 261.

Tong

Sun

Park."

Nation

225

(24

287
"Destabilization?" Economist 262 (5 February 1977): 71.
"G.I.s at the DMZ: Time to Come Home" Time 109 (6 June
1977): 28-9.
"General on the Carpet."~ 109 (30 May 1977): 14-5.
"Gen. Singlaub Survives Wars and Peace." CT, 28 May 1977.
"Habib's Cocktail Mix Upsets Parks Men." FEER 96 (10 June
1977): 11-2.
"House Report Hits Korea's Press Policies." Editor and
Publisher 111 (18 November 1978): 49.
"How Big a Risk?" Economist 263 (28 May 1977): 67-8.
"Japan Debates Defense." Atlas World 25 (April 1978): 43.
"Japan Plans US$13-billion Defense Modernization."
Aviation Week & Space Technology 111 (6 August 1979): 48.
"Killing the Peace of Panmunjom." FEER 93
1976): 12.

(27 August

"Kissinger, Haig and Koreans" Nation 225 (17 September
1977): 227-8.
"Korea: Danger Phase." National Review 29 (8 July 1977):
764.
"Korea Diarist." New Republic 179 (9 December 1978): 39.
"Korea' 78, Focus." FEER 100 (26 May 1978): 35-72.
"Korea Pullout: New Reasons for G.I. to stay." Time 113
(5 February 1977): 19.
"Korea Stonewalls." New Republic 177 (5 November 1977):
7-8.
"Last Salute for Singlaub." FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 12.
"Land of the Morning Calm." Soldiers 32 (March 1977): 424.

"Lid Finally Blows off Korean Bribery Scandal." USNWR 83
(19 September 1977): 28-9.
"Lulling Lull" Economist 262 (29 January 1977): 66-7.

288

"Mr. Koreagate Meets the Press." FEER 97

(9 September

1977): 28-9.

"New Scandal in Congress." USNWR 83 (1 August 1977): 912.

"New Wave of Repression." Christian Century 94

(4 May

1977): 420.

"Now: A Carter Doctrine for the World." USNWR 83
December 1977/ 2 January 1978): 12-5.

(26

"One More Hot Potato for Wartergate•s Jaworski." USNWR
84 (20 March 1978): 26-7.
"Plain Talk About America's Global Role." Time 109
June 1977): 8-10.

(6

"Pressure to Keep the U. s. in South Korea." Business Week
no. 2578 (26 March 1979): 45-6.
"Retreat from Asia: Again It's a Europe First Strategy
for U.S." USNWR 82 (20 June 1977): 22-4.
"Should U.S. Withdraw Troops from Korea?" USNWR 82 (20
June 1977): 27-8.
"The Near War of the Poplar Tree." Economist 260
August 1976): 34.

(28

"The Swindler from Seoul." Time 110 (4 July 1977): 8-9.
"The Whiff of Scandal Strengthens." Economist 263
June 1977): 39-40.
"Waiting for Word
1977): 24-5.

from Carter."

FEER 95

(2

(25

February

"What Price Withdrawal?" FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 10-1.
"Well Hello Tongsun." Newsweek 91 (6 March 1978): 29-30.
"When Will the Brass Learn?" Nation 224 (4 June 1977):
676-7.
"Why Carter's Withdrawal Plan Draws Fire." USNWR 83 (6
June 1977): 18.
"Why Koreans Tried to Fix U.S. Congress." USNWR 84 (20
March 1978): 27-8.

289
Books
Abernathy, M. Glenn, Dilys M. Hill, and phil Williams,
eds. The carter Years; The President and Policy Making. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
Adcock, Edgar, Jr., Beverley McDonough, and Judy Redel,
eds. Who's Who In American Politics. 1989-1990. New York: R.R.
Bowker Company, 1989.
Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American
People.
New
York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Meredith
Corporation, 1969.
Barnds, William J., ed. Japan and the United States:
Challenges and Opportunities. New York: New York University
Press, 1979.
Barton, John H. The Politics of Peace: An Evaluation of
Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981.
Bitzer, Lloyds F., and Theodore Rueter. Carter vs. Ford:
The Counterfeit Debates of 1976. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1980.
Blechman, Barry M., ed. Rethinking the U.S. Strategic
Posture: A Report from the Aspen Consortium on Arms Control
and Security Issues. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1982.
Bonner, Raymond. Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses
and the Making of American Policy. New York: Times Books,
1987.

Braisted, William Reynolds. The United States Navy in the
Pacific. 1897-1909. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958.
Brown, Harold, Thinking About National Security: Defense
and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World. Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1983.
Brown, Seyom. The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change
in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the
National Security Adviser. 1977-1981. New York: Farrar-StrausGiroux, 1982.
Buss, Claude A. The United States and the Republic of
Korea: Background for Policy. Stanford, California: Hoover
Institution Press, 1984.

290
Carter, Jimmy. A Government as Good as Its People. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1977.
-------------. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President.
New York: Bantam Books, 1982.
The Blood of Abraham.

Boston:

Houghton

Mifflin, 1985.
------------- Why not the Best?, Nashville, Tennessee:
Broadman Press, 1975.
Carter, Rosalynn.
Houghton Mifflin, 1984.

First

Lady

from

Plains.

Boston:

Chomsky, Noam. Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the
Current Crisis and How We Got There. New York: Pantheon, 1982.
Clarke, Duncan L. The Politics of Arms Control: The Role
and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. New York: Free Press, 1979.
Collins, John M. U.S. Defense Plannina:
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982.

A Critique.

Curtis, Gerald L., and Sung Joo Han, eds. The u.s.-south
Korean Alliance: Evolving Patterns in Security Relations.
Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983.
Farley, Philip J., Stephens s. Kaplan, and William H.
Lewis. Arms Across the Sea. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1978.
Feinberg, Richard E. The Intemperate Zone: The Third
World Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: w. w.
Norton, 1983.
Fink, Gary M. Prelude to the Presidency: The Political
Character and Legislative Leadership Style of Governor Jimmy
Carter. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980.
Franck, Thomas M., and Edward Weisband. Foreign Policy
by Congress. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical
Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Gallup, George H. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 19721977. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1978.

291

Garthoff, Raymond L. Detente and Confrontation: AmericanSoviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1985.
Garvey, Gerald. Strategy and the Defense Dilemma: Nuclear
Politics and Alliance Politics. Lexington, Massachusetts:
Lexington Books, 1984.
Glad, Betty. Jimmy Carter. in Search of the Great White
House. New York: W.W. Norton, 1980.
Gray, Colin. Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The
American Experience. Lexington, University of Kentucky Press,
1982.

Haas, Ernst B. Global Evangelism Rides Again: How to
Protect Human Rights without Really Trying.
Berkeley,
California: Institute of International Studies, 1978.
Han, Sung Joo, ed. U.S. -Korea Security Coooeration:
Retrospects and Prospects. Proceedings of a Conference
Commemorating. the 30th Anniversary of the U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual
Defense Treaty. Seoul, Korea: Asiatic Research Center, Korea
University, 1983.
Hoffmann, Stanley. Primacy or World Order: American
Foreign Policy since the Cold War. New York: McGraw-Hill,
1978,
Hollick, Ann L. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the
Sea. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
Johansen, Robert c. Jimmy Carter's National Security
Policy: A World Order Critique. New York: Institute for World
Order, 1980.
Jordan, Amos A., and William J. Taylor, jr. American
National Security Policy and Process. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981.
Jordan, Hamilton. Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter
Presidency. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982.
Jordan, William J. Panama Odyssey. Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1984.
Joshua, Muravchik. The Uncertain crusade: Jimmy Carter
and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy. Lanham, Maryland:
Hamilton Press, 1986.
Kennan, George F. The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American
Relations in the Atomic Age. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982.

292
Klunk, Brian. Consensus and the American Mission: The
Credibility of Institutions. Policies and Leadership. Lanham,
Maryland: University Press of America, 1986.
Koo, Young Nok, and Sung Joo Han. The Foreign Policy of
the Republic of Korea. New York: Columbia University Press,
1985.
Krause, Sidney, ed. The Great Debates: carter vs. Ford.
1976. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.
Kwak, Tae Hwan, John Chay, Sun Sung Cho, and Shannon
McCune, eds. U.S.-Korean Relations 1882-1982. Seoul, Korea:
The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University
Press, 1982.
LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions: The United
States and Central America. New York: W.W. Norton, 1983.
---------------.
The Panama Canal:
The Crisis in
Historical Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press,
1978.
Lake, Anthony, ed. The Vietnam Legacy: The War. American
Society and the Future of American Foreign Policy. New York:
New York University Press, 1976.
Ledeen, Michael, and William Lewis. Debacle: The American
Failure in Iran. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981.
Lee, Suk Bok. The Impact of U. S • Forces in Korea.
Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987.
Lee, Yur Bok, and Wayne Patterson, eds. One Hundred Years
of Korean-American Relations.
1882-1982.
Alabama:
The
University of Alabama Press, 1986.
Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand strategy of the soviet
Union. New York: st. Martin's Press, 1983.
May, Ernest R. Lessons of the Past.
University Press, 1973.

New York:

Oxford

Moritz, Charles. Current Biography Year Book. New York:
The H. w. Wilson Company, 1969-73.
Murray, Douglas J., and Paul R. Viotti. The Defense
Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1982.

293

Nam, Joo Hong. America's Commitment to South Korea: The
First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine. London: Cambridge
University Press, 1986.
Neustadt, Richard E., and Ernest R. May. Thinking in
Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers. New York: The
Free Press, 1986.
Nye, Josephs., Jr., ed. The Making of America's soviet
Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.
oye, Kenneth A., Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber,
eds. Eagle Entangled: u.s. Foreign Policy in a Complex world.
New York: Longman, 1979.
Park, Young Kon, pub. Korea Annual 1978. Seoul, Korea:
The Hapdong News Agency, 1978-80.
Passin, Herbert, and Akira Iriye, eds. Encounter at
Shimoda: Search for a New Pacific Partnership. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1979.
Pechman, Joseph A., ed. Setting National Priorities: The
Washington, D. c.: The Brookings Institution,

1978 Budget.
1977.
1979

----------------------- Setting National Priori ties: The
Budget. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,

1978.

Pierre, Andrew J., ed. Arms Transfers and American
Foreign Policy. New York: New York University Press, 1979.
Potter, William c. Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation:
An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982.
Powel 1, Jody. The Other Side of the Story. New York:
William Morrow, 1984.
Prados, John. The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence
Analysis and Russian Military strength. New York: Dial, 1982.
Record, Jeffrey • =R=e'-"v-=i=-=s....i=-=n.a.g..__---""u. . . .-=s"""._--=M=1=-·=-l=i""'t=a=r..y_'""'s....t=-r=----a-t-e_.,g._y___:
Tailoring Means to Ends. Washington, D. c. : Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis, 1984.
Reilly, John E., ed. American Public Opinion and U.S.
Foreign Policy 1983. Chicago: The Chicago council on Foreign
Relations, 1983.

294

Roherty, James M., ed. Defense Policy Formation. Towards
Comparative Analysis. Durham: University of South Carolina,
Carolina Academic Press, 1980.
Rhee, Taek Hyung. US-ROK Combined Operations: A Korean
Perspective. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1986.
Rozell, Mark J. The Press and the Carter Presidency.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989.
Rubin, Barry, and Elizabeth P. Spiro, eds. Human Rights
and U.S. Foreign Policy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1979.

Sanders, Jerry W. Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on
the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment. Boston:
South End Press, 1983.
Shevchenko, Arkady N.
Alfred A. Knopf, 1985.

Breaking with Moscow.

New York:

Shoup, Laurence H. The Carter Presidency and Beyond:
Power and Politics in the 1980s. Palo Alto, California: The
Ramparts Press, 1980.
Sick, Gary. All Fall down: America's Tragic Encounter
with Iran. New York: Random House, 1985.
Smith, Gaddis. Morality. Reason. and Power: American
Diplomacy in the Carter Years. New York: Hill and Wang, 1986.
Starr, John Bryan,
ed.
The Future of u.s.-china
Relations, New York: New York University Press, 1981.
Stroud, Kandy. How Jimmy Won: The Victory Campaign from
Plains to the White House. New York: William Morrow and
Company, 1977.
Talbott, Strobe. Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II.
New York: Harper and Row, 1979.
Tierney, John, Jr., ed. About Face: The China Decision
and Its Conseguences. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House,
1979.

Thompson,
Margaret C. , ed. President Carter. 19 7 7 :
Timely Reports to Keep Journalists. Scholars and the Public
Abreast of Developing Issues. Events and Trends. Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1977-80.

295
Turner, Robert L., comp. I'll Never lie to You: Jimmy
Carter in His own Words. New York: Ballantine Books, 1976.
Turner, Stansfield. Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in
Transition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985.
Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's
Foreign Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.
Vogelgesang, Sandy. American Dream. Global Nightmare: The
Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy. New York: w. w. Norton,
1980.
Westmoreland, William c. A Soldier Reports. Garden City,
New York: Doubleday and Company, 1976.
Wooten, James T. Dasher: The Roots and the Rising of
Jimmy Carter. New York: Summit Books, 1978.

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Tae Hwan Ok has been read and
approved by the following committee:
Dr. Theodore J. Karamanski, Director
Associate Professor, History, Loyola
Dr. Sheldon s. Cohen
Professor, History, Loyola
Dr. Mark A. Allee
Assistant Professor, History, Loyola
The final copies have been examined by the director of the
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies
the fact any necessary changes have been incorporated and that
the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee
with reference to content and form.
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Da'te

j

Signature

